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ABSTRACT 
All countries that have adopted Goods and Services Tax (GST) or Value Added Tax 
(VAT) employ a ‘change-in-use’ mechanism to distinguish consumption from the 
stages of production and distribution. New Zealand’s former change-in-use rules 
were unique. Unlike the ‘use’ based apportionment approaches employed in 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, New Zealand employed an adjustment 
approach that utilised a ‘principal purpose’ test and deemed supply mechanism. 
While Canada has also employed an adjustment approach for capital property, the 
New Zealand rules have operated differently to those in Canada. In response to 
criticism for being overly complex and confusing, the New Zealand change-in-use 
rules will adopt a new ‘use’ based apportionment approach, together with a new 
mechanism to constrain the number of adjustments, from 1 April 2011 for a number 
of taxpayers. Applying criteria identified by the Tax Working Group the performance 
of New Zealand’s change-in-use rules are examined, in comparison to those applied 
in Australia and Canada. In addition, the comparative readability of the change-in-
use provisions in all three jurisdictions is examined. The paper concludes that New 
Zealand should adopt an apportionment approach and that the Goods and Services 
Tax Act should be rewritten for improved readability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography 
and appendices) comprises approximately 50,000 words. 
Taxation – Indirect tax – Change-in-use  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION * 
“… there is very little published empirical research and analysis of our laws and their 
administration. It is much easier to rely on intellect and to engage in intuitive reasoning in 
drawing conclusions, rather than to get out on the ground and try to ascertain what happens 
in practice and to explore the costs and benefits of legal rules and administration approaches. 
But empirical analysis is important. It is crucial in any public policy development.”  
~ Sir Ivor Richardson 1 
A. The Change-in-Use Rules 
Goods and services tax (GST) is a broad based tax on consumption and every 
business in Australia, Canada, or New Zealand is either involved in its payment or 
collection (using a credit-offset system). In order that tax is ultimately imposed only 
on end consumption, GST legislation provides a mechanism to distinguish 
consumption (use for private purposes) from the stages of production and 
distribution (use for business purposes). This mechanism (known broadly as the 
change-in-use rules) plays a crucial role in ensuring tax is collected on private 
consumption. 
In New Zealand, the change-in-use mechanism from the inception of the GST in 
1986 to April 2011 has adopted an adjustment approach that utilises a “principal 
purpose” test for entitlement to input tax credits and a deemed supply mechanism for 
adjustments (hereafter referred to as an “adjustment approach”). In contrast, 
Australia has always used an apportionment approach for entitlement to input tax 
credits that has expressly capped the number of adjustments that can be made.2 In 
Canada, the GST change-in-use mechanism has utilised both the adjustment and 
apportionment approaches, depending on the nature of the goods or services.  
                                               
*
  I wish to thank and acknowledge the immense contribution of Dr David White for his unwavering 
guidance and support in the preparation of this thesis. I would also like to thank Prof Adrian Sawyer 
for his valuable comments on early drafts of Chapter 4 (Removing Drafting Style and Structure from 
the Policy Debate) and David Sherman for his early guidance on Canadian GST in the formulation of 
Chapter 3 (The Canadian Experience). Finally, I would like to thank Thomson Reuters Carswell for 
access to Canadian tax resources during the course of this research. Of course all opinions and 
mistakes are those of the author. 
1
  ILM Richardson “Launch of Journals by Sir Ivor Richardson” (1995) 1 New Zealand Journal of 
Taxation Law and Policy 196 at 199. 
2
  As discussed in Chapter 1 (The New Zealand Experience), New Zealand has embarked on adopting 
an apportionment approach from 1 April 2011 (subject to transitional measures) that is modelled on 
the Australian rules. 
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B. Thesis Parameters 
Thesis methodology 
In response to Sir Ivor Richardson’s call for greater empirical research in the field of 
taxation,3 and Dickson & White’s observations that “there has been little research on 
GST, particularly of an empirical nature”,4 this thesis has undertaken an empirical 
approach in determining whether New Zealand should adopt an apportionment 
approach (rather than an adjustment approach) to account for changes-in-use.  
To determine whether New Zealand should abandon an adjustment approach and 
adopt an apportionment approach, I have employed the criteria identified by the Tax 
Working Group as important in determining good tax design (ie, efficiency, equity, 
revenue adequacy, integrity, coherence, and simplicity).5 Evidence to support the 
thesis is obtained from examining and comparing the relative experiences of 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in applying the adjustment or apportionment 
approaches. 
In order to determine the extent to which the respective approaches have fulfilled the 
tax policy criteria, the thesis has adopted an empirical approach that has examined 
the administration, legal outcomes, and public reaction to the respective rules as a 
proxy for efficiency and compliance. Accordingly, the Australian, Canadian, and 
New Zealand chapters are divided into two parts. The first part provides an overview 
of the respective rules and the second part examines the empirical evidence of the 
respective rules application. Concluding observations are then provided. 
                                               
3
  ILM Richardson “Launch of Journals by Sir Ivor Richardson” (1995) 1 New Zealand Journal of 
Taxation Law and Policy 196 at 199. 
4
  I Dickson and D White “Value-Added Tax and Excises: Commentary” in Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(ed) Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review (Institute for Fiscal Studies, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010) 387 at 388. Document available at 
<www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/dimensions/ch4.pdf> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
5
  Victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group A Tax System for New Zealand’s Future: 
Report of the VUW Tax Working Group (Centre for Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research, 
VUW, Wellington, January 2010). See also C Scott and H Davis The Gist of GST: A Briefing on the 
Goods and Services Tax (VUW Press, Wellington, 1985) ch 4, and H Davis The New Zealand Goods 
and Services Tax 1985: An Interpretation, Comparison and Evaluation (VUW, LLM Thesis, 1986).  
 3 
The thesis has restricted a comparative analysis of other jurisdictions to Australia 
and Canada. Australia was selected on the basis of economic and geographic 
proximity, and the opportunity for harmonisation of GST rules between New 
Zealand and Australia.6 Canada was selected on the basis that it provided not only an 
additional jurisdictional comparison of an apportionment approach, but that it also 
provided a unique opportunity to compare the relative success of both approaches 
operating within a single jurisdiction at the same time.  
An examination of the respective jurisdictions also highlighted the differences in 
drafting styles. This raised an important question about whether drafting style had 
influenced the respective experiences of the GST change-in-use rules in each 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the legislative provisions containing the change-in-use 
rules in each jurisdiction were measured for readability. Significantly this study also 
provides, for the first time, an assessment of the readability of the entire New 
Zealand GST Act (attached as an Appendix to this thesis). 
The hypothesis adopted for this thesis when it was started in February 2010 was that 
New Zealand should adopt an apportionment approach. In a fortunate coincidence, 
this thesis has received an implied endorsement from the New Zealand Parliament, 
who in December 2010 enacted legislation that has replaced the adjustment rules, 
with new rules that adopt the apportionment approach.  
From 1 April 2016, New Zealand will have finally abandoned its use of an 
adjustment mechanism in favour of new apportionment rules, borrowed to a large 
extent from Australia. For a number of taxpayers who decide not to take advantage 
of the 5-year transitional period the journey will begin from 1 April 2011. For many 
taxpayers the changes are well over due. 
Thesis structure 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter examines the New Zealand 
experience. The chapter provides an overview of the former adjustment rules and 
                                               
6
  This selection has been validated by New Zealand’s recent adoption of apportionment rules that are 
modelled on the Australian apportionment rules located in Division 129 of the GST Act (Aust). See 
discussion in Chapter 2 (The Australian Experience) of this paper. 
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examines the empirical evidence of their application and the inherent problems they 
have attempted to over-come. The chapter also provides an overview of the new 
apportionment rules and outlines some of the key differences the rules provide in 
comparison to both the former New Zealand adjustment rules and the Australian 
apportionment rules, which they are modelled upon.  
The second chapter examines the Australian experience. The chapter provides an 
overview of Australia’s apportionment rules and examines whether empirical 
evidence supports the conclusion that an apportionment approach is a better GST 
design than New Zealand’s former adjustment approach. The chapter also reviews 
proposed reforms of apparent deficiencies in the Australian rules and whether any 
reform proposals should be adopted in New Zealand (if they have not been already).  
The third chapter examines the Canadian experience. Unlike New Zealand or 
Australia, Canada has adopted both an apportionment and adjustment approach in its 
GST change-of-use rules. The chapter provides an overview of the rules for each 
approach (which are distinct from both the New Zealand and Australian rules) and 
examines whether the evidence indicates which approach has performed better.  
The fourth chapter examines the different drafting styles of the respective 
jurisdiction. It examines the readability of the respective change-in-use provisions 
and whether the readability of the provisions has influenced the relative outcomes of 
each approach.  
Finally, the fifth chapter draws the strings together and makes a number of 
comparative observations and conclusions. 
Before jumping straight into an examination of each jurisdiction it is also worthwhile 
outlining the criteria this thesis is using in its evaluation and how GST worked in 
New Zealand under the former adjustment rules —and generally elsewhere in the 
world.  
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C. Evaluating Performance 
How do we judge a good or bad tax rule? According to the Mirrlees Review,7 the 
answer provided by seeing how it stacks up against a check list of desirable 
properties. The most famous checklist of desirable properties are those described by 
Adam Smith in 1776.8 These four canons of good tax design (equity, certainty, 
convenience; and economy), 9 or in some instances reduced to the “essential” three 
cannons (equity, simplicity, and efficiency),10 have been applied in numerous studies 
to evaluate and compare tax rules.11 As Davis acknowledged, “precisely which 
criteria are adopted and the weighting they are given depends on the question being 
answered”.12  
                                               
7
  Institute for Fiscal Studies and Mirrlees J, et al (eds) Tax by Design: Mirrlees Review vol 2, ch 2 
(draft) 2 at [2.1.1]. Document available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesReview/design (viewed 20 
March 2011). Final publication expected in Spring 2011 by Oxford University Press. 
8
  A Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Methuen & Co Ltd, 
London, 1776). Document available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html (viewed 20 
March 2011). An excellent summary of the principles can be found in C Alley and D Bentley “A 
Remodelling of Adam Smith’s Tax Design Principles” (2005) 20 Australian Tax Forum 579 at 586-
588 and A Sawyer “Regulatory Impact Statements and Accountability: Recent Australasian 
Experience”(2008) 11 Journal of Australian Taxation 42 at 61-63. 
9
  In the language of modern economics, Smith’s concept of “convenience” is described as the concept 
of “administrative simplicity” or “compliance” and the concept of “economy” is better know as the 
concept of “efficiency” or “neutrality”.  
10
 The modern principle of simplicity is based on Smith's certainty and convenience maxims and seeks 
to minimise the administrative and compliance costs incurred in raising a given level of tax revenue. 
The economic literature on tax compliance is substantial. For example: CT Sandford (ed) Tax 
Compliance Costs Measurement and Policy (Fiscal Publications, Bath, 1995); and C Evans, J Pope 
and J Hasseldine (eds) Tax Compliance Costs: A Festschrift for Cedric Sandford (Prospect Media Pty 
Ltd, Sydney, 2001). 
11
 A Dixon “Risk-Free Return Method — Out of the Frying Pan and Into the Fire” (2003) 9 New 
Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 329; S Ross and P Burgess Income Tax: A Critical 
Analysis (2nd ed, Sydney, Law Book Company, 1996) 25; M Dirkis “Accidents of History - 
Australia's Residency Rules for Individuals” (1997) 3 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and 
Policy 108; H Davis The New Zealand Goods and Services Tax 1985: An Interpretation, Comparison 
and Evaluation (VUW, LLM Thesis, 1986) 4; Australian Tax System, Draft White Paper (AGPS, 
Canberra, 1985) 14; R McLeod Tax Review – Issues Paper (IRD, Wellington, June 2001) 5; and R 
McLeod Tax Review – Final Report (IRD, Wellington, October 2001) 19. The 2001 Tax Review 
(across both reports) recognised that good tax design should be guided by five principles: growth (ie, 
enhancing economic well being), administrative efficiency (ie, reducing cost of imposing tax), 
fairness (ie, that people should be treated similarly), equity (ie, people should be able to contribute in 
accordance with their ability to pay), and revenue integrity (ie, continuing to raise sufficient revenue). 
12
 H Davis The New Zealand Goods and Services Tax 1985: An Interpretation, Comparison and 
Evaluation (VUW, LLM Thesis, 1986) 4. 
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In 2010, the Tax Working Group identified six principles that should guide the 
design of a good tax system.13 These principles were identified as: efficiency (and 
growth), equity (and fairness), revenue integrity, revenue adequacy (or fiscal cost), 
administrative simplicity (or compliance), and coherence.14  
As this is the most recent New Zealand guidance on good tax design principles, I 
have selected five of the most appropriate principles,15 plus the principles of 
“visibility” (used by Scott & Davies in their evaluation of the GST Act),16 and 
“predictability” (identified in the Meade Report),17 are used in this study as the 
criteria for evaluating the performance of the change-in-use rules in Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand. The seven criteria are explained below. As the Tax 
Working Group acknowledged “value judgements are necessary to determine the 
priorities and respective weighting of these objectives”.18 However, weighting will 
also be dependent on the question being asked.  
                                               
13
 Victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group A Tax System for New Zealand’s Future 
(Centre for Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research, Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington, January 2010) 15.  
14
 Victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group Second Session Summary (31 July 2009). 
Document available at 
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/cagtr/twg/Publications/SecondSession_Summary.pdf (viewed 20 
March 2011).  
15
 The principle of revenue adequacy (or fiscal cost) has been excluded on the basis it is a macro-
economic criteria and not appropriate for measuring the performance of legislative rules. The revenue 
adequacy principle also overlaps with the principles of revenue integrity, administrative simplicity, 
and efficiency. The principle of revenue adequacy requires that tax reforms are affordable given fiscal 
constraints and raise sufficient revenue for government spending. A tax reform that places 
government spending at risk and is outside fiscal constraints does not have revenue adequacy.  
16
 C Scott and H Davies The Gist of GST: A Briefing on the Goods and Services Tax (VUW Press, 
Wellington, 1985) 28-29. Scott & Davies identified four criteria to evaluate tax policy design. These 
were: economic efficiency (or neutrality), equity, administrative simplicity (or compliance) and 
visibility. 
17
 JE Meade The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation: Report of a Committee chaired by Prof JE 
Meade (The Institute for Fiscal Studies, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1978) ch 2, 7. Document 
available from http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/meade.pdf (viewed 20 March 2011). The Meade Report 
outlined six desirable characteristics of a tax system: incentives and economic efficiency; 
distributional effects; international aspects; simplicity and costs of administration and compliance; 
flexibility and stability; and transitional problems. 
18
 Victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group A Tax System for New Zealand’s Future 
(Centre for Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research, Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington, January 2010) 56. 
 7 
Administrative simplicity and compliance 
The principle of administrative simplicity (also known as administrative efficiency) 
is concerned with the compliance costs for taxpayers and administration costs for 
revenue authorities. A tax rule should be simple and inexpensive for taxpayers to 
comply with and for the revenue authority to administer and enforce. Tax rules that 
have high litigation activity, require high audit function, or require ongoing 
recalculation and tracking, would be considered to have high compliance costs. 
Efficiency and growth 
Tax policy (and its implementation as statutory rules) should avoid distorting 
economic decisions or choices in relation to the use or consumption of resources (eg, 
creating biases towards one form of activity over another) and should not impose 
heavy costs on taxpayers making decisions.19 If a tax rule achieves this outcome it is 
considered efficient. In this sense, efficiency is synonymous with neutrality.20 If a 
particular approach to the GST change-in-use issue creates uncertainty with 
individuals avoiding investment or organising their business in a less optimal way, or 
it requires extensive opinion writing by professional tax advisors and litigation, the 
approach might be considered inefficient. 
Equity and fairness 
Equity is synonymous with fairness and the terms are used inter-changeably.21 The 
concept also includes spatial qualities (ie, immediate and long term).22 The 2001 Tax 
                                               
19
 Victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group A Tax System for New Zealand’s Future 
(Centre for Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research, Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington, January 2010) 15. 
20
 H Davis The New Zealand Goods and Services Tax 1985: An Interpretation, Comparison and 
Evaluation (VUW, LLM Thesis, 1986) 4 at [1.1]. Efficiency or neutrality is the modern economic 
terminology for Smith’s principle of “economy”. 
21
 Davis suggests they are the same concept and that “equity is fairness”. See H Davis The New Zealand 
Goods and Services Tax 1985: An Interpretation, Comparison and Evaluation (VUW, LLM Thesis, 
1986) 5 at [1.2]. 
22
 Victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group, A Tax System for New Zealand’s Future 
(Centre for Accounting, Governance and Taxation Research, Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington, January 2010) 15. 
 8
Review Issues Paper acknowledged the concepts were inherently subjective and 
identified four principles of fairness: the ability to pay (ie, vertical equity); even 
handedness (ie, horizontal equity); user pays (ie, the benefit principle); and 
transitional fairness (ie, transparency).23 The Mirrlees Review also highlighted the 
need for procedural “transparency” and “fairness” in good tax design.24  
Horizontal equity requires the equal treatment of equals (ie, taxpayers with the same 
capacity should contribute the same and have the same tax liabilities). In contrast, 
vertical equity requires the unequal treatment of unequals (ie, that taxpayers with a 
greater ability to pay should contribute more and have larger tax liabilities). The 
benefit principle seeks to align individual benefits from tax expenditure with 
individual tax liability (or revenue) and focuses on tax-expenditure policy rather than 
tax-revenue policy. Transparency requires that tax rules should be known before they 
can be applied. For example, tax reform should not be retrospective or sprung upon 
taxpayers without prior consultation. Tax rules that are not clearly understood before 
implementation cannot be considered transparent and therefore would be unfair.Tax 
rules that treat taxpayers differently or inconsistently are not considered fair. A rule 
that creates higher compliance costs (ie, litigation costs) than other rules would be 
inequitable. 
Coherence 
The principle of coherence requires a holistic view of the tax system. A tax policy 
should make sense in the context of the entire tax system and not merely in isolation. 
The Meade Report observed that “a tax system cannot be simple and easy to 
understand unless it makes a coherent whole”.25 For example, a tax rule that does not 
function consistently with the underlying policy intent of the broader legislation 
would be considered incoherent.  
                                               
23
 R McLeod Tax Review – Issues Paper (IRD, Wellington, June 2001) 8.  
24
 Institute for Fiscal Studies and Mirrlees J, et al (eds) Tax by Design: Mirrlees Review vol 2, ch 2 
(draft) 6-9. A tax system will command respect and be complied with if it delivers outcomes that are 
perceived as fair. Tax systems that impose unexpected or excessive burdens on taxpayers will be 
considered unfair. Hence, tax systems that are reliant on self-assessment will require fairness. 
25
 JE Meade The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation: Report of a Committee chaired by Prof JE 
Meade (The Institute for Fiscal Studies, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1978) 19. 
 9 
Predictability 
According to the Mirrlees Review,26 the Meade Report,27 proposed a new principle 
of “predictability” reflecting the “structural aspects of tax rules”. According to the 
Meade Report, “there is a clear need for a certain stability in taxation in order that 
persons may be in a position to make reasonably far-sighted plans”.28 A tax rule 
should be certain and predictable.29  
Revenue integrity  
According to the Tax Working Group, the tax system should be sustainable over 
time, minimise opportunities for tax avoidance and arbitrage, and provide a 
sustainable revenue base for government. The principle of revenue integrity requires 
that tax rules protect the revenue base. A tax rule that does not achieve these goals 
does not have revenue integrity. 
Visibility 
The principle of visibility is related to the principle of neutrality,30 and similar to the 
concept of transparency (but distinct from the principle of predictability and 
coherence). According to Scott & Davis,31 visibility requires that the participants are 
                                               
26
 Institute for Fiscal Studies and Mirrlees J, et al (eds) Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review vol 2, ch 2 
(draft) 2 at [2.1.1]. According to Mirrlees the Meade Report included the principle of “predictability”. 
The concept of “predictability” would appear to be another aspect of “certainty”, albeit a procedural 
one, rather than one directed at determining tax liability. JE Meade The Structure and Reform of 
Direct Taxation: Report of a Committee chaired by Prof JE Meade (The Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
George Allen & Unwin, London, 1978) ch 2, 19. Document available at 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/meade.pdf (viewed 20 March 2011)  
27
 JE Meade The Structure & Reform of Direct Taxation: Report of a Committee Chaired by Prof JE 
Meade (The Institute for Fiscal Studies, Allen and Unwin, London and Boston, 1978). 
28
 JE Meade The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation: Report of a Committee chaired by Prof JE 
Meade (The Institute for Fiscal Studies, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1978) 21. 
29
 This principle has striking similarities to Hayek’s principle of predictability in the rule of law: F 
Hayek Rules and Order: Legislation and Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 1973) vol 1. 
30
 C Scott and H Davies The Gist of GST: A Briefing on the Goods and Services Tax (VUW Press, 1985) 
28. 
31
 C Scott and H Davies The Gist of GST: A Briefing on the Goods and Services Tax (VUW Press, 1985) 
29-30. 
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aware of the tax consequences of their economic decisions. According to Davis, “if 
the tax system is visible to taxpayers who receive the benefit of government 
expenditure they will be able to weigh up the costs and benefits”.32 A similar 
observation was made in the Meade Report,33 which stated that “the taxpayer should, 
as far as possible, be able to not only see clearly what is to be taxed, but also to 
understand the purpose which it is intended to serve”. Tax rules that are not clearly 
understood or confusing after implementation cannot be considered visible and 
therefore would be unfair.  
D. The United Kingdom Experience 
Unfortunately a comparative analysis of the United Kingdom (UK) VAT system 
could not be included in this thesis due to several reasons. First, the constraint of 
size, has meant that only a few jurisdictions that adopted an apportionment approach 
could be examined in sufficient detail from a comparative perspective. Secondly, it 
would appear that the New Zealand system, has from its outset, intentionally avoided 
importing elements of the United Kingdom VAT system. Thirdly, the United 
Kingdom VAT system has been heavily influenced by European directives and is 
very different from the model first used as a draft GST Act in the New Zealand 
White paper.34 Finally, it would appear that Australia, rather than the United 
Kingdom, is the model for an apportionment approach in New Zealand. Accordingly, 
Australia provides a stronger case for comparative examination than the United 
Kingdom. However, this is not to suggest that the United Kingdom VAT system is 
not capable of influencing the development of apportionment in New Zealand (or 
Australia). In fact, submissions on the introduction of the new apportionment rules in 
New Zealand raised a number of concerns from United Kingdom precedents. For 
that reason a brief examination of the United Kingdom adjustment rules has been 
included.  
                                               
32
 H Davis The New Zealand Goods and Services Tax 1985: An Interpretation, Comparison and 
Evaluation (VUW, LLM Thesis, 1986) 6 at [1.4]. 
33
 JE Meade The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation: Report of a Committee chaired by Prof JE 
Meade (The Institute for Fiscal Studies, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1978) 19. 
34
 EC Directives set the boundaries within which a member state must construct its VAT laws so that 
VAT legislation of a member state is subordinate to EC Directives. 
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The United Kingdom VAT apportionment rules are spread throughout the VAT 
Act35 and subordinate regulations. The United Kingdom Revenue Authority 
(HMRC) expands on the operation of the apportionment rules through VAT 
Notices.36 In the United Kingdom, VAT is apportioned where goods or services are 
“used or to be used” partly for taxable (ie, business) purposes and partly for non-
taxable (ie, non-business or private) purposes, so that only the part that is directly 
attributable to the business purpose is counted as input tax.37  
Generally, VAT is apportioned at the outset, and accounted for in the period in 
which the VAT became chargeable.38 However, the United Kingdom also recognises 
an alternative treatment known as the Lennartz approach (or mechanism) which is 
derived from an interpretation of the European Unions’s Sixth Directive, which the 
United Kingdom VAT Act is subject to.39 Article 17(2) of the Sixth Directive 
requires that acquisitions of goods and services be “used for the purposes of … 
taxable transactions” before the right to deduct arises.40  
The Lennartz approach provides that taxpayers may treat the VAT that they incur as 
fully recoverable from the outset.41 This approach derives from Lennartz v Finanznt 
Munchen III,42 where the court held that where a taxpayer acquires goods and uses 
them partly for business purposes and partly for private or non-business purposes 
                                               
35
 Value Added Tax Act 1994 (UK). 
36
 VAT Notices are similar to public rulings. 
37
 Value Added Tax Act 1994 (UK), s 24(5) and reg 101(2) Value Added Tax Regulations (1995/2518). 
38
 Value Added Tax Act 1994 (UK), Schedule 4 at cl 5(4) Reg 4 Value Added Tax Regulations 
(1995/2518 and 1997/1086). For goods supplied in the UK, the suppliers tax point; for goods acquired 
in another EC country the acquisition date; for imported goods outside the EC, the date of 
importation; and goods removed from customs, the date of removal. 
39
 Value Added Tax 2006-07 (Tottel Publishing Ltd, London, 2006) 130 [4.56]. 
40
 The courts have given the phrase a narrow interpretation so as to require “a direct and immediate 
link” between the acquisition and taxable supply: Midland Bank Plc v Customs & Excise 
Commissioners CJEC Case C-98/98; [2000] STC 501 and Customs & Excise Commissioners v 
Southern Primary Housing Ltd 2003 [2004] STC 209 (CA). 
41
 A similar entitlement to full input tax credits is available under New Zealand’s former “principal 
purpose” test.  
42
 Lennartz v Finanznt Munchen III, CJEC Case C-97/90, [1995] STC 514. 
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they have the right to total and immediate input tax credits. In Seeling v Finanzant 
Starnberg,43 the Lennartz approach was extended to construction services.44 The 
taxpayer must then account for output tax on private or non-business use at the end 
of each subsequent taxable period.  
The United Kingdom legislation does not provide any de minimis rules for 
insignificant adjustments.45 The UK legislation also does not directly provide a 
mechanism that limits the number of adjustments. However, the HMRC, in applying 
the Lennartz approach to immovable property, calculate output tax credits over a 20-
year period using a straight-line depreciation method. For movable property (eg, 
computers) a 5-year period using a straight-line depreciation method is applied. Once 
the goods have been written off, no further output tax is payable.46 
The United Kingdom VAT legislation does not prescribe any particular method of 
apportionment, instead the regulations merely requires that the method adopted must 
be fair and reasonable (eg, fixed percentage methods, income or revenue methods, 
expenditure or cost methods, time or space methods, or transaction history 
methods).47 In practice, the HMRC officers will only challenge an apportionment 
that is completely outside the range of acceptable apportionment methods.48  
 
 
                                               
43
 Seeling v Finanzant Starnberg, CJEC Case C-269/00, [2003] STC 805. A married couple purchased a 
holiday bungalow intending to use it 87.5 per cent for business letting and 12.5 per cent for private 
use and claimed a 100 per cent input tax credit. The court held the taxpayer had the right to treat all 
VAT as input tax when they purchase capital goods for mixed purposes and allocate the goods wholly 
to their business: Tolley’s Value Added Tax 2007 (1st ed, Lexis Nexis Ltd, London, 2007) 740 
[35.7(3)]. 
44
 According to Tolley’s, the UK Revenue Authority’s attempts to restrict the Lennartz approach “in 
order to protect the revenue base]” were held to be ultra vires: Charles & Charles-Tijems v 
Staatssecretaries van Financien, CJEC, Case C-434/03, [2006] STC 1,429.  
45
 Tolley’s Value Added Tax 2007, (1st ed, Lexis Nexis Ltd, London, 2007) 738 at [35.7(2)].  
46
 Value Added Tax 2006-07 (Tottel Publishing Ltd, London, 2006) 246 at [13.37]. 
47
 VAT Notice 706 at [6.6]. 
48
 Tolley’s Value Added Tax 2007, (1st ed, Lexis Nexis Ltd, London, 2007) 737 at [35.7(2)]. This is a 
similar to the approach adopted in Canada. 
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E. A Brief Overview of How GST Works in New Zealand 
Before examining the respective change-in-use rules it is important to understand 
how those rules fit within the general framework of a Goods and Services Tax 
(“GST”) in New Zealand. GST is a value added tax (“VAT”). New Zealand’s GST 
system is a broad based indirect consumption tax.49 It is recognised internationally 
for its simplicity and comprehensiveness.50  
GST is charged on imported goods, as well as any supplies made by a registered 
person. The current rate of GST is 15 per cent.51 Any person carrying on a taxable 
activity can register for GST. A person can either voluntarily register for GST, or be 
deemed to be registered if their taxable activity for the year exceeds the specified 
threshold (currently $60,000). Figure 5 illustrates how GST generally operates.  
A taxable activity is an activity that is carried on continuously or regularly and 
involves or is intended to involve the supply of goods or services to other persons for 
consideration.52 For a supply to be liable for GST it must be made in New Zealand 
by a registered person in the course or furtherance of a taxable activity (and not be 
exempt).  
Output and input tax is accounted for using three different methods: payments basis, 
invoice basis, or hybrid basis. The invoice basis is the default method.53  
 
                                               
49
 GST is designed to be administratively simple to collect and account for. In the context of fairness 
and equity, it is difficult for taxpayers to escape paying it. 
50
 C Alley, et al New Zealand Taxation (Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2009) 888. However, it has become 
apparent that not all parts of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 are as straightforward as initially 
perceived. The adjustment rules in particular have been the subject of extensive litigation, judicial 
criticism, and regular review. 
51
 Before 1 October 2010 it was 12.5 per cent. When the GST Act was first enacted the rate was 10 per 
cent. 
52
 The test for a taxable activity is similar to the business test in the Income Tax Act (ITA) and certainly 
has used existing ITA case law. But unlike the Income Tax Act business test there is no requirement 
for the activity to be carried out for profit. 
53
 The payments basis can only be used by registered persons whose annual taxable activity does not 
exceed 2 million. The hybrid basis allows a combination of both: sales (output tax) using the invoice 
basis, and purchases (input tax) using the payments basis. 
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Figure 5: How GST Works (using 15 per cent GST rate) 
Foreign supplier
Manufacturer
(GST registered)
Customs ServiceInland Revenue
Retailer
(GST registered)
Customer
(not registered)
Foreign Customer
(not registered)
Rest of World
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Raw Materials
$1,000
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$2,000+$300
$2,300
Goods
$3,000+$450
$3,450
$300
output tax
$450
output tax
$150
input tax
$300
input tax
$150 GST
Goods
(zero rated)
$3,000
 
Source: Alley C, et al New Zealand Taxation (Brookers Ltd, 2009) 892 (Fig 19.1). 
GST operates on a credit off-set basis (illustrated in Figure 6).54 Registered persons 
both pay (output tax) and claim back (input tax) GST. Registered persons are 
expected to furnish returns at the end of their taxable period.55 The normal taxable 
period is 2 months.56 The amount (if any) payable to IRD at the end of the registered 
persons taxable period is the difference between input and outpu tax.  
GST output tax is charged on the supply of goods and services by a registered person 
in the course or furtherance of a taxable activity. GST incurred by that registered 
                                               
54
 This is in contrast to Retail Sales Tax (RST) which has a cumulative effect at each stage of production 
and distribution. See C Scott and H Davis The Gist of GST: A Briefing on the Goods and Services Tax 
(VUW Press, Wellington, 1985).  
55
 There are three taxable period options: 1-month, 2-months, and 6-months. 
56
 As with registration there are thresholds. Anyone can elect to use a 1-month period. Any annual 
taxable activity exceeding $24 million must use a 1-month taxable period. If annual taxable activity is 
less than $500,000 the registered person can elect to use a 6-month period.  
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person on goods and services that are attributable to making taxable supplies may be 
claimed as input tax against this output tax.57 As discussed above, goods or service 
acquired for application in the taxable activity may be re-directed to other non-
business activities (ie, a change-in-use). In such circumstances a change-in-use 
mechanism will be required to ensure the registered person is not over or under 
taxed.  
Figure 6: How GST Works: Input and Output Flow (using 15 per cent GST rate) 
Producer
Manufacturer
Wholesaler
Retailer
Consumer
Goods
Goods
Goods
Goods
Input tax 
credit
Input tax 
credit
Input tax 
credit
$1.50
$3.00
$6.00 $80.00
$40.00
$20.00
$10.00
$11.50
Output tax
Output tax
Output tax
Output tax
$23.00
$3.00
$6.00
$12.00
$46.00
$92.00
$1.50
The output tax is the GST collected by the supplier on supplies made and the input tax is the 
GST paid by the supplier on supplies received.
 
Source: Deloitte NZSA Educational Tax Course – GST (Continuing Education Paper, March 1994) at [B2]. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
57
 Before 1 April 2011, attribution was determined by a “principal purpose” test. From 1 April 2011, 
attribution is determined by “use” (subject to transitional period ending 1 April 2016). 
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I. THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE  
“The wording governing the question of whether and to what extent the input tax relating to 
a particular item of expenditure is deductible must be clear enough to withstand word by 
word dissection by the courts, for this is bound to be an area of conflict between registered 
persons and the Inland Revenue Department.” (emphasis added)1 
A. Introduction 
New Zealand’s GST system is widely considered the international model for 
VAT\GST systems.2 Twenty five years after the introduction and commencement of 
New Zealand’s GST Act, New Zealand will finally replace the former change-in-use 
rules, which apply an adjustment approach (utilising a “principal purpose” test and 
deemed supply mechanism), with an apportionment approach (employing a “use” 
test and value based tracking mechanism). This is a marked and welcome u-turn in 
policy direction from the 1999 GST Review3 and 2008 Issues Paper4 — which both 
expressly declined to implement an apportionment approach.  
The new apportionment approach also comes ten years after the adjustment 
provisions were last revised (in order to incorporate legislative guidance on 
measurement and calculation methodology), and five years after the Court of 
                                               
1
  Peat Marwick Submissions on the Goods and Services Tax Bill 1985 (25 September 1985) 3 at [1.2] 
(Finance and Expenditure Committee file number FE/85/307, 262W). 
2
  Institute for Fiscal Studies (eds) Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review (Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 388. Document available at 
<www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/dimensions/ch4.pdf> (viewed 20 March 2011). See also Krever R 
and White D (eds) GST in Retrospect and Prospect (Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2007) viii. 
3
  B Birch and B English GST: A Review – A Government Discussion Document (Policy Advice 
Division, IRD, Wellington, March 1999). Document available at 
<http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/1999-dd-gst-review/overview> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
4
  Policy Advice Division and Treasury Options for Strengthening GST Neutrality in Business-to-
Business Transactions: An Officials' Issues Paper (IRD, Wellington, June 2008). Document available 
at <http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/2008-ip-gst-b2b-neutrality/overview> (viewed 20 March 
2011). 
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Appeal’s attempt in CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd5 to provide 
clear guidelines on the calculation of adjustments.6  
The adjustment rules were until 2011 the source of substantial litigation and ongoing 
uncertainty. The adoption of a new apportionment approach and calculation 
methodology not only utilises a widely applied adjustment approach that is used by 
many international jurisdictions, but also better aligns itself to rules (in particular the 
calculation methodology rules) that are already well established in Australia.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part provides a brief overview of the 
adjustment rules and attempts to provide a conceptual picture of how elements of the 
rules have developed. Part two examines a number of the issues experienced with the 
application and interpretation of the former adjustment rules and provides empirical 
evidence that the rules have a number of ongoing conceptual problems that have not 
withstood judicial dissection very well. Part three provides a brief overview of the 
new apportionment rules and concludes that the new rules will provide greater 
certainty for a far greater number of taxpayers than is currently the case.  
Part 1: The Old Adjustment Rules 
B. Legislation 
New Zealand GST law essentially comprises a principal GST Act7 and subordinate 
legislation (regulations).8 The Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 was enacted in 
October 1985, but did not commence until 1 October 1986. Before its 
commencement it was subject to three remedial amendment Acts, which probably 
reflected the speed in which the GST Act was introduced (illustrated in Figure 1.1).  
                                               
5
  CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA). 
6
  It is suggested in the course of this chapter that the new apportionment rules have attempted to rewrite 
the outcome of the Court of Appeal decision in Lundy and provide a calculation methodology that 
appears more aligned to the unsuccessful argument advanced by the Commissioner that holding costs 
(associated with the cost of rental activity and normally factored into rental payments) should be used 
to determine the value of a change-in-use. 
7
  Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 (hereafter the “GST Act”). Document available at 
<www.legislation.co.nz/act/public/1985/0141/latest/DLM81035.html> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
8
  Goods and Services Tax (Local Authorities Accounting on Payments Basis) Orders (2001, 2005, 
2009) and Goods and Services Tax (Grants and Subsidies) Orders (1992, amended in 2003). 
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The GST Act was reprinted in 1991 and comprises nine Parts and 100 individual 
provisions.9 In contrast to the Australian GST Act, it contains no diagrams or 
examples. Numbering of provisions and divisions are consecutive and do not allow 
room for large expansion without complex numbering. Fortunately, insertions of 
new provisions have not been extensive. Unlike the Income Tax Act 2007 or the 
Australian GST Act, defined terms are not highlighted in provisions and the general 
drafting style is not in plain language. Definitions are also located at the front of the 
Act in an interpretation provision (rather than the back), while key terms (eg, input 
tax or supply) are located in separate provisions. In contrast to the Australian GST 
Act, the general rate of GST is contained within the Act. 
Figure 1.1: The Introduction of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 
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9
  The GST Act originally comprised 12 Parts. The 9 active Parts are: Part 1(Interpretation, ss 2 to 7); 
Part 2 (Imposition, ss 8 to 14); Part 3 (Returns and Payments, ss 15 to 26A); Part 6 (Recovery of Tax, 
s 42 to 43); Part 7 (Refunds and Relief from Tax, ss 45 to 48A); Part 8 (Registration, 51 to 54); Part 9 
(Special Cases, ss 55 to 61A); Part 11 (General Provisions, ss 75 to 79); and Part 12 (Transitional 
Provisions, ss 84 to 86).  
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Income tax has been described as a “creature of statute” 10 and GST is no different. 
Both utilise concepts of time, jurisdiction, and entity (or activity).11 The GST Act 
also appears to directly leverage a number of concepts from income tax law. 
However, the similarity ends. The language and structure of the GST Act is 
intentionally different,12 a difference that is more pronounced after the rewrite of 
income tax legislation and final enactment in the Income Tax Act 2007.13  
Over a period of 25 years the GST Act has been subject to three major reviews.14 
The adjustment rules have been discussed in all three reviews and have had a number 
of minor remedial amendments (illustrated in Figure 1.2). While the GST Act has 
received a reasonable level of reform and remedial legislative activity, the 
adjustment rules have largely remained untouched since enactment, subject to a 
revision and codification of the calculation methodology in 2000.15  
                                               
10
  J Prebble “Why is Tax Law Incomprehensible?” (1994) British Tax Review 380.  
11
 The spatial element of time (ie, taxable periods and periodic adjustments) has had a significant impact 
on the change-in-use rules. 
12
 Given the speed in which the GST Act was drafted, it is hardly surprising that the drafters seem to 
have leveraged and modified widely known income tax concepts when drafting a new form of indirect 
tax legislation. For example, the GST Act contains a business test modelled on the income tax 
concept of business, but modified to make it broader by removing the second limb (ie, the 
requirement for profit) and renaming it the “taxable activity”. Other examples include the adoption of 
a “purpose” test (considered in CIR v Haenga (1985) 7 NZTC 5,198 and CIR v National Distributors 
Ltd (1989) 11 NZTC 6,346), which appears in the GST Act as the “principal purpose” test, or the use 
of the words “to the extent” (considered in CIR v Banks [1978] 2 NZLR 472 (CA)) that enable 
apportionment. It is little wonder that the early GST cases (eg, Case M53 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,312 
(TRA)), referred back to these established income tax cases.  
13
 The rewrite of the Income Tax Act (and phased enactment in 2004 and 2007) has adopted a plain 
language approach to tax legislation. See B Birch and W Creech Rewriting the Income Tax Act – 
Objectives, Process, Guidelines: A Discussion Document (IRD, Wellington, 1994). 
14
 D Caygill The Goods and Services Tax Act 1985: Legislative Audit (IRD, Wellington, February 
1989); B Birch and B English GST: A Review – A Government Discussion Document (Policy Advice 
Division, IRD, Wellington, March 1999); and P Dunne GST: Accounting for Land and Other High-
Value Assets – A Government Discussion Document (IRD, Wellington, November 2009). Document 
available at <http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/publications/2009-dd-gst/overview> (viewed 20 March 
2011). A more detailed discussion is outlined below (see Part 3 of this Chapter). 
15
 Codification of the calculation methodology was enacted by the Taxation (GST and Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 2000 and applied from 10 October 2000. The original s 21 was restructured, 
effectively moving proviso’s to their own subsection. Sections 21A to 21I were added, effectively 
codifying the calculation methodology. All of the case law is in relation to the pre-2000 version of the 
adjustment rules and there has yet to be a case on the post-2000 versions.  
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In December 2010 (with general application from 1 April 2011) the change-in-use 
rules were “fundamentally changed”, shifting from an adjustment approach (utilising 
a “principal purpose” test and deemed supply mechanism) to an apportionment 
approach (utilising a “use” test).16 This sudden change in direction was brought 
about by an apparent drive towards reducing compliance costs and broad 
acknowledgment that the rules (particularly the calculation methodology) were 
difficult to understand and apply.  
Figure 1.2: The Reform History of Adjustment Rules 
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C. Deconstructing the Rules 
Essentially the New Zealand change-in-use rules can be divided into three periods: 
(1) the original rules as enacted in 1985; (2) the revised rules that codified a number 
of earlier guidelines in 2000; and (3) the reformed rules (enacted in December 2010) 
that take affect from 1 April 2011. The first two periods adopted a threshold 
adjustment mechanism (utilising a “principal purpose” test) that enabled change in 
use adjustments (utilising a deemed supply mechanism). The third period marks a 
                                               
16
 Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Act 2010. Document available at 
<www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2010/0130/latest/DLM3123411.html> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
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fundamental shift away from a rigid threshold adjustment and deemed supply 
approach towards the adoption of a new apportionment approach (which would 
appear to a large extent to have adopted the Australian rules). This later approach 
utilises a more liberal “use” test that reflects actual use, rather then the application of 
a broad gateway threshold. Accordingly, a change-in-use is determined by 
comparing intended (or estimated) use against actual use, rather than a fictional 
deemed supply created by the existence of another purpose that is not the principal 
purpose. 
An analysis of the rules also has to divide the change-in-use rules into two parts: (1) 
the gateway tests into the mechanism that entitle the claiming of input or output tax 
credits (ie, the front-end); and (2) the measurement mechanism that applies the 
relative financial values to the non-taxable use or deemed supply (ie, the back-end).  
Much of the early development and judicial consideration of the change-in-use rules 
in New Zealand dealt with determining the scope of the change-in-use mechanism 
(ie the front-end of the rules), with considerably less discussion about how the value 
of the adjustment should be determined (ie, the back-end of the rules).17 Detailed 
judicial consideration of the calculation methodology did not materialise until the 
Lundy line of cases, where conflicting methods in determining the value of the input 
or output tax credits were advanced. Until this line of cases, judicial consideration 
was very fleeting and generally involved apportionment (eg, 49 per cent or 25 per 
cent), rather than discussing how a portion would be calculated.18 In Australia, 
judicial consideration of methodology has also been limited.19 In Canada, it has had 
slightly more consideration, but due to the flexibility in choosing a reasonable 
method of calculation, litigation has again been limited.20  
                                               
17
 A large amount of the early New Zealand cases settled on adjustments based on very general 
apportionment considerations. 
18
 During the period where the Courts believed that principal purpose meant “more than half”, 
adjustments for private use could only amount to something less than 50 per cent (eg, 49 per cent) as 
anything greater would suggest the principal purpose had been abandoned.  
19
 American Express Wholesale Currency Services Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 122, (2010) 77 ATR 12. 
20
 Canada employs a “fair and reasonable” methodology test. 
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D. The General Rules 
The adjustment rules are based on the inter-related operation of ss 3A (definition of 
input tax), 20 (calculation of tax payable), and 21 (adjustments) of the GST Act. The 
policy objective of the adjustment rules is to ensure that input tax credits reflect the 
extent of the taxable use of goods and services.21 This is achieved by making 
adjustments to input tax or output tax if the original intended use of the goods and 
services changes, or if they are acquired for both taxable and non-taxable purposes.  
Input tax credits 
The expression “principal purpose” is used in both ss 3A (input tax) and 21 
(adjustments).22 Unfortunately, the expression is not defined in the GST Act leaving 
the courts to determine its nature and scope.  
Input tax is currently defined in s 3A.23 The definition provides that: 
“(1) Input tax, in relation to a registered person, means -  
(a) tax charged under section 8(1) on the supply of goods and services made to 
that person, being goods and services acquired for the principal purpose of 
making taxable supplies:” (emphasis added) 
The “principal purpose” test is a threshold test for entitlement to input tax credits. To 
obtain an input tax credit, the registered taxpayer has to prove that goods or services 
                                               
21
 B Birch and B English GST: A Review – A Government Discussion Document (IRD, Wellington, 
March 1999) at [4.4]. Although this policy was not recognised by IRD until after the Court of Appeal 
case of CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA). Before 
Lundy, the IRD considered that the adjustment rules did not necessarily reverse tax credits to the 
extent of the taxable use (a view advanced by the Commissioner in argument before the Court of 
Appeal in Lundy). 
22
 The definition of input tax was initially located in the definitions provisions of s 2(1). However, in 
2000, the definition was shifted to its own unique provision. This course of action was recommended 
in submissions on the GST Bill 1985, but not carried out on enactment. For example, see Peat 
Marwick Submissions on the Goods and Services Tax Bill 1985 (25 September 1985) 2 at [1.2] 
(Finance and Expenditure Committee file number FE/85/307, 262W). 
23
 Section 3A was inserted by s 85(1) of the Taxation (GST and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2000 
and applied from 10 October 2000. Prior to the introduction of s 3A, the definition was found in s 2(1) 
– the general definitions provision. For the purposes of this paper the key elements of the provision 
(emphasised above) have remained intact since its introduction in 1985. 
 24 
would be “acquired for the principal purpose of making taxable supplies”24 and not 
principally for some other non-taxable purpose. 25 If the acquisition was made 
principally for making taxable supplies, then the acquisition will be entitled to a full 
input tax credit. Goods or services not acquired for the principal purpose of making 
taxable supplies are not entitled to any input tax credits. The input tax credit is not 
apportioned. Effectively this is an all or nothing approach to input tax credit 
entitlement (illustrated in Figure 1.3), with the focus of inquiry at the time of 
acquisition.26  
Figure 1.3: Principal Purpose (100 per cent Input tax Credit) 
Taxable Supply
(Principal Purpose)
100% input tax credit
Section 3A
Non-Taxable Supply
 
Adjustments 
In most instances goods or services will be acquired for one purpose and the focus of 
inquiry will be whether they were acquired for making a taxable or non-taxable 
supply. However, there will be instances where goods or services are initially 
acquired for mixed purposes or subsequently become used for mixed purposes (eg, 
acquired for both taxable and non-taxable supplies).  
As the input tax rules adopt an all or nothing approach to input tax credit entitlement, 
it is possible that part of the supply that is used for a non-taxable supply will be 
included as part of the overall input tax credit entitlement. In such instances 
adjustment rules are required to ensure the correct amount of input tax is paid (so 
that the taxpayer is not over-taxed) and equally to ensure the correct amount of tax is 
                                               
24
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 3A.  
25
 The burden of proof is on the registered taxpayer to establish on the balance of probabilities. 
26
 Case M53 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,312 (TRA) and cited with approval in CIR v Trustees in the Mangaheia 
Trust (2009) 24 NZTC 23,711 (HC) and Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR (1999) 19 NZTC 15,202 (HC). 
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collected in order that the taxpayer has fulfilled their tax obligations (so that the tax 
base is protected).27 
To ensure a similar result to an apportionment approach (ie, the clawing back of that 
part of the full input tax credit not related to making taxable supplies), adjustment 
rules are required that create a deemed supply of the non-taxable portion of the initial 
acquisition (illustrated in Figure 1.4). This mechanism is provided for in s 21 
(subject to de minimis thresholds) that are designed for changes-in-use.28  
Section 21(1) as originally enacted stated: 29 
“(1)  Subject to section 5(3) of this Act, to the extent that goods and services applied by a 
registered person for the principal purpose of making taxable supplies are 
subsequently applied by that registered person for a purpose other than that of 
making taxable supplies, they shall be deemed to be supplied by that registered 
person in the course of that taxable activity to the extent that they are so applied:” 
(emphasis added) 
Section 21(1), applies where goods or services used for the principal purpose of 
making taxable supplies are later applied for a different purpose (eg, non-taxable or 
exempt). Section 21(1) is used to account for the GST element in the value of 
personal use of business goods or services (eg, personal use of a business motor 
vehicle, or goods taken from a corner dairy for personal consumption). Section 
21(5), covers the reverse situation — where privately-owned goods or services are 
                                               
27
 In contrast, an apportionment approach (utilising a use test) will only award input tax credits for the 
part of the supply that is acquired for taxable supplies. Any part of the supply not related to a taxable 
purpose will not be awarded input tax credits. 
28
 In contrast, a financial de minimis threshold is not specified in the Canadian threshold adjustment 
rules, which instead apply a 90:10 safe harbour rule (see Chapter 3). The apportionment approach in 
Australia utilise a safe harbour approach (see Chapter 2). 
29
 The original s 21 was replaced by s 100(1) of the Taxation (GST and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
2000 and applied from 10 October 2000. For the purposes of this paper the key elements of the 
provision (emphasised above) have remained intact since its introduction in 1985. It is interesting to 
not that prior to the second reading of the GST Bill, many elements of the adjustment rules were to a 
large extent scattered throughout the GST Act. Clause 23A (subsequently enacted as s 21, was created 
during the Select Committee phase and brought together “in one clause the various provisions dealing 
with apportionment” (eg, cls 5(2)(a), 5(2)(b), 9(2), 10(7) and 23(5) of the first reading version of the 
GST Bill). It was also recommended that “a new de minimis provision be inserted to allow a person 
engaged in a taxable activity to ignore for apportionment purposes only exempt supplies that did not 
exceed $48,000 and 5 per cent of his total turnover”. This subsequently became the first proviso in s 
21(1) of the GST Act. 
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applied partly for use in a taxable activity (eg, partial business use of a privately-
owned motor vehicle).30  
Figure 1.4: Adjustment of 100 per cent Input Tax Credits (Clawback and Reversal) 
Taxable Supply
(Principal Purpose)
100% input tax credit
Section 3A
Section 21(1) Clawback
Section 21(5) Reversal
 
Effectively, the deficiency of a broad brush threshold approach (ie, the “principal 
purpose” test) to awarding input tax credits, has been overcome by utilising rules 
designed for changes in subsequent use between taxable and non-taxable purposes, 
as opposed to apportionment of the initial acquisition.  
Unfortunately, the adjustment rules have the potential for output tax credits 
(adjustments in favour of Inland Revenue) to exceed the total input tax credits 
initially claimed, as there is nothing expressly provided in the legislation to prevent 
periodic adjustments continuing indefinitely. While such an approach was rejected 
by the Court of Appeal (in favour of a “used-up” model, illustrated in Figure 1.5),31 
it would appear that the principal purpose test does provide a point where the total 
amount of adjustments (eg, successive output tax credits) could build up to the point 
where the principal purpose has been abandoned and the taxable activity is no longer 
the principal purpose (ie, a tipping-point model, illustrated in Figure 1.6). At this 
tipping point a full adjustment for any outstanding input tax credits would then have 
to be made.32 In contrast, the Court of Appeal resolved the matter slightly differently, 
                                               
30
 Other elements (ie, “subsequently applied” and “to the extent that”) are present in the provisions. But 
due to word restrictions, these elements are not discussed in this paper. 
31
 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA). 
32
 This is the obiter reasoning advanced by Judge Barber in Case U13 (1999) 19 NZTC 9,147 (TRA). 
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on the basis that periodic adjustments and off-one adjustments should produce the 
same result (ie, an implied financial cap on output adjustments).33 
Figure 1.5: Principal Purpose: Used Up Point Model 
          
Taxable Supply
(Principal Purpose)
100% output tax credit
Section 21(1) Clawback
Non-Taxable 
Supply
Used-Up Point
Periodic adjustments
 
Figure 1.6: Principal Purpose Tipping Point Model 
          Taxable Supply
100% output tax credit
Section 21(1) Clawback
Non-Taxable Supply
(Principal Purpose)
Tipping Point
Periodic adjustments
 
Adjustment exclusion 
A registered person is not required to make output tax adjustments for exempt 
supplies that do not exceed the de minimis rule. The de minimis rules are designed to 
minimise compliance costs by excluding small exempt uses from the operation of the 
adjustment rules.34  
The de minimis rule comprises two tests (estimated on a reasonable basis over a 12-
month period) that must not be breached. The rule provides that a changes-in-use 
                                               
33
 See discussion below in Part 2 of this Chapter. 
34
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21(1), first proviso. De minimis is the shortened version of the 
phrase “de minimis non curat lex”, meaning that the law does not concern itself with trifles. 
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below the lesser of either the maximum specified financial value (ie, $90,000) or 
specified percentage (ie, 5 per cent), will not activate the adjustment mechanism.35 
Failing to meet either test will result in the adjustment rules being applied.36  
Timing of adjustments 
Generally, adjustments will be made according to the taxable periods they are made 
in. This can result in high administration and tracking costs for changes-in-use for 
low value supplies. To reduce compliance costs, the rules provide taxpayers the 
opportunity to elect to make a one-off adjustment (subject to specific conditions), 
rather than ongoing periodic adjustments.37 A one-off adjustment will automatically 
be available for supplies below $18,000 (or above that amount with the agreement of 
the Commissioner). This option for a one-off adjustment may be taken up only in the 
first return period in which the goods were acquired or produced. 
Supplies above the $18,000 threshold (originally $10,000 and adjusted for inflation 
to $18,000 in 2000) remain subject to periodic adjustments for an indefinite period. 
According to Inland Revenue this adjustment requirement is to prevent avoidance 
opportunities and protect the revenue base.38  
Calculation of adjustment  
To calculate change-in-use adjustments it is necessary to establish the proportion that 
goods or services are used in relation to taxable and non-taxable supplies. There are 
three methods of allocation: direct attribution; the turnover method; or a special 
                                               
35
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21(4). The de minimis rule was originally located in the first 
proviso of s 21(1). In 2000, the threshold was adjusted for inflation from $48,000 to $90,000.  
36
 The new apportionment approach also provides a de minimis threshold approach. 
37
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21G. Before this provision was enacted in 2000, the Courts had 
acknowledged that a one-off adjustment was available (for supplies less than $10,000) under the 
second proviso in s 21(1): Case N39 (1991) 13 NZTC 3,333 (TRA). The second proviso was inserted 
by s 18(3) Goods and Services Tax Amendment Act 1986. In 1995, IRD confirmed that a deemed 
supply occurred in each taxable period in which the goods and services were used for non-taxable 
purposes (ie, periodic adjustments): Tax Information Bulletin Vol 6:11 (April 1995) 1. Section 21G is 
to a large extent a codification of judicial interpretation and prior policy.  
38
 B Birch and B English GST: A Review – A Government Discussion Document (Policy Advice 
Division, IRD, Wellington, March 1999) at [4.32].  
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method. These methods were initially prescribed as policy statements,39 but were 
later codified in the legislation.40  
Direct attribution involves allocating the cost of goods and services to taxable and 
non-taxable supplies on the basis of actual use. If the cost of goods and services 
cannot be directly attributed, the proportion of taxable and non-taxable use can be 
calculated on a turnover basis. If the direct attribution or turnover methods are not 
suitable, a registered person may agree with Inland Revenue to use another method 
of allocation. 
Rule refinement 
The principal purpose test has experienced two major refinements. The first was the 
notion that a principal purpose of a supply did not need to be “more than half” of a 
taxable supply for it to be entitled to an input tax credit. Something less than a 50 per 
cent threshold was sufficient, provided it remained the main or fundamental purpose 
(illustrated in Figure 1.7).  
The second refinement was the notion that purposes did not need to be linear, but 
could be concurrent. In a linear approach, only one purpose can exist at any one time 
and the taxpayer switches between taxable and non-taxable purposes (illustrated in 
Figure 1.8). Many of the early cases adopted this approach, although this may have 
also reflected the nature of the goods and services that were examined. Adopting a 
concurrent approach acknowledges that non-taxable purposes can exist in parallel to 
taxable purposes (illustrated in Figure 1.9). This approach acknowledges that some 
goods and services are capable of different uses at the same time. In both 
approaches, the court must decide which purpose (taxable or non-taxable) is the 
principal purpose.  
                                               
39
 See BR Pub 96/11 (expired) in Tax Information Bulletin Vol 8:10 (December 1996) and earlier 
interpretation statements in Public Information Bulletin 143 (February 1986), Public Information 
Bulletin 169 (February 1988), Tax Information Bulletin Vol 5:8 (January 1994), Tax Information 
Bulletin Vol 6:11 (April 1995), Tax Information Bulletin Vol 6:14 (June 1995) and GST Guide – A 
guide to working with GST (GST 600, December 1997). 
40
 The codification was enacted by the Taxation (GST and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2000 and 
applied from 10 October 2000. 
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Figure 1.7: Principal Purpose (More or Less Than Half) 
Taxable Supply
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Figure 1.8: Linear Purposes 
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Figure 1.9: Concurrent Purposes 
Taxable
Non-Taxable
Timeline
Purpose A
Purpose B
 
The adjustment rules provide a mechanism that creates a deemed (or fictional) 
supply in order to make an apportionment between the taxable and non-taxable 
nature of the supply. The fictional supply is activated when the taxable supply (ie, a 
good or service acquired for the principal purpose of making taxable supplies) is 
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subsequently applied for two or more purposes (one of which is for a non-taxable 
purpose). Effectively, part of the taxable supply has been applied for a non-taxable 
purpose. The task before the courts is to identify a non-taxable purpose and to 
determine the extent of that purpose as a portion of the ongoing taxable purpose (ie, 
the principal purpose). 
In some instances the courts have instead sought to identify the make-up of the 
taxable supply itself.41 However, this ignores the fact that the focus of inquiry is on 
purpose of the supply, not the supply itself. Rather, the deemed supply (or fiction) 
results from the identification of a non-taxable purpose. The non-taxable purpose 
does not result from identifying what does or does not make up a taxable supply (or 
taxable activity). This misconception appears to be at the heart of the legal services 
cases, which seek to apply an analysis that was in part, first attempted by Judge 
Barber in Case S81 (and over-turned in Morris), by suggesting that rental activity 
(an exempt supply) was part of the normal course of property development (ie, 
sufficiently tied to property development).  
It is submitted that an examination of purpose is separate from an examination of 
supply, although how the supply is used (or not used), may assist in a determination 
of purpose. In most cases the courts could have resolved the cases on what should 
have been (or not been) the taxable supply at the start, rather than utilising the 
change-in-use mechanism to achieve the same result. Exempt supplies could never 
have been part of a taxable supply. Often the taxable supply has been identified by 
the courts as the equivalent taxable activity (eg, the provision of elderly care, or 
property development) and this equivalence may have added to the general 
confusion.  
Restructuring 
In 2000, the adjustment rules were restructured (and redrafted) into new provisions 
that made a distinction between input tax adjustments42 and output tax adjustments.43 
                                               
41
 For example  see Case S81 (1996) 17 NZTC 7,505 (TRA).  
42
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, ss 21E to 21I. 
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The restructuring also codified prior policy statements on methodology published in 
Tax Information Bulletins (TIB).44 No case law has examined these rules and for the 
purpose of this thesis they have not been examined in detail due to the constraints of 
this paper.45  
Part 2: Implementation and Operation — Empirical Evidence 
The extent of judicial consideration and the amount of litigation of the principal 
purpose test and the adjustment rules strongly suggests that the adjustment rules 
have not worked well. The rules have invited substantial judicial interpretation (and 
appeal) of key elements of the rules. This ongoing interpretation illustrates the 
underlying complexity inherent in the adjustment approach adopted in New Zealand 
and the manner in which it has been drafted. 
E. Judicial Activity 
Over the last 25 years (from 1985 to 2010), there have been 532 reported cases that 
have cited or considered GST provisions (illustrated in Figures 1.10 and 1.11).46 Of 
those cases, 349 interpreted a provision of the GST Act according to the headnotes 
(illustrated in Figures 1.12 and 1.13).47 White and Trombitas have reported a similar 
figure (albeit a slightly lower figure of 335 cases).48  
                                                                                                                                     
43
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, ss 21 to 21D. 
44
 For example Tax Information Bulletin Vol 5:8 (January 1994) 1. 
45
 This thesis is based on the assumption that the restructuring is a codification of existing law and for 
this reason has avoided adding to the pre-existing complexity of the rues by citing revised adjustment 
provisions. 
46
 This figure results from a search for “Goods and Services Tax Act” across the full text of all reported 
tax cases in Thomson Reuters (New Zealand) Brookers Tax Service Cases database (viewed 20 March 
2011).  
47
 This figure results from a search for “Goods and Services Tax Act” across the headnote field of all 
reported tax cases in Thomson Reuters (New Zealand) Brookers Tax Service Cases database (viewed 
20 March 2011).  
48
 D White and E Trombitas “New Zealand” in Ecker T, Lang M and Lejeune I (eds) The Future of 
Indirect Taxation: Recent Trends in VAT and GST Systems Around the World – A Global Comparison 
(2011, forthcoming publication) at [1.5] fn 34. As no date of application is provided it is assumed the 
estimated figures do not relate to the year ended 2010 (more likely October 2010) which would 
explain the slight difference. McKenzie recorded 300 GST cases (as at 1 May 2008): A McKenzie 
GST: A Practical Guide (8th ed, CCH Ltd, Auckland, 2008) viii. 
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Figure 1.10: Total Cases Citing GST Provisions 1985-2010 (Accumulated) 
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Figure 1.11: Total Cases Citing GST Provisions 1985-2010 (Courts) 
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Figure 1.12: Reported GST Cases 1985-2010 (Accumulated) 
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Figure 1.13: Reported GST Cases 1985-2010 (Courts) 
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Figure 1.14: Reported Principal Purpose and Adjustment Cases (Accumulated) 
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Figure 1.15: Reported Principal Purpose and Adjustment Cases (Courts) 
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Over the same period there have been 46 cases that are related to resolving change-
in-use or principal purpose issues (illustrated in Figures 1.14 and 1.15). This figure 
equates to 13 per cent of recognised GST cases (eg, 46/349). The 46 cases comprise 
33 Taxation Review Authority (TRA) cases, nine High Court cases, and four Court 
of Appeal cases. Figure 1.16 illustrates the sequential development of the respective 
cases. Interestingly, there have been no cases that have interpreted or applied the 
revised adjustment rules enacted in 2000. 
Figure 1.16: Timeline of Cases (Principal Purpose and Adjustments) 1985-2010 
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Judicial consideration of the 46 cases can also be mapped into four broad 
overlapping categories. The first field of categorisation groups cases on the basis of 
the facts. Generally there are six broad groups of fact situations: (1) the vehicle 
cases;49 (2) the land cases;50 (3) the legal services cases;51 (4) the dwelling cases;52 
                                               
49
 Case K55 (1998) 10 NZTC 453 (TRA); Case M53 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,312 (TRA); Case M74 (1990) 
12 NZTC 2,441 (TRA); Case M106 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,674 (TRA); and Case P5 (1992) 14 NZTC 
4,034 (TRA). 
50
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(5) the financial services cases;53 and (6) the property development cases.54 A second 
field of categorisation between the cases makes a distinction between (1) the private 
use cases; or (2) exempt supply cases.55 A third field of categorisation also exists in 
respect of input tax adjustments or output tax credit adjustments (although the courts 
have recognised this is not a significant distinction).56 Finally, a fourth field of 
categorisation of the cases exists between: (1) singular competing purposes (eg, 
switching between two opposing purposes); and (2) concurrent purposes (eg, two 
purposes that occur at the same time or overlap).  
F. The Problems of Principal Purpose 
The principal purpose test has been a source of extensive and ongoing judicial 
examination since its unexpected introduction. To a large extent the principal 
purpose test has been problematic because the concept of “purpose” and “principal” 
are not defined in the GST Act, but also because the concepts are inherently open to 
many different interpretations. In the absence of adequate guidance, there has been 
ample scope for argument and confusion, as the Court of Appeal recognised in 
Lundy.57 
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 CIR v Morris (1997) 18 NZTC 13,385 (HC) at [27]. 
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Early criticism of the principal purpose test 
The principal purpose test is not defined in the GST Act and Parliament did not 
explain why it had adopted a “principal purpose” test. However, its appearance is 
clearly connected to the appearance of the adjustment rules, in an attempt to 
differentiate between two or more competing purposes — one purpose associated 
with a taxable activity or supply (ie, the “principal purpose”), and other purposes 
associated with a non-taxable activity or supply.  
When the GST Act was first proposed (White Paper)58 it did not contain any 
adjustment rules. The Advisory Panel (First Report)59 observed that adjustment rules 
were “necessary in order to distinguish between the supply of goods and services for 
personal reasons and the supply of goods and services for the purpose of the 
furtherance of a taxable activity.”60 The Minister agreed, but neither the Bill nor the 
GST Act contained any detailed adjustment guidelines.  
The appearance of a “principal purpose” test was a surprise for many who had 
expected detailed rules and guidance, rather than a conceptual test of “purpose”, that 
had is origins in income tax law.61 According to Teixeira, this was “not the type of 
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 R Douglas Proposals for the Administration of the Goods and Services Tax (Wellington, March 1985) 
[The White Paper]. See Figure 1.1. 
59
 D Brash Report of the Advisory Panel on the Goods and Services Tax (Wellington, June 1985) [First 
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to the adoption of an adjustment mechanism is couched in terms of a set of apportionment rules. For 
example, “The draft legislation contains no rules to apportion inputs between taxable supplies and 
other supplies. In our view such rules are necessary in order to distinguish between the supply of 
goods and services for personal reasons and the supply of goods and services for the purpose of the 
furtherance of a taxable activity. Again, apportionment rules are required in order to deal with 
charities and non-profit organisations and they could, depending upon the policy decisions made by 
Government, be required in other areas.” Nowhere in the White Paper does it refer to a deemed 
supply mechanism as the basis for apportionment. 
60
 D Brash Report of the Advisory Panel on the Goods and Services Tax (Wellington, June 1985) ch 
“General Comments on the Draft Legislation”. 
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 It is evident when reading the GST Act that the drafters drew on income tax concepts and language 
(present at the time) to provide some degree of certainty. For example, taxable activity draws on the 
first limb of the income tax concept of business, but does not require an intention for profit (thus 
making it broader). See Grieve v CIR [1984] 1 NZLR 101 (CA). 
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guidance anticipated by many traders, who expected clear rules and apportionment 
formulae.”62  
The meaning of “purpose” 
The expression “principal purpose” comprises two concepts: “purpose” and 
“principal”. Both terms have borrowed extensively from income tax concepts.63 The 
term “purpose” is best described as the objective or ends (ie, the effect which is 
sought to be achieved or to be done), not the means to an end. It has also been 
described with approval as “the object or the end which the taxpayer has in mind or 
view”.64 In one of the earliest GST cases considering the meaning of principal 
purpose, Judge Bathgate in Case M53 observed that:65 
“‘Purpose’ is a fairly common word in tax law. In CIR v Haenga (1985) 7 NZTC 5,198; 
(1985) 9 TRNZ 41 Richardson J considered the various ways of interpreting the word 
‘purpose’, according to its statutory context and the ways that the dictionary meaning of the 
object or end in view varies, according to whether it is the immediate or ultimate object, the 
conscious or unconscious purpose and the objective or subjective purpose that is to be 
considered. … The proper interpretation of the word is dependent on its statutory context.” 
(emphasis added) 
Adding that:66 
“‘Purpose’ is not a material thing but is dependent to a large extent upon a state of mind, but 
it is not the same as ‘intent’ or ‘motive’. The word is commonly used in the tax avoidance 
field, where ‘purpose’ is said to mean the effect which is sought to be achieved - the end in 
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 A Teixeira, C Scott, and M Devlin Inside GST: The Development of Goods and Services Tax (VUW 
Press, Wellington, 1986) 45. 
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 Plimmer v CIR [1958] NZLR 147 (CA); Newton v C of T [1958] AC 450; CIR v Walker [1963] NZLR 
339 (CA); CIR v Hunter [1970] NZLR 116 (CA); Mangin v CIR [1971] NZLR; Ashton v CIR [1975] 
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(CA); CIR v Haenga (1985) 7 NZTC 5,198 (CA); and CIR v National Distributors Ltd [1989] 3 
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 A discussion of “purpose” can be found in M Keating “The Principal Purpose Test for the GST Input 
Tax: Is a Wide Interpretation Justified?” 16 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy (2010) 
85.  
65
 Case M53 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,312 (TRA) at 2,316 at [20]. 
66
 Case M53 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,312 (TRA) at 2,316 at [22]. 
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view, and what is done or what is contracted to be done is said to be the purpose of a 
transaction - Newton v FCT (1958) 11 ATD 442; [1958] AC 450, Mangin v CIR 70 ATC 
6001; [1971] NZLR 591 and Ashton v CIR (1975) 2 NZTC 61,030; [1975] 2 NZLR 717; 
(1975) 1 TRNZ 190.” (emphasis added) 
Several years later in CIR v BNZ Investment Advisory Services Ltd, the High Court 
again sought to import income tax concepts of purpose. Doogue J observed that:67  
“So far as the word ‘purpose’ is concerned, there was no real difference between them in 
their submissions. They relied upon cases such as Plimmer v CIR [1958] NZLR 147; CIR v 
Hunter [1970] NZLR 116 (CA); CIR v National Distributors Ltd [1989] 3 NZLR 661; 
(1989) 11 NZTC 6,346 (CA), and CIR v Walker [1963] NZLR 339 (HC & CA). They were 
agreed that purpose is the object which the taxpayer has in mind or in view. It is not 
synonymous with intention or motive. (emphasis added)” 
This interpretation of “purpose” would subsequently find support as one of several 
general principles in CIR v Trustees in the Mangaheia Trust (2009) 24 NZTC 23,711 
(HC) and Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR (1999) 19 NZTC 15,202 (HC), where Chisholm 
J held that:68 
“Purpose is a reference to the object that the taxpayer had in mind or in view. This is not 
synonymous with intention or motive. Moreover, care must be taken to avoid confusing the 
means by which the taxpayer achieves its purpose with the purpose itself: CIR v BNZ 
Investment Advisory Services Ltd (1994) 16 NZTC 11,111; Norfolk Apartments Ltd v CIR 
(1995) 17 NZTC 12,003 (HC) and 12,212 (CA)” 
The meaning of “principal”: a main or more than half approach? 
Early judicial consideration of “principal purpose” does not make any reference to 
authority, although it did tend to suggest that the expression “principal” should be 
“more than half”.69 In Case M53,70 Judge Bathgate suggested that a 50:50 approach 
to mixed use was insufficient to establish a “principal purpose”. It was not until Case 
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 CIR v BNZ Investment Advisory Services Ltd (1994) 16 NZTC 11,111 (HC) at 11,115. 
68
 Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR (1999) 19 NZTC 15,202 (HC) at 15,206 at [20].  
69
 Case M53 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,312 (TRA). Subsequently cited with approval in Case M106 (1990) 12 
NZTC 2,674, although “principal purpose” was not found for want of evidence. 
70
 Case M53 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,312 (TRA). 
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N13 that two cases were cited as authority: CIR v Mitchell71 and General Motors 
New Zealand Ltd v Taylor.72 Unfortunately the cases provide slightly different tests 
and the court in Case N1373 was left to determine which way it would turn. No doubt 
in light of Case M53, Judge Bathgate adopted Mitchell’s “more than half” approach. 
Davison CJ in Taylor74 interpreted the word “principally” by asking the question 
“what was the primary and fundamental purpose … as opposed to a merely 
incidental or accessory purpose?”.75 This was an approach that Davidson CJ 
observed was consistent with Funk & Wagnell's New Standard Dictionary definition, 
which provided that “principally” meant:  
“First or highest in rank, character, authority, value or important; most important; leading; 
chief; as the principal men of a town; principal points of advantage. Being the most worthy 
or important, as distinguished from what is incidental, appertinent, or accessory; as, a 
principal obligation, right or estate.” 
Three years later Davison CJ in Mitchell76 again explored the meaning of 
“principal”.77 Interestingly, Davison CJ this time drew upon the observations of Lord 
Morton of Henryton in Fawcett Properties Ltd v Buckingham County Council78 (a 
case not cited in Taylor) where Lord Morton expressed the view that the word 
“mainly” probably meant “more than half”. An interpretation that was supported by 
the dictionary definition of “mainly” which provided that it meant “for the most part, 
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 CIR v Mitchell (1986) 8 NZTC 5,181 (HC). 
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 General Motors New Zealand Ltd v Taylor (1983) 6 NZTC 61,880 (HC). 
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 Case N13 (1991) 13 NZTC 3,105 (TRA). 
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 General Motors New Zealand Ltd v Taylor (1983) 6 NZTC 61,880 (HC) at 61,885. 
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 CIR v Mitchell (1986) 8 NZTC 5,181 (HC). 
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 An appeal from Case E102 (1982) 5 NZTC 59,547 (TRA). 
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 Fawcett Properties Ltd v Buckingham County Council [1961] AC 636 (HL). Subsequently supported 
in CIR v Mitchell (1986) 8 NZTC 5,181 (HC) and General Motors New Zealand Ltd v Taylor (1983) 
6 NZTC 61,880 (HC). 
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chiefly, principally”.79 His Honour concluded that the correct test to apply was 
“greater than the total of all other uses” (emphasis added).80 This test confirmed the 
“more than half” approach.81 
The TRA in Case N19,82 Case N22,83 Case N39,84 and Case P5,85 would also apply a 
“more than half” approach. Notwithstanding these cases, it was Judge Barber in Case 
P5, who was the first to suggest a preference for something “less than half” — an 
approach that would later find approval in the High Court.86 Until Case P62,87 the 
courts had adopted a “more than half” approach to principal purpose.  
As Judge Barber in Case P5 observed:88  
“The meaning of the word ‘principal’ in relation to purpose or use has been dealt with in a 
number of cases over the past decade, and Judge Bathgate also deals with that aspect in Case 
M53. It is sufficient to say, for present purposes, that the word ‘principal’ merely means 
main. This could be a user of less than 50%.” 
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 Interestingly, the Commissioner had argued in the TRA that the word “principally” meant 
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 CIR v BNZ Investments Advisory Services Ltd (1994) 16 NZTC 11,111 (HC). An appeal from Case 
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 Case P5 (1992) 14 NZTC 4,034 (TRA) at 4,037 at [12]. 
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This interpretation was later cited with approval by Judge Willy in Case P62.89 
Although the High Court in BNZ Investments90 would overturn on appeal the 
decision in Case P62,91 Judge Willy’s analysis in Case P62 of how the principal 
purpose should be measured (on something less than 50 per cent), was not 
challenged.92  
In BNZ Investments, the taxpayer was a financial planner and offered investment 
advice to its customers (for a small fee amounting to 2 per cent of total business 
income), as well as implementing that advice (and receiving a larger commission). 
Generally, 90 per cent of their time was spent on investment advice and 10 per cent 
on implementation. While both activities were of a financial nature and therefore 
exempt supplies,93 the provision of advice was excluded from the financial services 
exemption.94 Thus, only the implementation of advice was an exempt activity. 
Accordingly, the taxpayer argued that the supply of advice (not implementation) was 
the principal purpose and was entitled to claim a full input tax credit. The CIR 
argued to the contrary although conceded that the taxpayer might be entitled to a 10 
per cent adjustment. The TRA found for the taxpayer and allowed an adjustment of 
10 per cent for the exempt activity. 
The High Court (overturning the result in the TRA) held that the advice was merely 
a “means to an end” (not the end or ultimate purpose) and provided little income to 
the business. The main method of earning income was by earning commissions on 
investments placed with financial institutions. Doogue J observed that: 
“With all respect to the TRA, it, like the taxpayer, has confused the means by which the 
taxpayer achieved its purpose with its purpose. Its purpose was not the provision of almost 
free advice to its customers but the making of an income from the investments made by those 
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90
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customers: that is, the GST-exempt activity. The error is understandable when the taxpayer, 
to achieve its income, had to invest so much time and trouble in the investment advice aspect 
of its business.” 
The essential difference between the TRA and High Court in determining which 
purpose (advice or implementation) was the principal purpose was the High Court’s 
focus on the revenue generated, rather than effort (or time) spent. Doogue J justified 
this approach on the basis that here was no suggestion that the taxpayer was carrying 
on business for a purpose other than achieving a profit. Had the taxpayer charged 
realistic fees (that were not loss making) or demonstrated that revenue was not 
central to their on-going existence, the focus and result may well have been different.  
Within a year the court again returned to the meaning of the word “principal” in 
Case S8195 which was successfully appealed in CIR v Morris.96 In Morris, Giles J 
did not refer directly to Taylor97 or Mitchell,98 but did cite with approval Doogue J’s 
analysis of those cases in BNZ Investments — where Doogue J concluded that “the 
word “principal” should be interpreted as main or primary or fundamental 
purpose”.99  
The significance of the Morris case is the judicial recognition of two lines of 
competing cases (those supporting a more than half approach, and those that 
supported something less) and the explicit decision to follow the “less than half” test. 
While BNZ Investments is cited as the authority for this principal purpose test, 
Morris is when it became the undisputed authority.  
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 Case S81 (1996) 17 NZTC 7,505 (Judge Barber). 
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interpreted as a “more than half” test. 
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The test outlined in BNZ Investments100 has since been approved by the High Court 
in Norfolk Apartments Ltd v CIR,101, Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR,102 and CIR v 
Trustees in the Mangaheia Trust.103 It appears the courts, with approval from 
commentators104, have moved towards adopting the Taylor105 interpretation of 
“principal purpose” and moved way from the “more than half” approach in 
Mitchell.106 This was a shift in thinking that was certainly open for subsequent High 
Courts to entertain.  
As Keating observes, a shift from a “more than half” approach to a “fundamental 
purpose” approach avoids the need for the court to weigh up a single purpose against 
combined alternatives — which could be unduly arduous. The court “must simply 
determine which is the most significant of all competing purposes”.107 However, the 
proposed removal of the “principal purpose” test, and adoption of a use 
apportionment based test, could well throw the courts back to more detailed 
measurement process.  
An alternative approach to principal purpose: the sufficient nexus test 
Despite the general principles outlined in Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR, the High Court 
in CIR v Trustees in the Mangaheia Trust sought to apply a “nexus” test to determine 
the “principal purpose”, first used in Case Q43 (1993) 15 NZTC 5,208 (TRA) and 
subsequently in Case U30 (2000) 19 NZTC 9,286 (TRA) and Case W3 (2003) 21 
NZTC 11,014 (TRA).  
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According to Gendall J:108 
“These decisions demonstrate one way of approaching the factual inquiry required under s 
3A(1)(a). To establish whether the services were required for the "principal purpose" of 
making taxable supplies may be to ask whether there is sufficient nexus between the services 
acquired and the making of the taxable supplies. It is inherent in a "sufficient nexus" 
approach that the purpose must be the principal purpose - if the principal purpose was 
something other than the making of taxable supplies then the conclusion should be there was 
insufficient nexus.” (emphasis added) 
Some commentators have expressed concerns about this High Court decision. 
According to Keating:109 
“… Gendall J’s decision (and the reasoning in Case T30) is both bad policy and contrary to 
the clear wording of the legislation. Furthermore, the reasoning in that decision even appears 
to be at odds with the income tax treatment of similar administrative expenses.” 
However, a similar use of “nexus” or being “tied” to the taxable activity was also 
applied in Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR to determine the principal purpose.110 The fact 
the courts have been drawn to devise other tests to determine the “principal” purpose 
illustrates the general difficulty in identifying and applying such a test.  
Is “principal” the immediate or ultimate purpose? — a blurring of the lines 
In Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR the High Court was called upon to determine the 
temporal scope of the principal purpose test.111 The facts were similar to CIR v 
Norfolk Apartments Ltd.112 The taxpayer had expanded their rest home business and 
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acquired additional land to expand the existing complex as well as construct several 
self-contained studio units and six stand-alone villas. Occupation of the units and 
villas were granted under a licence to occupy. Importantly, the provision of care was 
a compulsory component of the licence. The Commissioner rejected the taxpayer's 
claim for full input tax credit on the basis the principal purpose of the supply of the 
studio units and villas was not immediately for elderly care, but for occupation and 
accommodation. 
The court rejected the Commissioner’s argument and concluded that the dispute had 
essentially resulted from the Commissioner’s inability to make a proper distinction 
between “the objector's object and the means by which it has set out to achieve that 
object”.113 The court held that when determining the principal purpose it was 
necessary to make an overall evaluation of “all relevant purposes”, 114 and purposes 
that could not be fulfilled until some future time should not be automatically ruled 
out. Chisholm J observed that:115 
“… In some cases it may be possible to achieve the principal purpose within the taxation 
period under consideration while in other cases achievement of the principal purpose may be 
much more distant in time. Each case will depend on its own facts.” 
The High Court determined that the licences to occupy the studios and villas were 
“factually and legally tied to the provision of care to the elderly” which was a 
                                                                                                                                     
the facilities by way of a lease. The dwellings took up one-third of the land, the remainder being for 
common use. Both the High Court and Court of Appeal rejected the taxpayer’s claim. The Courts held 
that the taxpayer's principal purpose in acquiring and developing the land was to be able to provide 
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115
 Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR (1999) 19 NZTC 15,202 (HC) at 15,207 at [27]. 
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taxable activity.116 The licences to occupy constitute nothing more than a legal 
mechanism that made it possible to deliver residential care to the occupants of the 
studio units. 
Principal purpose and the other purpose: the one purpose model 
The High Court in CIR v Carswell Investments Ltd 117 was invited to entertain an 
argument that there could only be one purpose, which effectively challenged the 
reasoning in Morris that it was possible to have two different concurrent purposes. In 
Morris, Giles J had held that:118 
“s 21(1) requires a purpose which need not be the 'principal purpose' … [but rather] a new 
purpose that is separate and distinct from the principal purpose.”  
It was argued that s 21(1) drew a distinction between a “principal purpose of making 
taxable supplies” on the one hand, and “a (subsequent) purpose other than that of 
making taxable supplies” on the other. Accordingly, the subsequent purpose had to 
be a new and different purpose, which displaced the earlier principal one. A principal 
and a subsequent purpose could not co-exist.119 
This interpretation was rejected by the High Court. Panckhurst J observed that the 
very concept of deeming a supply presupposed that the principal purpose subsisted, 
which meant that there had to be two purposes co-existing.120 This interpretation was 
                                               
116
 The different outcome in Norfolk and Wairakei can be explained on the basis of the taxpayer’s 
taxable activity. In Norfolk, the activity was classified as providing dwellings (an exempt non-taxable 
activity), whereas in Wairakei it was elderly care (a taxable activity). Had the taxpayer in Norfolk 
been providing “retirement care”, the result might have been different, although the Court of Appeal’s 
recognition that the common areas formed part of the building (an appurtenances to the dwellings) as 
a single exempt supply, would suggest not. 
117
 CIR v Carswell Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,149 (HC). 
118
 CIR v Morris (1997) 18 NZTC 13,385 (HC) at 13,395 at [45]. 
119
 The word “subsequently” was inserted into s 21(1) by s 6(1)(b) of the Goods and Services Tax 
Amendment Act 1987 and the reason for its late insertion is unknown. It is interesting to note that 
Willy J in Case Q51 (1993) 15 NZTC 5,284 (TRA) at 5,291 at [49] observed that “subsequent was 
the opposite of contemporaneous”. See also Case P59 (1992) 14 NZTC 4,406 (TRA). It is submitted 
that such an interpretation would appear to suggest that s 21 cannot apply to apportion mixed uses that 
have dual purposes at the time of acquisition because they are contemporaneous and have not 
changed.  
120
 CIR v Carswell Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,149 (HC) at [33]. 
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reconfirmed in Lundy (HC).121 However, had it been accepted, it would have 
prevented any model of multiple concurrent purposes,  which proved troublesome 
for the courts to apply,122 when attempting to then determine the level of 
apportionment between them. If the principal purpose test had also remained a more 
than 50 per cent test, such an interpretation would have provided a very simple 
model to apply, that would have had very low compliance costs (and avoided any 
need for de minimis rules).  
Under a one-purpose model, an adjustment would only occur if the principal purpose 
had been abandoned and would provide a one-off full output tax credit adjustment. 
This would effectively have removed any mismatching or disconnect between input 
and output tax credits or indefinite adjustments.123 
Concurrent purposes — the multiple purpose model 
Despite a number of High Court cases providing guidance, the courts continued to 
struggle with the operation of the rules and identification of the issues. In Case 
W28,124 (a property development case that was ultimately decided on the question of 
valuation methodology in the Court of Appeal decision in Lundy),125 Willy J held 
that Morris126 and Carswell127 were authority for the proposition that it was possible 
to have two concurrent principal purposes, which was an interpretation rejected by 
the High Court as wrong and not supported by either Morris or Carswell.128 
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 CIR v Lundy Family Trust (2004) 21 NZTC 18,595 (HC). 
122
 For example, see CIR v Lundy Family Trust (2004) 21 NZTC 18,595 (HC). 
123
 Effectively this is the change-in-use adjustment model applied in Canada and might explain the low 
litigation activity the Canadian rules have experienced. 
124
 Case W28 (2003) 21 NZTC 11,289 (TRA) at 11,300 at [23]. 
125
 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA). 
126
 CIR v Morris (1997) 18 NZTC 13,385 (HC). 
127
 CIR v Carswell Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,149 (HC). 
128
 The Carswell case was a failed attempt to distinguish Morris on the basis that the rental activity was 
part of the principal purpose and not a separate purpose (ie, the rental activity facilitated security 
while the properties were marketed for sale, not to derive rents). In essence this was a similar line of 
argument advanced by Judge Barber in Case S81 who suggest rental activity was part of property 
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On appeal in CIR v Lundy Family Trust,129 the High Court acknowledged that there 
were multiple purposes (eg, property development for sale and letting), but found 
that while “the principal purpose and subsequent purpose co-exist” there could only 
be one principal purpose at anyone time and this was the purchase of the properties 
for ultimate sale. The letting supply was a lesser purpose. According to Chisholm J, 
the real issue was not whether there could be two principal purposes, but the extent 
to which the properties were applied for the non-taxable purpose of letting.  
The High Court (and subsequently the Court of Appeal)130 were also unable to 
accept the Commissioner’s argument that the principal purpose of property 
development had been subsequently displaced by a new principal purpose of letting. 
Chisholm J considered the argument unsustainable.131 The letting was a non-taxable 
purpose that was deemed to have been supplied by operation of the adjustment rules 
themselves. The rules themselves imply that the non-taxable supply is the lesser 
purpose and the amount of displacement is determined by their “extent”.  
Chisholm J’s reasoning would appear to be somewhat circular in logic and does not 
address the question whether the principal purpose had been abandoned — which is 
at the heart of Commissioner’s argument.132 Surely the Commissioner’s argument 
could have been simply addressed by the facts themselves. The fact the apartments 
remained for sale at all times, suggests that the principal purpose had not been 
abandoned or displaced. Had the court not accepted the properties were for sale at all 
times, it is likely the result might have been different.  
                                                                                                                                     
development (which was an approach and overturned in Morris). Panckhurst J rejected the argument 
as it was not supported by the facts. The rental activity was not incidental, but substantial, both in 
income and duration of the tenancies. Interestingly the Court gave little consideration to the rental 
activity being an exempt supply when determining the existence of another purpose as it had in 
Morris. 
129
 CIR v Lundy Family Trust (2004) 21 NZTC 18,595 (HC). 
130
 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corporation Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA). 
131
 CIR v Lundy Family Trust (2004) 21 NZTC 18,595 (HC) at 18,603 at [31]. 
132
 There is nothing in the legislation suggesting that a non-taxable supply cannot be a principal purpose. 
On the contrary, the principal purpose test operates on the basis of disallowing input tax credits where 
a non-taxable supply is the principal purpose. 
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As Galzebrook J observed:133 
“In this case, the taxpayers' principal purpose of the sale of the properties in the course of 
their taxable activities subsisted. The properties were therefore at all times being used for 
that taxable purpose. They were part of the taxpayers' trading stock and, indeed, remained on 
the market at all times. At the same time, they were let for residential purposes, but on a 
temporary basis.” 
Glazebrook J’s judgement also suggests that the question of determining the 
principal purpose is not restricted to examining the evidence or the taxpayer’s mind 
only during the relevant taxable period (where the Court of Appeal recognised that in 
terms of both time and space the properties were 100 per cent dedicated to both 
purposes), but over the lifetime of the activity.134 In contrast, the measurement of any 
change-in-use is often framed within the context of the taxable period.  
Subjective or objective test  
It is also worthwhile noting that in tandem with the court’s difficulty in applying the 
“principal purpose” test, they have had equal difficulty deciding on whether the test 
should be determined objectively, subjectively, or a combination of both135 (or in 
some instances, if the facts allowed, not at all).136 As Chisholm J observed in 
Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR there had:137  
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 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corporation Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA) at 19,647 at 
[41]. 
134
 This broader approach to identifying the principal purpose is consistent with earlier cases.  
135
 An objective test was applied in: CIR v Carswell Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,149 (HC) 
(citing Morris); CIR v Morris (1997) 18 NZTC 13,385 (HC) (citing Case M106); Case U13 (1999) 19 
NZTC 9,147 (TRA) (citing Case M106); Case P5 (1992) 14 NZTC 4,034 (TRA); Case M106 (1990) 
12 NZTC 2,674 (TRA); Case N13 (1991) 13 NZTC 3,105 (TRA) (citing Case M106); and Case Q43 
(1993) 15 NZTC 5,208 (TRA) (citing Case M106). A combination test was applied in: Wairakei 
Court Ltd v CIR (1999) 19 NZTC 15,202 (HC) (citing Case P62); Case Z12 (2009) 24 NZTC 14,142 
(TRA) (citing Wairakei); Case S56 (1996) 17 NZTC 7,361 (TRA); Case Q51 (1993) 15 NZTC 5,284 
(TRA); Case P62 (1992) 14 NZTC 4,427 (TRA); Case N13 (1991) 13 NZTC 3,105 (TRA); Case N22 
(1991) 13 NZTC 3,187 (TRA) (where Judge Bathgate stated “No matter how ‘purpose’ is to be 
interpreted, in either an objective or subjective sense, the purpose of applying A and B to obtain rental 
returns, albeit for a net loss, was undoubtedly an object or end the objector had in view when it let 
those properties”), Case M53 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,312 (TRA); Case U30 (2000) 19 NZTC 9,286 
(TRA); and Case W3 (2003) 21 NZTC 11,014 (TRA). 
136
 Several cases have declined to entertain a decision on whether a subjective, objective or combination 
test is required. These cases were: Coveney v CIR (1994) 16 NZTC 11,328 (HC) at [55] (where Fraser 
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“… been some divergence in judicial opinion about whether the principal purpose should be 
evaluated objectively, subjectively or by reference to a combination of those factors”. 
At present it would appear that there are essentially two lines of thinking, best 
summed up by Case M106 (approved by the High Court in Wairakei) and Case P62 
(approved by the High Court in Carswell and Morris). In Case M106 Judge Bathgate 
observed that:138 
“… the word 'purpose' in the operation of the Act, and in the particular parts mentioned, is to 
be given an objective meaning. It is to be determined objectively, from the activities of the 
taxpayer in relation to the supply of goods and services and the acquisition of goods and 
services relative to that supply.” 
According to Giles J in Morris, a subjective test was unworkable. The practical 
efficiency of the GST regime required a straightforward approach to purpose which 
was deduced from the objective facts, not on some idiosyncratic basis. However, 
some courts consider that such an approach does not rule out considering subjective 
considerations as well. The most recent word on the issue was expressed by  
Chisholm J in Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR (who agreed with the opinion of Willy J in 
Case P62) who observed that the proper approach:139  
“was to consider all evidence relevant to the stated intention and the manner in which that 
intention had been carried through … it will usually be necessary to consider both subjective 
and objective indicators when determining the principal purpose”. 
                                                                                                                                     
J stated “I do not see any point in conducting an analysis into the subjective and objective 
approaches”); CIR v BNZ Investment Advisory Services Ltd (1994) 16 NZTC 11,111 (HC) at [19] 
(where Doogue J stated “I do not find it helpful to traverse this area of the argument as in the context 
of this case it does not seem to me important whether an objective, subjective or some other 
intermediate position should be taken.”); and Case T44 (1998) 18 NZTC 8,295 at [20] (where Judge 
Barber stated “It does not matter in this case whether one applies a subjective, objective (the usual 
test), or mixed test to ascertaining the "principal purpose" as there is no evidentiary conflict in that 
regard.”). 
137
 Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR (1999) 19 NZTC 15,202 (HC) at 15,206 at [21]. 
138
 Case M106 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,674 (TRA) at 2,678-2,679. 
139
 Wairakei Court Ltd v CIR (1999) 19 NZTC 15,202 (HC) at 15,206 at [21]. 
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The fact the courts have oscillated between whether subjective considerations should 
be included (or not) has added to the level of uncertainty surrounding the correct 
application of the principal purpose test.140 
G. The Problems of Calculating Adjustments 
The Court of Appeal’s last word 
The Court of Appeal in CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd141 
highlighted (and attempted to resolve) a number of ongoing inconsistencies and 
ambiguities that existed in the adjustment rules in the unanimous judgment of the 
court delivered by Glazebrook J. These problems included: a lack of connection 
between adjustments and the initial input tax credits received; the appropriate 
application of a one-off adjustment; and the degree of apportionment and method for 
valuing the adjustment. The fact these problems existed almost 20 years after the 
enactment of the rules and several years after BNZ Investments,142 Morris,143 and 
Carswell,144 illustrates the ongoing and inherent complexity of the adjustment 
rules.145 For all the protagonists (ie, taxpayers, tax advisors, the revenue authority, 
and judiciary), the rules remained difficult to understand, hard to apply, and 
appeared to be divorced from the underlying policy intent.  
                                               
140
 In the author’s view it is implicit in an objective test that subjective considerations are taken into 
account and that there is no distinction between a mixed or objective approach. Clearly the test 
(whether subjective or objective) will be determined by the statutory language. In those income tax 
cases where a subjective test was applied the statutory language used subjective words (eg, 
“intention”). In the former GST provisions (ss 3A and 21) the word “purpose” has been used instead 
of “intention”. It will be interesting to observe whether this debate is re-opened by the statutory 
language of the new apportionment test which has used the expression “intended use” which would 
tend to suggest the import of a subjective test. In contrast, the equivalent Australian rules have used 
more objective terminology (eg, “estimated use”). The Australian terminology is to be preferred if an 
objective test is intended. 
141
 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA). 
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 CIR v BNZ Investment Advisory Services Ltd (1994) 16 NZTC 11,111 (HC). 
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 CIR v Morris [1998] 1 NZLR 344, (1997) 18 NZTC 13,385 (HC). 
144
 CIR v Carswell Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,149 (HC). 
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 This remains a concern for some taxpayers who might still be subject to these rules after 1 April 
2011.  
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As in Morris, the facts in Lundy concerned a property development that had acquired 
input tax credits on the acquisition of the properties, but had subsequently stalled and 
as an interim measure to keep the project financially afloat, a number of properties 
were leased, pending sale.146 At all material times the properties were actively 
marketed and available for sale. Although early judicial consideration in the TRA 
and High Court examined the proper application of the principal purpose test, by the 
time the case arrived at the Court of Appeal the dispute had centred on the correct 
methodology to be applied for determining the adjustment.  
The CIR argued that the holding costs (eg, interest, rates, insurance, depreciation, 
and maintenance costs), of the apartments reflected the true value of the supply and 
had to be included in the adjustment calculation. The taxpayers argued that they had 
followed the IRD’s policy statement example.147 They argued the cost of the rental 
supply was reflected in depreciation, and not the interest, rates, insurance and 
maintenance, which all related to the property development activity.  
Mirror provisions 
The courts have long acknowledged that s 21(1) and (5) were mirror provisions that 
provided for the receipt and payment of input tax and output tax credits, 
respectively.148 However, while the provisions may have mirrored one another 
operationally (ie, enabling the receipt or payment of credits by the taxpayer), it 
remained unclear whether they also mirrored one another financially, so that the total 
amount of output tax credits that had to be paid (or returned to the revenue 
authority), were constrained by the initial input tax credits claimed.149  
                                               
146
 As a number of prior cases suggest, this is a common strategy with property developers and 
continues to be a common strategy in New Zealand and in other jurisdictions. 
147
 Tax Information Bulletin Vol 5:8 (January 1994) p 1. The policy statement was subsequently 
codified in 2000. Document available at 
<www.ird.govt.nz/resources/1/9/194616004bbe4243b4bdf4bc87554a30/tib5-08.pdf> (viewed 20 
March 2011). 
148
 For example, Case U13 (1999) 19 NZTC 9,147 (TRA). Clause 23A of the GST Bill (which became s 
21 of GST Act) was effectively the drawing together of like minded provisions. 
149
 A process described by the High Court as “reversing” the operation of the adjustments. 
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The periodic nature of GST and the lack of relationship between the initial input tax 
credit and the adjustment had the potential for adjustments to be open-ended. A 
major weakness of an adjustment mechanism that utilises deemed supplies, is the 
opportunity for unlimited adjustments, especially where the mechanism does not 
expressly provide in the statutory language for some form of financial cap. The 
added complexity of ongoing periodic adjustments, where a deemed supply for a 
new input or output tax credit might arise over the lifetime of the taxable activity, 
also adds to the confusion. As Keating observes, “it was theoretically possible that 
adjustments made period-by-period could accumulate over time to more than the 
original GST portion paid”.150  
Deemed supply mechanisms are artificial and fictional by nature and require an 
equally artificial and fictional mechanism to constrain them. Without a cap on the 
financial amount, or the time in which a series of adjustments can be made, there is 
substantial room for the process to get very messy.151 As Judge Barber observed in 
Case U13:152 
“… it does concern me that, perhaps, if the apartment were to have been let for long enough 
(which I understand it was not), the accumulated deemed output of one ninth of rental during 
the relevant two-monthly GST periods would eventually exceed the total inputs initially taken 
by the objector when building the apartments. That is not an issue I need to address for the 
present, but one might have thought that when the initial input has been fully recovered by 
the respondent, then the deeming procedure of s 21(1) has been completed (and the original 
principal purpose of making taxable supplies changed or abandoned) and any letting 
thereafter would be regarded as an exempt activity under s 14(c). However, there may be 
problems in achieving that equitable outcome in terms of the wording of the Act.” (emphasis 
added) 
However, the Court of Appeal in Lundy153 rejected such a possibility and in the 
absence of specific rules examined the overall scheme of the Act to reach an answer. 
                                               
150
 M Keating “Calculation GST Adjustments – The Way Forward?” (2006) 2 New Zealand Tax 
Planning Report 9 at 11. 
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 In the Australian apportionment rules, the ongoing adjustment process is capped by time, rather than 
amount (eg, the initial input tax claim). 
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 Case U13 (1999) 19 NZTC 9,147 (TRA) at 9,159 at [37]. 
153
 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA). 
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The Court of Appeal concluded that the adjustment provisions were capped 
financially, based on a conclusion that one-off and periodic adjustments achieve the 
same result “of reversing the earlier input tax credit”.154 Glazebrook J held that “any 
period adjustments cannot exceed the costs (or lower market value)”. However, this 
did not mean there was financial matching. While the value of the reversal could not 
exceed the cost, there was the potential for the value to fall below the cost. This was 
because the value had to be determined on the basis of the “lesser” of cost or market 
value. Effectively, any reversal could never exceed the initial input tax credits 
(contrary to the Commissioner’s argument that it could).  
The court also observed that had there been a total change of use of the whole of the 
goods (or services) “the deemed supply will be of the whole of the goods (or 
services) at the lesser of cost or market value”.155 As discussed above, this approach 
appears to ignore the argument advanced in Case U13 that the principal purpose may 
well have been abandoned well before being used up or totally changing. The failure 
of the Court of Appeal to explore this line of reasoning might suggest that it did not 
find favour with the court. However, it might also be explained on the basis that such 
an argument was not advanced.  
This analysis also highlights the consequences of different interpretations of the 
principal purpose test and whether it should adopt a “more” or “less than half” 
approach. If the principal purpose test is a “more than half” test, then the reasoning 
from Case U13 would suggest that the principal purpose would be abandoned much 
earlier than if the test was a “less than half” test. It is also interesting to observe that, 
while a “less than half” test might provide the court with an easier task in awarding 
input tax credit entitlement, it also provides a much more difficult task when it 
comes to measuring subsequent adjustments. 
Determining the quantum  
The GST Act provides that the value of a supply is calculated on the lesser of either 
cost or market value. The court focused on the cost of the deemed supply. Inherent in 
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 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA) at 19,648 at [48]. 
155
 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA) at 19,647 at [40]. 
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the valuation process is determining the supply. The court determined that what was 
being applied (for the purpose of residential letting) was the properties themselves. 
Thus it was the properties that were the deemed supply and not the exempt activity 
(eg residential letting). The rental activity was the other purpose, not the supply.  
The court also rejected the use of the rent as a means of determining market value. 
This was because such an adjustment “would have the effect of a GST charge on 
what is an exempt supply, which would not accord with the scheme of the 
legislation”.156  
This additional reason for not using rent as a basis of value might appear perplexing 
as the adjustment rules do not appear to make a distinction between private and 
exempt activities, but rather between taxable and non-taxable purposes. However, 
this confuses the identification of different purposes with a determination of value – 
the latter being tied to a supply, and the former tied to the taxable and non-taxable 
purposes. 
The Court of Appeal found that the cost of the buildings was their acquisition cost. 
Consistent with the notion that the rental activity was not the deemed supply the 
court rejected the notion that holding costs could be used to determine cost. The 
court also accepted that the land on which the buildings were located were also to be 
included in the calculation. This was because the land and the buildings were both 
applied to the residential letting and the buildings were effectively no more used up 
in that process than the land. In the absence of any guidance, the court accepted 
depreciation of the cost of the buildings and land was a reasonable method to 
determine the value of the apportionment — depreciation being a measurement of 
value over time.  
“To the extent” — a rough and ready approach to apportionment  
In the absence of any guidance for allocating the adjustments between various 
periods, the court was left to adopt what it considered reasonable. Glazebrook J 
                                               
156
 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA) at 19,646 at [38]. 
Interestingly, the new apportionment rules appear to use market value rental in quantifying the 
adjustment amount (see Part 3 of this Chapter). 
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observed that “any reasonable method appears to be allowed by the statute”.157 Some 
commentators have suggested this was a “rough and ready” approach to 
apportionment.158 The court itself recognised this point, but considered that such an 
approach was a reasonable method and within the scope of the legislation.  
The court recognised that concurrent purposes provided “conceptual difficulties 
because it is not possible to separate out the use of the properties on any time or 
space basis”.159 During the period in question the property was dedicated 100 per 
cent to both purposes. In the absence of any other means of apportionment, the court 
concluded that a division between the value of the land (the principal purpose) and 
the value of the property (the other purpose) provided a reasonable allocation method 
for an apportionment. This was also what the taxpayers had done.  
The court also recognised that service costs relating to the properties (ie, rates and 
insurance) also related equally to both purposes. The court rejected a 50:50 
apportionment as it did not recognise that the principal purpose remained the sale of 
the properties and that the service costs would have been incurred whether the 
properties were let or not. The court was of the opinion that an apportionment of 75 
per cent (principal purpose) and 25 per cent (other purpose) recognised this potential 
difference in use.  
The fact the courts have had to resort to a potential alternative use (that did not 
actually happen, but might have) illustrates the difficulty the courts face with 
apportioning concurrent purposes. In contrast, an apportionment approach (based on 
use) avoids consideration of overlapping or concurrent purposes and instead focuses 
on the actual (or intended) activities.  
The apportionment approach adopted by the Court of Appeal appears to 
acknowledge that different methods of apportionment can be applied for different 
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 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA) at 19,647 at [42]. 
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 M Smith “GST and Real Property Transactions in New Zealand: Some Interpretative Issues” in 
Krever R and White D (eds) GST in Retrospect and Prospect (Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2007) 277 at 
284.  
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 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA) at 19,647 at [43]. 
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elements of the deemed supply (eg, land or property, versus service costs). This 
approach has continued in the new apportionment rules (eg, the method of working 
out the extent of intended taxable use will depend on the nature of the goods and 
services in question).160 
The reasoning in Lundy161 would also appear to be at odds with Morris,162 which 
used the rental activity to measure the value of the deemed supply. However, in 
Morris the taxpayer was unable to provide information about the cost of building the 
two apartments and could not discharge their onus of proof to show that the 
Commissioner should have used a cost method for fixing the value of the deemed 
supply. 
IRD’s continued confusion 
Despite the Court of Appeal’s pronouncement of the law, the adjustment rules have 
continued to be misunderstood. According to IRD the main problems with the 
adjustment rules are:163 
(1) The adjustment does not relate to the original input tax credit: 
“This approach of taxing the “self supply” of goods and services ignores the original input 
tax deduction claimed by the GST-registered person as the change-in-use adjustments do not 
relate to the amount of the deduction claimed on acquisition. This is because the use of 
goods and services for a non-principal purpose is deemed to be a supply which is separate 
from the purchase transaction.”  
(2) There is no limit on the number of adjustments that can be made: 
“Another aspect of the GST rules is that there is no statutory limit on the maximum number 
of adjustments that have to be made, so the number of adjustments required can be excessive 
relative to the amounts involved.” 
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 Tax Information Bulletin Vol 21:1 (February 2011) 34. 
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 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA). 
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 CIR v Morris [1998] 1 NZLR 344, (1997) 18 NZTC 13,385 (HC). 
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 Tax Information Bulletin Vol 23:1 (February 2011) 33. Document available at: 
<www.ird.govt.nz/resources/e/f/efe82b8045b25b4f9dbabf7747109566/tib-vol23-no1.pdf> (viewed 20 
March 2011). 
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(3) The amount of output tax can exceed the original input tax claim: 
“In addition, since change-in-use adjustments do not relate to the amount of the initial input 
tax deduction, the value of adjustments that a person is required to make can potentially 
amount to more than the original GST paid on the purchase. Conversely the value of the 
deduction received by means of change-in-use adjustments can sometimes exceed the 
amount of GST originally paid.” 
While the point 2 quote is correct, the point 1 and 3 quotations are confused. The 
Court of Appeal in Lundy164 clearly stated that the output tax credit cannot exceed 
the original input tax claim. It cannot “potentially amount to more than the original 
GST paid”, but it can amount to less if market value is lower than cost (hence they 
do not match).  
The court also found that the deemed supply was not the letting activity, but a 
portion of the property and land. For this reason, the property and land were 
apportioned according to the respective purposes, together with associated service 
costs. In this respect (ie, determining the value of the apportionment) the deemed 
supply is not separate from the purchase transaction. However, the act of deeming a 
supply is conceptually separate, and results from the purpose of the supply. 
H. Revenue Authority Guidance 
It is apparent that there has been very little guidance provided on the adjustment 
rules (illustrated in Figure 1.17). The guidance provided after the introduction of the 
GST Act was merely a restatement of the legislative provisions and failed to 
examine how the specific tests applied in common commercial transactions. The 
poor guidance provided often led to disputes and differing judicial interpretations. It 
was not until the improving judicial clarification of the rules (eg, BNZ Investments to 
Morris) that a flurry of revenue authority guidance appeared between 1994 and 
1998.  
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 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA). 
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Figure 1.17: Official Guidance on Application of Section 21  
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The introduction of the Binding Rulings regime in 1995 did provide the opportunity 
for taxpayers to benefit from increased certainty. Yet after the enactment of the 
Binding Rulings regime, there were still very few public rulings published, with 
most guidance remaining in the form of exposure drafts that are now unlikely to be 
finalised in light of recent reforms.165 It would also appear that IRD have been 
withdrawing from binding themselves to interpretations, with subsequent re-releases 
of rulings appearing as (non-binding) interpretation statements.  
This trend would appear to suggest the IRD are not confident that they are correctly 
interpreting the rules, or do not have confidence that the interpretation provided by 
the judiciary (on which a ruling would be based) is correct and will hold up to 
subsequent scrutiny after the ruling is released. Either way the IRD appear unable to 
provide any certainty for taxpayers. Of course, there is another explanation for a 
deferral of any binding ruling or the general absence of adequate guidance since the 
enactment of the adjustment rules — inadequate resourcing allocated to providing 
adequate guidance.166 It remains to be seen if the new apportionment approach will 
be supported by substantially more guidance than provided to the former rules.  
                                               
165
 Recent trends appear to suggest that IRD are withdrawing from binding themselves to 
interpretations, with recent re-releases of ruling topics appearing as (non-binding) interpretation 
statements. 
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 Dr David White estimates that that the Policy Advice Division (PAD) GST team was for a large 
period merely one to two people. See D White “Twenty Years of GST: The Best Path Forward” 
(2007) 13 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 357 at 358 (fn 9). This is an interesting 
resource allocation given the amount of revenue the GST Act is responsible for, although more 
recently the GST team has expanded to four people (subject to resources being distracted by other 
projects). The fact GST already accounted for approximately 26 per cent of total revenue under a GST 
rate of 12.5 percent (which has since increased to 15 per cent), would suggest it deserves more 
attention. Whether the Rulings team is equally under resourced is unknown, but the limited output 
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I. The Problem of Compliance: A Chorus of Concerns 
Apart from judicial consideration of the adjustment rules there has been very little 
detailed examination of the rules.167 However, what has been written has not been 
complimentary. According to Pallot & Fenwick,168 the change-in-use rules are 
“without a doubt the most practically and technically difficult area in any GST 
system” and an area of law that will “provide on-going challenges in New Zealand 
(as undoubtedly in other jurisdictions) for the private sector, tax practitioners and 
policy makers”.  
In 1994, Deloitte observed that the adjustment provisions were “lengthy, complex 
and difficult to interpret; but when one wrestles through them to their conclusion, 
they combine to produce the apportionment rules”.169 In 1999, the GST Review 
acknowledged that the “the legislation does not clearly specify how the calculations 
are to be made, which creates high compliance costs”,170 and that the “adjustment 
approach used in New Zealand is difficult to apply in some circumstances and has 
resulted in considerable litigation”.171  
In 2010, during submissions on the new apportionment rules the New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA) were of the opinion that the former 
                                                                                                                                     
would suggest it is. The lessons of history would suggest that the Rulings team will also need more 
attention if guidance is to improve above what was delivered in the mid-1990s. 
167
 Keating’s two articles appear to be the only academic contribution to examining New Zealand’s 
change-in-use rules: M Keating “The Principal Purpose Test for the GST Input Tax: Is a Wide 
Interpretation Justified?” 16 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy (2010) 85 and M 
Keating “Calculation GST Adjustments – The Way Forward?” (2006) 2 New Zealand Tax Planning 
Report 9. In part this is a reflection of a general lack of qualified authors to negotiate the topic and 
limited academic resources, rather than any lack of concern. For statistics on the paucity of research 
and publications on New Zealand GST in general from 1986 to 2007, see D White “Twenty Years of 
GST: The Best Path Forward” (2007) 13 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 357 at 
365-371. 
168
 M Pallot and H Fenwick “Recent GST Reforms and Proposals in New Zealand” (2000) 10 Revenue 
Law Journal 88 at 94. 
169
 Deloitte NZSA Educational Tax Course – GST (Continuing Education Paper, March 1994) D7.2. 
170
 B Birch and B English GST: A Review – A Government Discussion Document (Policy Advice 
Division, IRD, Wellington, March 1999) at [4.6]. 
171
 B Birch and B English GST: A Review – A Government Discussion Document (Policy Advice 
Division, IRD, Wellington, March 1999) at [4.10]. 
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change-in-use rules were “cumbersome”172 and the Corporate Taxpayers Group also 
observed that “the current change-in-use provisions are overly complex and 
confusing”.173 Prophetically, submissions on the original GST Bill preceding its 
enactment, also raised concerns about the adoption of an adjustment mechanism and 
the drafting of the provisions. One observation is the opening quote to this chapter. 
Submissions highlighted the fact that the drafting did not “adequately express the 
draftsman’s intent” and that the adoption of a “principal purpose” test would not 
withstand dissection by the courts and would be “bound to be an area of conflict 
between registered persons and the Inland Revenue Department.”174 
The regular and ongoing chorus of concerns with the operation of the adjustment 
rules is compelling. It is little wonder that the adjustment rules have finally been 
abandoned. What is surprising is how long it took to abandon them and adopt an 
apportionment approach. 
J. The Big Picture 
Bringing together Figures 1.2, 1.16 and 1.17 presents an interesting snapshot of 
activity in New Zealand over the last 25 years (illustrated in Figure 1.18).175 
 
 
 
                                               
172
 NZICA Submissions on the Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill (10 September 2010) 5. 
Document available at <www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/85113B1E-46F9-40E1-84B4-
97B8FA15C81F/159160/49SCFE_EVI_00DBHOH_BILL10121_1_A68095_NewZealandIn.pdf> 
(viewed on 20 March 2011). 
173
 Corporate Taxpayers Group Submissions on the Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill (9 
September 2010) at [4.6]. Document available at <www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/9792EC07-
61A5-4E8E-9022-
D7816E51CB91/159146/49SCFE_EVI_00DBHOH_BILL10121_1_A67981_CorporateTax.pdf> 
(viewed on 20 March 2011). 
174
 Peat Marwick Submissions on the Goods and Services Tax Bill 1985 (25 September 1985) 3 at [1.2] 
(FE/85/307, 262W). 
175
 Note that all the case law and guidance is related to the period before the legislative codifications 
introduced by the Taxation (GST and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2000. 
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Figure 1.18: Guidance, Cases, and Legislative Activity Timeline 
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Part 3: The New Rules 
Since embarking on this thesis, Parliament has introduced and enacted the repeal of 
the adjustment rules and replaced them with a new apportionment approach that has 
borrowed heavily from the Australian apportionment rules (although not as heavily 
in legislative expression).  
K. A New Approach: Reform Proposals 
The first legislative audit 
There have been three reviews of the adjustment rules since s 21 was first introduced 
in 1985. The first review of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 began in August 
1987 (and was later published in February 1989), barely a year after the Act had 
come into force on 1 October 1986.176 By the time the review was published in 
February 1989,177 there had already been judicial consideration of the principal 
purpose test and the application of s 21.178 In the meantime IRD had published very 
little detailed guidance on the application of s 21 or the interpretation of “principal 
purpose”.179 The approach taken by the audit exercise was to focus on the issues 
raised in submissions rather than carry out a comprehensive review, as this was not 
feasible due to a limited number of staff.180  
                                               
176
 The purpose of the audit review was to consider any administrative problems in operation and not to 
consider the well-established fundamental policy structure of the Act. 
177
 D Caygill The Goods and Services Tax Act 1985: Legislative Audit (IRD, Wellington, February 
1989). Hereafter referred to as the “1989 Review”. 
178
 Case K55 (1988) 10 NZTC 453 (TRA). 
179
 For example, two short summaries with little detail in Public Information Bulletin 162 (April 1987) 
and Public Information Bulletin 143 (February 1986). Detailed guidance on the application of the 
principal purpose would not be published until Tax Information Bulletin Vol 5:8 (January 1994) 1.  
180
 A constant theme running through much of IRD’s activity (or inactivity) with regard to GST (and in 
particular adjustments) has been a general lack of resources to conduct exhaustive reviews or provide 
sufficient support for taxpayers and advisors. The GST Act itself was designed and implemented with 
limited resources and extraordinarily tight time frames. The frugal nature of its birth appears to have 
continued through the course of its entire life. 
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Despite the short time frame and limited resources, 120 issues were identified as 
requiring corrective action or further consideration.181 As the Minister of Revenue, 
David Caygill observed “a large number of submissions commented on the 
adjustments made for private, exempt, or taxable use of goods and services in terms 
of section 21”.182 Due to the limited resources available to the IRD at the time, the 
120 issues were divided into 5 categories183 and prioritised for action. However, 
despite s 21 being categorised as a key issue, the report deferred consideration of s 
21 to a second report.  
The second report was subsequently published in September 1990,184 but due to the 
complexity of the issue, the GST adjustments topic was again deferred to the Tax 
Simplification Consultative Committee reports published in March 1990 (Interim 
Report)185 and September 1990 (Final Report).186 The Final Report acknowledged 
that small businesses held concerns about the high compliance costs of calculating 
private use adjustments and proposed several changes aimed at reducing compliance 
costs.187  
                                               
181
 D Caygill The Goods and Services Tax Act 1985: Legislative Audit (IRD, Wellington, February 
1989). 
182
 D Caygill The Goods and Services Tax Act 1985: Legislative Audit (IRD, Wellington, February 
1989) i. 
183
 The five categories comprised: (1) key policy issues; (2) interpretation problems; (3) industry 
problems; (4) lesser policy issues; and (5) minor issues. Key issues comprised eight topics including 
“section 21 private use adjustments”. 
184
 D Caygill GST Legislative Audit – Miscellaneous Issues (IRD, Wellington, September 1990). 
185
 D Caygill Tax Simplification Interim Report of the Consultative Committee (IRD, Wellington, March 
1990). 
186
 D Caygill Tax Simplification Final Report of the Consultative Committee (IRD, Wellington, 
September 1990). At the time these reports were being published the government was already 
committed to reducing compliance costs in another report. See D Caygill Consultative Document on 
Tax Simplification (IRD, Wellington, December 1989).  
187
 To reduce compliance costs the Final Report recommended increasing the threshold for capital 
assets subject to one-off adjustments from $10,000 to $40,000, thus reducing the number of assets 
that required ongoing adjustments for private use. Unfortunately it appears this recommendation was 
never enacted. However, in 2000 (10 years later) the threshold was increased to $18,000 (on the basis 
of inflation). The Interim Report had recommended that GST registered persons be given the option 
of making private use adjustments at the end of the income year. This recommendation was 
abandoned in the Final Report in favour of using the private use calculation in income tax returns for 
the relevant GST period (thus reducing compliance costs and avoiding interest calculations).  
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The second legislative audit 
Ten years later a second review, entitled GST: A Review (published in March 
1999),188 provided a much broader review of the Goods and Services Tax Act 
1985.189 Chapter 4 of the 1999 Review is explicitly directed at compliance issues for 
change-in- use adjustments.190 Chapter 5 explored other issues more concerned with 
wording and technical drafting.191 However, unlike the first review in 1989, there is 
little explanation of concerns or problems with the adjustment rules. Rather, the 1999 
Review proposes several policy changes around thresholds192, one-off adjustments, 
and codifying the existing IRD methodology for the allocation of adjustments (eg, 
direct attribution, turn-over, or special method).193 These changes were subsequently 
enacted in 2000. No changes to the inclusion of “principal purpose” in the change-
of-use rules were advanced.  
To its credit, the 1999 Review also explored the apportionment approach adopted in 
Canada and the UK.194 However, the report concluded the apportionment approach 
                                               
188
 B Birch and B English GST: A Review – A Government Discussion Document (Policy Advice 
Division, IRD, Wellington, March 1999). Hereafter referred to as the “1999 Review”. 
189
 The 1999 Review acknowledges that it was the first review of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 
to be conducted under the Government’s generic tax policy process. See B Birch and B English GST: 
A Review – A Government Discussion Document (Policy Advice Division, IRD, Wellington, March 
1999) 3. 
190
 Chapter 4 and 5 resided in Part 2 of the 1999 Review (entitled “Working with GST”). Chapter 4 
comprised 10 pages (pp 27-36) of a 116 page report, a little under 10 per cent. In contrast, Part 3 of 
the Review (entitled “Maintaining the Revenue Base”) comprised 25 pages (pp 41-66). 
191
 Chapter 5 comprised four pages (pp 37-40). The two chapters together comprised 10 per cent of the 
report. The vast majority of the two chapters addresses allocation issues. This would appear to suggest 
that the confusion surrounding “principal purpose” was reasonably settled (or not considered a 
significant issue).  
192
 The minimum threshold for an adjustment to be made (involving an exempt supply) increased from 
$48,000 to $90,000. The one-off adjustment for non-taxable to taxable use was increased from 
$10,000 to $18,000.  
193
 See BR Pub 96/11 (expired) in Tax Information Bulletin Vol 8:10 (December 1996) and earlier 
interpretation statements in Public Information Bulletin 143 (February 1986), Information Bulletin 
169 (February 1988), Tax Information Bulletin Vol 5:8 (January 1994), Tax Information Bulletin Vol 
6:11 (April 1995), Tax Information Bulletin Vol 6:14 (June 1995) and GST Guide – A guide to 
working with GST (GST 600, December 1997).  
194
 B Birch and B English GST: A Review – A Government Discussion Document (Policy Advice 
Division, IRD, Wellington, March 1999) 29 at [4.8-4.9]. Unfortunately the exploration is rather brief. 
Understandably, no explicit reference is made of the rules applied in Australia. While GST in 
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used in both jurisdictions had considerable complexities, especially with the 
treatment of tax credits on disposal. Furthermore the apportionment approach was 
considered inconsistent with the GST Acts underlying principle that GST was borne 
by the final consumer. The report concluded that this key principle should be 
retained, but that the compliance costs of the existing rules had to be reduced.195  
The third legislative audit 
Twenty years after the first review, two further reports were released. The first was a 
2008 Issues Paper196 in which officials explored the adjustment rules applied in 
other jurisdictions,197 among other things. The second was a 2009 discussion 
document,198 in which the government proposed major reform in response to 
feedback on the 2008 Issues Paper — replacing the existing adjustment rules with a 
cost-based apportionment approach.199 The 2009 reform proposal finally 
acknowledged that New Zealand’s current approach was “complex and 
confusing”.200  
New legislation 
On 5 August 2010, the Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill 2010 was tabled 
in Parliament and received its first reading on 19 August 2010, before being directed 
                                                                                                                                     
Australia was unveiled in August 1998, it was not enacted until 8 July 1999 (and commenced from 1 
July 2000), several months after the 1999 Review was published. 
195
 B Birch and B English GST: A Review – A Government Discussion Document (Policy Advice 
Division, IRD, Wellington, March 1999) 29 at [4.11]. 
196
 Policy Advice Division and Treasury Options for Strengthening GST Neutrality in Business-to-
Business Transactions: An Officials' Issues Paper (IRD, Wellington, June 2008). Officials received 
23 submissions and in light of these submissions considered there was scope for reform of the 
change-in-use rules and recommended publishing a discussion document outlining reform proposals. 
197
 This time the jurisdictions examined included Australia. 
198
 P Dunne GST: Accounting for Land and Other High-Value Assets – A Government Discussion 
Document (IRD, Wellington, November 2009).  
199
 The inference in the 2009 Reform proposal is that the feedback comes from the Issues Paper 
published in June 2008. However, serious concerns with s 21 have been present since the First Review 
published in 1989. 
200
 P Dunne GST: Accounting for Land and Other High-Value Assets – A Government Discussion 
Document (IRD, Wellington, November 2009) 21. 
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to the Finance and Expenditure Committee for consideration.201 The Bill (amongst 
other GST reforms), proposed the repeal of the adjustment rules and the adoption of 
a use-based apportionment approach together with a new mechanism (modelled on 
the Australian rules) for capping the number of adjustments. The Bill was reported 
back from the Finance and Expenditure Committee (FEC) on 15 November 2010,202 
received its second reading on 24 November 2010, and was passed by the House on 
9 December 2010. On 20 December 2010, the Bill was enacted as the Taxation (GST 
and Remedial Matters) Act 2010, which applies from 1 April 2011 (or from 1 April 
2016 under transitional measures). 
During the first reading of the Bill the Minister of Revenue acknowledged that while 
New Zealand’s GST system was praised internationally for “its simplicity, its 
efficiency, and its transparency”, over the passage of time some parts of the GST 
system (ie, the adjustment rules) had lacked clarity and had become “cause for 
concern”. According to the Minister the “purpose of these measures is to clarify 
those parts of the GST rules where taxpayers have been experiencing difficulty in 
accounting for GST or interpreting the legislation”.203 The Minister also 
acknowledged that the new apportionment rules would make it easier to understand 
the change-in-use rules, reduce compliance costs, and “simplify the requirements for 
many GST-registered businesses”.204  
                                               
201
 Submissions on the Bill closed on 9 September 2010. Document available at: 
<www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/Legislation/Bills/1/e/c/00DBHOH_BILL10121_1-Taxation-GST-
and-Remedial-Matters-Bill.htm> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
202
 According to the Tax Policy Report, PAD 2010/255 (7 October 2010), the Finance and Expenditure 
Committee (FEC) received 16 submissions and according to the Officials Report to the FEC (15 
November 2010), heard six submissions on the Bill. The Officials Report on the Bill responded to a 
number of submissions on the change-in-use rules and appears to indicate that the change-in-use rules 
took nearly a quarter of the FEC’s attention (ie, comprised 22 pages of discussion in a 110 page 
document). 
203
 Dunne P “Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill – First Reading” (19 August 2010) 665 NZPD 
13,277. Document available at <www.parliament.nz/en-
NZ/PB/Debates/Debates/6/5/e/49HansD_20100818_00001365-Taxation-GST-and-Remedial-Matters-
Bill-First.htm> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
204
 Dunne P “Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill – Second Reading” (24 November 2010) 669 
NZPD 15,769. Document available at <www.parliament.nz/en-
NZ/PB/Debates/Debates/1/1/0/49HansD_20101124_00001004-Taxation-GST-and-Remedial-
Matters-Bill-Second.htm> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
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The emphasis in Hansard on the compliance costs savings of the new apportionment 
rules is repeated in IRD’s summary of the new rules, where it states:205 
“Overall, the new rules are intended to reduce compliance costs for businesses by being 
simpler and requiring fewer adjustments.” 
What is driving reform?  
Both the 1999 GST Review and the 2008 Issues Paper declined to adopt an 
apportionment approach. The 1999 GST Review conclude that while the 
apportionment approach may appear to be simpler and more accurate in determining 
input tax credits, it had considerable complexities.206 It acknowledged that the 
current adjustment approach also imposed high compliance costs, but expressed a 
preference to keep these rules and to focus on reducing the cost of complying with 
them. Nine years later, private sector submissions on the 2008 Issues Paper noted 
that the adjustment rules were “complex and confusing” and the concepts behind 
imposing GST on mixed use and changes-in-use were not sufficiently transparent 
and could result in ongoing costs due to the indefinite nature of adjustments.207  
Underlying the 2009 reform proposals is a strong concern for providing simplicity, 
improving compliance and reducing compliance costs. Throughout the report, 
references to “conceptual simplicity”, “transparency”, and reducing “uncertainty” are 
regularly made.208 The report also explicitly acknowledged that the Australian 
approach was perceived as simpler.209 The focus on transparency appears to be in 
                                               
205
 Tax Information Bulletin Vol 23:2 (February 2011) 33. 
206
 The 1999 report provided two examples. First, apportionment required prediction of future use. 
Second, it had complex rules for determining value on disposal. See B Birch and B English GST: A 
Review – A Government Discussion Document (Policy Advice Division, IRD, Wellington, March 
1999) 29 at [4.10]. 
207
 M Pallot Tax Policy Report to Minister of Revenue, PAD2009/192 (8 October 2009) 3 at [7]. 
208
 A principal reason for not adopting the Issues Paper proposals to modify the existing rules, was 
concern that it would not simplify the rules, but rather complicate them further. See P Dunne GST: 
Accounting for Land and Other High-Value Assets – A Government Discussion Document (IRD, 
Wellington, November 2009) 22 at [7.7].  
209
 P Dunne GST: Accounting for Land and Other High-Value Assets – A Government Discussion 
Document (IRD, Wellington, November 2009) 22 at [7.7]. 
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direct response to the criticism made by the Court of Appeal in Lundy.210 Certainly, 
the timing of the reform (after the Court of Appeal’s judgment) would appear to 
indicate this.  
Similar themes appear throughout several reports to the Minister, which 
acknowledged that the reform proposals were “more intuitive”, provided “greater 
consistency” for land transactions, and brought the rules “into line with the approach 
taken in Australia”,211 adding: 212 
“Owing to the clear link between the initial input tax adjustments an the change-in-use 
adjustments, the proposed rules will be easier to understand and follow than the current 
rules. … and will reduce compliance costs” 
Generally the reforms appear to focus more on simplicity and compliance than 
revenue. 213 There has been no cost-benefit analysis undertaken for implementing the 
proposed reform and Inland Revenue has acknowledged that it did not have 
sufficient information on the fiscal impact of reforming the rules.214 However, the 
reform proposals were considered to be “revenue neutral”, offering “solutions to 
neutrality concerns” and not having any “significant” revenue impact.215 This would 
                                               
210
 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA). The reform 
proposal directly attributes the Court of Appeal’s concerns in terms of “transparency” and “tax and 
compliance costs”: P Dunne GST: Accounting for Land and Other High-Value Assets – A 
Government Discussion Document (IRD, Wellington, November 2009) 21. 
211
 M Pallot Tax Policy Report to Minister of Revenue, PAD2009/202 (20 October 2009) 3 at [2]. 
Obtained under Official Information Act 1982. Request made to Manager, Policy Advice Division, 
Inland Revenue Department. 
212
 M Pallot Cabinet Paper: GST Issues for the July 1010 Bill PAD 2010/137 (21 June 2010) 2 at [7]. 
Obtained under Official Information Act 1982. Request made to Manager, Policy Advice Division, 
Inland Revenue Department. 
213
 Clearly there have been revenue concerns in relation to a minority of taxpayers using adjustments to 
circumvent second hand goods restrictions: P Dunne GST: Accounting for Land and Other High-
Value Assets – A Government Discussion Document (IRD, Wellington, November 2009) 32 at [7.49]. 
This concern will be removed with the adoption of the new apportionment approach. 
214
 M Pallot Tax Policy Report to Minister of Revenue, PAD2009/192 (8 October 2009) 3-4 at [10]. 
Obtained under Official Information Act 1982. Request made to Manager, Policy Advice Division, 
Inland Revenue Department. 
215
 M Pallot Cabinet Paper: GST Issues for the July 1010 Bill PAD 2010/137 (21 June 2010) 1. 
Obtained under Official Information Act 1982. Request made to Manager, Policy Advice Division, 
Inland Revenue Department. 
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suggest that the administrative costs to the IRD are not a principal driver for these 
reforms. This is confirmed by Inland Revenue’s concern that financial service 
providers may suffer increased compliance costs if they were required to apply the 
new apportionment rules. Accordingly, officials supported transitional rules that 
would enable the preservation of existing agreements.216  
Little argument is made for justifying the changes on the basis of equity, efficiency, 
or administrative costs.217 Although officials do make several references to 
underlying revenue concerns and providing options that address “the tax base 
risks”.218 Much of the reform is about providing an accurate mechanism to ensure 
input tax credits correspond to taxable use in the first instance.219 At first glance, it is 
hard to see where compliance costs have been reduced. Both the adjustment 
approach and the apportionment approach require taxpayers to track their use of 
goods and services to determine if there has been a change of use.  
Furthermore, the apportionment approach could provide the IRD a revenue wind-
fall. At present non-taxable use is accounted for at the end of the GST period (eg, 2 
months after the good or service has been acquired). The apportionment approach 
brings this forward to the time the taxpayer receives the goods or services (eg, the 
taxpayer now has to predict non-taxable use).220 However, the former adjustment 
approach potentially remitted adjustments more regularly (ie, 2-monthly), whereas 
                                               
216
 M Pallot Cabinet Paper: Officials Report to the FEC PAD 2010/255 (7 October 2010) 2 at [4]. 
Obtained under Official Information Act 1982. Request made to Manager, Policy Advice Division, 
Inland Revenue Department. 
217
 Interestingly, no mention is made of harmonising our rules with Australia, although the implication 
of adopting the Australian approach would result in greater trans-Tasman harmonisation.  
218
 P Dunne GST: Accounting for Land and Other High-Value Assets – A Government Discussion 
Document (IRD, Wellington, November 2009) 2. 
219
 Effectively, this addresses judicial concerns raised by the Court of Appeal in CIR v Lundy Family 
Trust and Behemoth Corporation Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA), over the complexity of the 
existing valuation methodologies. 
220
 Alternatively, taxpayers could claim that they do not forecast any non-taxable use, and wait for the 
next adjustment period. It’s unclear how taxpayers will be incentivised to provide fair and reasonable 
estimates. Guidance in Tax Information Bulletin Vol 23:1 (February 2011) 34, on the application of 
fair and reasonable estimates is silent on the issue of penalties and one is left to assume not taking a 
fair and reasonable estimate will probably fall under the tax shortfall penalty provisions in Part 9 of 
the Tax Administration Act 1994 (eg, not taking reasonable care or taking an unacceptable tax 
position).  
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the new apportionment approach remits adjustments on an adjustment period basis 
(ie, 12-monthly). 
L. The Apportionment Rules 
General overview 
The new rules provide a new mechanism for initial entitlement to input tax credits 
and any subsequent adjustments.221 The new rules seek to achieve as much accuracy 
as possible in the first instance by requiring taxpayers to make a fair and reasonable 
estimate of the intended taxable and non-taxable uses of acquired goods and services 
at the time of acquisition.222 Intended use includes items intended to be used, but 
which are not yet applied in the taxable period in which they were acquired (eg, raw 
materials not yet used for making goods). Accordingly, taxpayers are able to claim a 
full input tax credit in respect of goods and services “available for use” in making a 
taxable supply.223 
Following the initial input tax credit claim, taxpayers will be required to make an 
adjustment if the actual taxable use of an asset is different from its intended taxable 
                                               
221
 A more detailed explanation of the new apportionment rules is provided in Tax Information Bulletin 
Vol 23:1 (February 2011) 33-42. 
222
 However, the new rules do not define the meaning of “acquired” or “time of acquisition”. Do the 
terms “acquired” and “time of acquisition” refer to the moment that legal and equitable ownership is 
obtained, possession, performance, or the time payment is made. Case T35 (1997) 18 NZTC 8,235 
(TRA) suggests there are problems with word “acquired” and determining the exact period of 
acquisition might prove difficult in relation to intangible or continuous services (rather than goods). 
Officials considered that the terms “acquired” and “time of acquisition” should be given their normal 
meaning and do not consider that attempting to define the terms would be helpful. This is because the 
legislation relies on the notion that input tax may only be claimed “to the extent” that an asset is 
“used” for making taxable supplies. In most situations, a purchaser will not be able to use goods or 
services until they obtain ownership of the goods and services. However, it is possible for goods and 
services to be acquired in other ways. The focus is on the time of actual “use” for the taxable activity 
– this is the point of acquisition.  
223
 Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill 2010 (182-2) Officials’ Report to the Finance and 
Expenditure Committee on Submissions on the Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill (IRD, 
Wellington, October 2010) 57. Document available at 
<http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2010-or-grm.pdf> (viewed 20 March 2011). This is 
consistent with the UK Lennartz Mechanism which allows a full input tax credit to be acquired, with 
output tax credits counting for any subsequent non-taxable use: Lennartz v Finazamt Munchen III, 
CFEC Case C-97/90; [1995] STC 514. See Tolley’s Value Added Tax 2007 (1st Ed, Lexis Nexis Ltd, 
2007) 739 at [35.7(3)].  
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use at the end of an adjustment period.224 However, no adjustment will be required if 
the percentage difference of the adjustment is no more than 10 per cent and the 
adjustment does not exceed $1,000 in total.225  
The first adjustment period is a period that starts on the date of acquisition and ends 
at least 12 months after the date of acquisition on the taxpayer’s first balance date. 
All subsequent adjustment periods are annual 12-month periods that start from the 
end of each adjustment period. 
The number of adjustment periods for all supplies (excluding real property) is 
capped.226 There is no limit on adjustment periods for land.227 The number of 
adjustment periods for which adjustments are required is based on the GST-
exclusive value of the supply (see Table 1.1 below). Alternatively, taxpayers will be 
able to select the maximum number of adjustments by reference to the estimated 
useful life of the asset specified in the Tax Depreciation Rates Determinations.228  
Depending on the value of the goods and services acquired, the number of 
adjustments that have to be made for “substantial” changes in the use of goods and 
services will be determined by the value of the transaction. The higher the value of 
an asset, the greater number of adjustments the taxpayer will have to make over a 
longer period of time.229  
                                               
224
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21(3). An adjustment arises on the last day of the relevant 
adjustment period. 
225
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21(2)(c) and (d). Officials acknowledged that a 5 per cent safe 
harbour threshold had originally been proposed in the 2009 discussion document GST: Accounting for 
Land and Other High-Value Assets – A Government Discussion Document (IRD, Wellington, 
November 2009), but declined to adopt a safe harbour rule instead  favouring a 10 per cent de 
minimis rule. Officials declined to remove $1,000 financial cap on the de minimis rule during 
submissions on the Bill on the basis that adjustments of $1,000 were substantial. 
226
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21G(4). 
227
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21G(5). 
228
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21G(4). Adopting an estimated useful life (EUL) approach for 
adjustments addresses one of the recommendations made for the improvement to the Australian rules. 
It will be interesting to see if Australia follow. 
229
 According to officials, by requiring taxpayers to make adjustments in relation to high-value assets 
for longer periods of time, the new rules aim to minimise the possibility of taxpayers under-claiming 
or over-claiming input tax in relation to those assets, so that the final amount of the input tax claimed 
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No change-in-use adjustment will be required for goods and services acquired for the 
GST-exclusive value of $5,000 or less.230 For assets with a value of more than 
$5,000, no adjustment will be required in the relevant adjustment period if the 
recipient makes both taxable and exempt supplies and the total value of their exempt 
supplies in the adjustment period is no more than the lesser of $90,000 or 5 per cent 
of the total consideration for all taxable and exempt supplies for that adjustment 
period.231 
There appear to be three opportunities to avoid an adjustment: 
• The supply is $5,000 (excluding GST) or less; or 
• The change-in-use is less than 10 per cent (capped at $1,000 maximum); or 
• Over a 12-month period, the total value of all exempt supplies does not 
exceed 5 per cent of the total value of all supplies (capped at $90,000 
maximum). 
                                                                                                                                     
by the taxpayer corresponds as closely as possible with the actual taxable use of the asset in question. 
Although relaxing the thresholds would reduce compliance costs to taxpayers stemming from having 
to make continuous adjustments for changes in use, it would also reduce the accuracy of the final 
amounts of input tax claimed by taxpayers. Officials considered that the thresholds strike a good 
balance between the need for accuracy and the reduction of compliance costs. Taxation (GST and 
Remedial Matters) Bill 2010 (182-2) Officials’ Report to the Finance and Expenditure Committee on 
Submissions on the Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill (IRD, Wellington, October 2010) 47. 
230
 The $5,000 exclusion (or safe harbour) is intended to act as a compliance and administration cost-
saving measure. However, officials acknowledged it might also potentially result in a loss to the tax 
base. Officials declined to increase the safe harbour threshold from $5,000 to $20,000. According to 
officials, increasing the de minimis threshold (better described as a safe harbour) to $20,000 would 
increase the potential losses to $3,000 (ie, GST at 15 per cent, $20,000 × 15 per cent = $3,000). At 
this level (ie above the loss of $750 = 15 per cent × $5,000), officials considered the requirement to 
make adjustments seemed warranted. Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill 2010 (182-2)  
Officials’ Report to the Finance and Expenditure Committee on Submissions on the Taxation (GST 
and Remedial Matters) Bill (IRD, Wellington, October 2010) 49. However, the $750 loss is less than 
the $1,000 capped loss that would be incurred under the 10 per cent de minimis rule. 
231
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, ss 21(2)(a) and 20(3D). This is effectively a roll over of the 
former de minimis rule. Officials observed that s 20(3D) is intended to relieve taxpayers from having 
to apportion input tax if they make mixed supplies and have reasonable grounds to believe that they 
will make a minimal amount of GST-exempt supplies. However, there was confusion as to whether 
the exclusion applied from the date of initial acquisition or at the end of the adjustment period. 
Officials agreed guidance was required and it will be interesting to see in what form it is provided (ie, 
ruling or policy statements). It is noted that the discussion document specified “on the date of 
acquisition”. See P Dunne GST: Accounting for Land and Other High-Value Assets – A Government 
Discussion Document (IRD, Wellington, November 2009) 24 at [7.18]. 
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Table 1.1: Adjustment Periods 
Proposed  Enacted  
Threshold * Adjustment Period Threshold * Adjustment Period 
$0 - $1,000 0 $0 - $5,000 0 
$1,001 - $5,000 2 $5,001 - $10,000 2 
$5,001 - $499,999 5 $10,001 - $500,000 5 
Above $500,000 10 Above $500,000 10 
*GST Exclusive. 
The enacted thresholds are different to those originally proposed in the discussion 
document.232 The increase from the proposed $1,000 threshold to $5,000 threshold 
for no adjustment, appears to have now created an overlap with the 10 per cent de 
minimis rule (capped at $1,000), such that it will only apply to supplies between 
$10,000 and above $5,000, as anything below $5,000 is already excluded from 
making an adjustment (making the 10 per cent de minimis irrelevant). 
In contrast to Australia, no distinctions are made for different entities (ie financial 
institutions) or between types of non-taxable activity (ie private use or exempt use). 
New Zealand has also provides a much large exclusion from adjustments at $5,000, 
whereas Australia excludes adjustments at either $1,000 or $10,000 (depending on 
the entity or activity). New Zealand has followed the Australian maximum threshold 
of 10 adjustments at $500,000. However, New Zealand has not adopted the 
Australian reform proposal to reduce the maximum number of adjustment to five or 
cap land transaction adjustments.  
Calculation methodology 
Direct or indirect methods for ascertaining the extent of the difference between 
intended and actual use remain available. However, unlike the former adjustment 
rules, the respective methods are not prescribed in the legislation. 
                                               
232
 P Dunne GST: Accounting for Land and Other High-Value Assets – A Government Discussion 
Document (IRD, Wellington, November 2009) 25.The thresholds were increased in response to 
submissions on the discussion document suggesting the thresholds were too low. See Comments on 
submissions to the discussion document GST: Accounting for Land and Other High-Value Assets 
(Policy Advice Division, IRD, Undated) 4. Document available at 
<www.minterellison.co.nz/pdfs/Consultation_note_9_April_2010.pdf> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
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Significantly, the new apportionment methodology has sought to provide a 
connection between subsequent adjustment periods when calculating the value of the 
adjustment. The former adjustment rules did not do this. Under the new rules the 
first adjustment compares the difference between the intended use of the goods or 
services against their actual use.233 All subsequent adjustments compare either: (1) 
actual use against actual use in the earlier period (if there was an earlier adjustment); 
or (2) actual use against intended use (if the earlier adjustment was nil).234  
General apportionment methodology 
The amount of a change-in-use adjustment for an adjustment period is determined 
using the following formula:235 
full input tax deduction × percentage difference 
The “full input tax deduction” is the total amount of input tax credit received on the 
taxable supply. The “percentage difference”236 is the difference between the 
“percentage actual use” and either: (1) the “percentage intended use”; or (2) the 
“previous actual use” if the person has already made an adjustment in an earlier 
adjustment period.  
The second element is a significant change from the former adjustment rules and 
provides a connection between subsequent adjustments to ensure, that irrespective of 
the number of adjustments, the total value of the adjustments does not exceed the 
original input tax credit received.  
Specific rules are also provided for adjustments on disposal.237 
 
                                               
233
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21C(a). This process is consistent with the former rules. 
234
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21C(b)(i) and (ii). 
235
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21D. 
236
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21G(1)(c). 
237
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21F. 
 77 
Apportionment methodology for concurrent use of land 
Unlike the former adjustment approach, a specific formula has been provided for 
apportioning concurrent use between taxable or non-taxable supplies (ie, 
“consideration for taxable supply” / “total consideration for supply”).238 The 
concurrent use formula measures the difference between the cost of the land (taxable 
supply) and the amount of rental income (non-taxable supply).239 If the cost of land 
is not available, the value of the land will be the market value at the time of the 
adjustment (not acquisition). If no rental income was paid, the market value of rental 
income that would have been derived over the adjustment period may be used. If 
market values are not available another method that is fair and reasonable maybe 
used.240 
It is clear that this formula is not a codification of the approach applied in Lundy 
(where the land and building values were compared to derive an apportionment), but 
instead has codified the argument presented by the Commissioner (and rejected by 
the Court of Appeal) that the rental income should have been used.241 Furthermore, a 
market value approach would effectively include holding costs. Again, this was an 
argument presented by the Commissioner and rejected by the Court of Appeal in 
Lundy. 
Transitional rules 
The new rules will apply to all goods and services acquired after 1 April 2011 (see 
Table 1.2). For goods and services acquired before 1 April 2011, taxpayers may 
                                               
238
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21E. The taxpayer may also apply to the Commissioner for 
approval for an alternative approach if the circumstances make the application of the formula 
unworkable. 
239
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21E(3). 
240
 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 21E(6). 
241
 Officials declined to remove this provision in the face of compliance cost concerns of adjusting for 
an exempt use, when the exempt use was temporary and would probably not be reflected in the final 
wash-up calculation when the asset was disposed of. Officials considered that a timing allowance in 
the first adjustment period provided sufficient relief from compliance costs. Officials also considered 
that the provisions were constrained to land only. Furthermore, the provision was only intended to 
provide guidance regarding the methodology to be used to apportion concurrent uses of land and 
allowed taxpayers to apply to the Commissioner for an alternative approach.  
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choose to defer the application of the apportionment rules (ie the obligation to make 
adjustments) depending on the 1 April 2011 market value or book value of goods or 
services.242 
Table 1.2: Application Date for Assets Acquired Before 1 April 2011 
Book or Market Value  Application Date 
$5,000 or less  1 April 2011 
$5,000 and $10,000 1 April 2013 
Above $10,000 1 April 2016 
 
M. Some Comparative Observations of the Two Approaches 
The new apportionment approach is based on “use”, not “purpose”. As Judge 
Bathgate observed in Case M53:243 
“… ‘purpose’ and ‘use’ are not the same concepts. The purpose of an exercise is the object 
for which it was undertaken, the intended action to attain a goal. On the other hand, ‘use’ is 
the act or fact of the using or employing a thing, whether for a particular object or not. A use 
is normally, easily capable of perception from the objective facts involved. On the other hand 
a ‘purpose’ is usually a far more subjective concept, as a goal or an end in view.” 
The former adjustment rules involve awarding (or not) a full input tax credit on the 
basis of a “principal purpose” threshold. It applied an all or nothing approach. Where 
                                               
242
 During submissions on the Bill, Officials rejected any deferral of the application date or retaining the 
current rules for the benefit of some taxpayers, as this was considered to undermine the objectives of 
the proposed rules (eg, simplification benefits). However, officials subsequently agreed to provide a 
5-year transitional window to the new rules (rather than at 1 April 2011), deferring the recalculation 
of adjustments for goods and services (excluding land) under the new rules to 1 April 2016 (ie, a 
deemed sale of goods at market value for output tax and deemed acquisition on the estimated use for 
input tax credits). IRD acknowledged that the finance and property sector were the other main sectors 
affected by the apportionment rules, although the number and range of assets held by the property 
sector was necessarily far more limited than for the financial services sector. This effectively is a 
deferral of the new rules and will provide larger taxpayers sufficient time to put in place appropriate 
systems before opting into the new rules. Officials also considered that special rules to negotiate fair 
and reasonable apportionment methods (for the benefit of financial services sector) would provide the 
necessary flexibility to agree on future approaches as well as to accommodate existing apportionment 
agreements already in place (subject to modifications). Officials considered that this would address 
most of the compliance cost concerns raised in submissions. 
243
 Case M53 (1990) 12 NZTC 2,312 (TRA). Case N22 (1991) 13 NZTC 3,187 (TRA) also discusses 
the distinction between ‘use’ and ‘applied’. 
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there were mixed uses on acquisition (or mixed uses subsequently materialised) 
adjustments were manufactured by deeming a supply (when there was none actually 
made) on the basis of identifying a subsequent purpose separate from the principal 
purpose.  
In contrast, the apportionment approach seeks to reflect non-taxable use in the 
apportionment of the initial input tax credit (based on a fair and reasonable estimate) 
at the first time of supply, and then provide for a capped number of subsequent 
adjustments (if required) based on the difference between what was estimated and 
what was actually supplied. If the estimate is accurate no subsequent adjustment is 
required. In contrast, the principal purpose approach in providing an up-front 100 per 
cent input tax credit invites subsequent adjustments to correct the over-payment 
(illustrated in Figure 1.19). Both approaches provide de minimis rules for 
adjustments. 
A new feature of the apportionment rules is a capped adjustment mechanism, not 
provided in the adjustment rules. This new process will cap the number of 
adjustments that can be made. However, the new mechanism also calculates 
adjustments by measuring changes between adjustments. This approach ensures 
output tax credits can never exceed initial input tax credits. In contrast, the 
adjustment rules calculated subsequent adjustments against the initial input tax credit 
and ignored the impact of earlier adjustments. This approach without judicial 
intervention would have resulted in output tax credits exceeding initial input tax 
credits. This was a major failure of the former adjustment mechanism. The unlimited 
nature of periodic adjustments only accentuated this problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 
Figure 1.19: Comparison of Current and Proposed Rules 
Principal 
PurposeUse
Deemed
Supply
Taxable 
Supply55%
55%
45%
Output Tax
Input Tax 
Credit
55% 100%
45%
 
N. Examples 
The following examples illustrate and compare the operation of the respective rules.  
Example 1.1: Computer (Capital property)244 
Cian is a graphic designer and purchases a computer for $4,000 (plus GST of $600) 
to use both for business (80 per cent) and private purposes (20 per cent). Cian’s 
principal purpose of buying the computer is for the taxable activity of graphic 
design. Cian files GST returns every two months. In the second year of operation, 
private use increases to 40 per cent due to his children’s use of the computer. 
However, no other changes in use occur over the lifetime of the computer. 
Under an adjustment approach, each adjustment is 20 per cent × $600 = $120. Under 
an apportionment approach the supply would be apportioned in the input tax claim 
between taxable (($600 × 80 per cent = $480) and non-taxable use ($600 × 20 per 
cent = $120).  
No subsequent adjustment for change-in-use in year two is required. While the 
amount of change is above the 10 per cent de minimis an adjustment is not required 
                                               
244
 Based on example provided in Tax Information Bulletin Vol 21:1 (February 2011) 36, Example 7. 
 81 
because the value of the transaction is within the safe harbour threshold of $5,000. 
No subsequent adjustment calculation is required.245 
Adjustments Change-in-Use Approach Apportionment Approach 
  Adjustment  Adjustment 
Input tax credit $600  * $480 $120 
Adjustment 1 $480 $120 $480 $0 
Adjustment 2 $360 $120 $480 $0 
Adjustment 3 240 $120 $480 $0 
Adjustment 4 120 $120 $480 $0 
Adjustment 5 $0 $120 $480 $0 
Balance $0  $480  
* Cian could possibly opt for a 100 per cent claim of $600 (based on the Lennartz 
rule)246 and make an adjustment in the next adjustment period.247 Because the value 
of the goods acquired is less than $5,000, Cian would not be required to make any 
adjustment for the private use. 
Example 1.2: Property Development (Real property)248 
The GST rate is 15 per cent. Louise, a property developer purchases a house and 
land for $500,000 and intends to sell the development on completion. Louise is not a 
builder or associated with one. The land cost $300,000 (plus GST of $45,000) and 
the house $200,000 (plus GST of $30,000). The market value of the property is 
                                               
245
 PWC GST Direct Newsletter (August 2010) 3.  
246
 Lennartz v Finazamt Munchen III, CFEC Case C-97/90; [1995] STC 514. See Tolley’s Value Added 
Tax 2007 (1st Ed, Lexis Nexis Ltd, 2007) 739 at [35.7(3)]. It is unclear if this rule would apply in 
New Zealand as the taxpayer is required to make a “fair and reasonable” estimation of the extent of 
the taxable use at the time of acquisition. The fact the IRD example does not refer to the $5,000 safe 
harbour threshold would suggest they do not consider the Lennartz approach can apply to the New 
Zealand rules. 
247
 Officials acknowledged that the $5,000 safe harbour would allow taxpayers to claim a full input tax 
credit up to the value of $750 (ie, 15 per cent × $5,000) if following the acquisition, the taxpayer 
changed their use to solely non-taxable use. “For example, a taxpayer may purchase an asset for a 
GST-exclusive value of $5,000 and claim the full available input tax of $750 (at 15 per cent). If, 
immediately following the acquisition, the taxpayer changes their use of the asset to solely private 
use, the taxpayer will not be required to make a subsequent change-in-use adjustment and will 
therefore have claimed $750 more in input tax than they would have claimed if they were required to 
make ongoing adjustments.” See Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill 2010 (182-2) Officials’ 
Report to the Finance and Expenditure Committee on Submissions on the Taxation (GST and 
Remedial Matters) Bill (IRD, Wellington, October 2010) 48-49. 
248
 Based on example provided in Tax Information Bulletin Vol 21:1 (February 2011) 38, Example 9. 
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$650,000. The development does not sell and the development is rented until a buyer 
can be found. The rent returns $25,000 per annum. Insurance and rates cost $10,000 
per annum (plus GST of $1,500). The depreciation rate for the house is 10 per cent 
per annum. Louise claims an input tax credit of $75,000 on the purchase price of 
$500,000. Louise is entitled to an initial 100 per cent claim. The subsequent change 
in use will create an adjustment.  
Under the adjustment approach for concurrent purposes adopted in Lundy249 the 
apportionment ratio for the property is: $200,000:$300,000 = ($200,000 / $500,000) 
40 per cent (non-taxable). Depreciation of the house is $30,000 (10 per cent × 
$300,000) per annum (or $5,000 per 2-monthly period). The adjustment (per taxable 
period) is 40 per cent × $5,000 = $2,000. The apportionment ratio for insurance and 
rates is 75 per cent (non-taxable) and 25 per cent (taxable). The adjustment is: 75 per 
cent × $11,500/6 = $1,437.50. The total adjustment for 2-monthly period is $2,000 + 
1,437.50 = $3,437.50. Under an apportionment approach, the total supply is 
$650,000 + $25,000 = $675,000. The taxable use of the house is: $650,000 / 
$675,000 = 96 per cent. The non-taxable use is 100 per cent - 96 per cent = 4 per 
cent. The first adjustment is $25,000 × 4 per cent = $1,000. The second adjustment 
calculates the total supply as $675,000 + $25,000 = $700,000. The taxable use of the 
house is now: $650,000 / $700,000 = 92 per cent. The non-taxable use is 96 per cent 
- 92 per cent = 4 per cent. The second adjustment would be $25,000 × 4 per cent = 
$1,000.  
Taxable Periods Change-in-Use Approach Apportionment Approach 
  Adjustment  Adjustment 
Input tax credit $75,000  75,000  
Period 1  $3,437.50   
Period 2  $3,437.50   
Period 3  $3,437.50   
Period 4  $3,437.50   
Period 5  $3,437.50   
Period 6  $3,437.50  $1,000 
12 month Balance  $20,625.00  $1,000 
                                               
249
 CIR v Lundy Family Trust and Behemoth Corp Ltd (2005) 22 NZTC 19,637 (CA). 
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As the transaction involves land, there is no cap on the number of adjustments. 
O. Conclusion 
It is evident from all the empirical evidence that the former adjustment rules were 
overly complex and difficult to apply. They resulted in a substantial amount of 
litigation which provided less than satisfactory clarity. The judiciary struggled with 
the artificial nature of the rules and the abstract distinctions that are inherent in 
purpose tests.  
Several problems are inherent in the rules. First, the adjustment rules create an 
artificial (or fictional) deemed supply arising from the identification of another 
purpose, that is not the principal purpose. This fiction appears to have created 
confusion between identifying the deemed supply and the purpose that brought the 
deemed supply into being, which might be based on identification of a non-taxable 
activity (eg, an exempt supply). Implicit in the adjustment rules is an apportionment 
between a principal purpose and another purpose, rather than apportionment between 
actual uses. The possibility for some assets to have concurrent purposes (across time 
and space) posed serious problems for apportionment and has resulted in the courts 
being compelled to make rough and ready apportionment decisions. This was an 
inherent problem in apportioning purpose rather than use.  
These problems (and their manifestation into a disproportionate amount of litigation) 
are not surprising (and were even expected), given the concept of purpose contained 
in the adjustment rules appears to have been imported from income tax law, where 
they have created similar difficulties of interpretation.250 It would appear from the 
litigation activity that the adjustment rules have failed to provide sufficient certainty 
                                               
250
 For example, the discussion of “purpose” by the Court of Appeal in CIR v National Distributors Ltd 
[1989] 3 NZLR 661 (CA) at 666-669, (1989) 11 NZTC 6,346 at 6,350-6,352 at [12] where 
Richardson J observed that: “Where there is more than one purpose present taxability turns on 
whether the dominant purpose was one of sale or other disposition: CIR v Walker [1963] NZLR 339 
(CA); CIR v Hunter [1970] NZLR 116 (CA); and Holden v CIR [1974] 2 NZLR 52 (PC). The analysis 
may become more complicated where different purposes may be more significant depending on 
whether the focus is on the short term, the medium term or the ultimate object. Adoption of a 
dominant purpose test in relation to the particular property purchased allows a sensible focus as a 
practical matter on what was truly important to the taxpayer at the time of acquisition. … In some 
factual situations it may be necessary to draw a careful distinction between motives and intentions and 
purposes, even though the ideas conveyed by the respective words merge into each other without a 
clear line of differentiation.” 
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for all the protagonists (eg, taxpayers, advisors, and the revenue authority). An 
examination of the cases reveals that the judiciary have struggled with the front and 
back-end of the adjustment rules. The rules have been prone to different lines of 
interpretation by lower courts which has added to the difficulties facing higher 
courts. The fact that there has been a steady stream of litigation and appeal is 
evidence that there is something wrong with the adjustment rules (and\or their 
drafting). The cost of complying with the rules, from a litigation perspective, has 
been high. 
The new apportionment approach reduces compliance costs by recognising mixed 
use at the time of acquisition rather than relying on an adjustment mechanism to 
correct overpayment of input tax credits. The new rules also introduce a new 
mechanism for calculating adjustments that overcomes many of the problems 
experienced from using an existing set of supply rules that never contemplated 
repetitive recalculation of supplies in order to provide accurate adjustments. The new 
rules have lost none of the compliance cost features of the former adjustment 
mechanism and carry-over many of the prior de minimis rules (as well as new ones) 
in order to further reduce compliance costs. Harmonisation of apportionment rules 
with Australia should also reduce litigation activity, provide improved opportunities 
to leverage guidance, and improve judicial outcomes. Overall it would appear that 
the new rules will reduce compliance costs for the majority of taxpayers.  
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II. THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
“The present law is overly complex, having too many differing thresholds and drawing a 
generally unhelpful distinction between business finance and other types of activity.” 
 ~ Australian Board of Taxation.1 
“The existing Division 129 provision places an unreasonable compliance burden on 
taxpayers and this inevitably leads to a lack of integrity in relation to the practical application 
of the Division.” ~ Australian Bankers Association2 
A. Introduction 
It has been 10 years since the commencement of Australia’s GST. This is a sufficient 
period of time to examine whether Australia’s change-in-use rules provide a possible 
model for other jurisdictions to emulate or avoid — or in light of recent reform 
proposals, refine.  
Similar to the New Zealand experience, the change-in-use rules have largely 
remained untouched since their introduction. But unlike New Zealand, the amount of 
case law surrounding the rules has not been substantial — quite the opposite. 
Judicial intervention has been markedly absent.  
If a lack of legislative and judicial activity is a measure of success, why have the 
Australian change-in-use rules been so successful? Why has the Australian 
experience been so different to New Zealand? Is it due to the rules themselves, or is 
it due to revenue authority guidance or the drafting style and structure of the 
legislation? Clearly, any apparent success has to be tempered against a recent Board 
of Taxation review of the change-in-use rules, which has attempted to address 
                                               
1
   E Mayne Review of the Legal Framework for the Administration of the Goods and Services Tax: A 
Report to the Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs (The 
Board of Taxation, Canberra, December 2008) 34 at [2.2.33]. Document available at 
<www.taxboard.gov.au/content/reviews_and_consultations/legal_framework_for_administration_of_
gst/report/downloads/legal_framework_for_administration_of_gst_report.pdf> (viewed 20 March 
2011). 
2
   Australian Bankers Association Submission on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the 
Board of Taxation’s Review of the Legal Framework for the Administration of the Goods and Services 
Tax (22 June 2009) 2. Document available at 
<www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1578/PDF/Australian_Bankers_Association.pdf> (viewed 20 
March 2011). 
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concerns that the compliance costs to taxpayers arising from the change-in-use rules 
are far too high.3  
To answer such a broad question requires not only an examination of the legislation 
and the specific rules, but also the broader tax landscape within which the Australian 
rules have existed. 
This chapter first examines the key provisions that provide the basis for entitlements 
to input tax credits and change-in-use adjustments (on an apportionment basis). The 
chapter then examines problems with the practical implementation of those rules, 
which have been highlighted in the literature and by taxpayers, and proposals from 
the Board of Taxation and Treasury to mitigate them.  
Part 1: The Rules 
The rules for claiming entitlement to input tax credits on acquisitions and 
adjustments for change-in-use are provided for in the GST legislation, interpreted 
through case law, and guided by Taxation Office rulings.  
B. Legislation 
Australian GST law essentially comprises a principal GST Act4, a Transitional GST 
Act5, and subordinate legislation (eg, regulations and determinations)6. While the 
GST Act has received a reasonable level of remedial legislative activity, the input tax 
rules and the change-in-use rules (Divisions 11 and 129) have largely remained 
untouched since enactment (illustrated in Figure 2.1).7  
                                               
3
   E Mayne Review of the Legal Framework for the Administration of the Goods and Services Tax: A 
Report to the Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs (The 
Board of Taxation, Canberra, December 2008). 
4
   A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999. Hereafter the “GST Act”. 
5
   A New Tax System (Goods and Services Transitional Tax) Act 1999. 
6
   A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Regulations 1999. Hereafter the “GST Regulations”. 
7
   Between enactment and commencement the GST Act was amended by six remedial amendment Acts, 
containing 372 amendments. Of those six remedial amendment Acts, three amended Divisions 11 and 
129. Since the introduction of the GST Act there have been 54 amendment Acts. Of those 54 
amendment Acts, only five have amended Divisions 11 and 129. The five amendment Acts are: A 
New Tax System (Indirect Tax and Consequential Amendments) Act 1999 (No 176); A New Tax 
System (Indirect Tax and Consequential Amendments) Act (No 2) 1999 (No 177); Indirect Tax 
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of Legislative Amendments to Apportionment Rules 
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This level of legislative stability over a period of 10 years would at first glance 
appear to suggest the rules are working well.  
Generally, the GST Act is highly detailed8 and contains diagrams, notes, and 
examples. The GST Act is structured in a step-by-step manner (and quite 
prescriptive) and is written in plain language.9 Numbering of provisions and 
divisions are sequential, but not consecutive. This allows for expansion without the 
need for complex numbering.10 Definitions are located at the back of the Act in 
                                                                                                                                     
Legislation Amendment Act 2000 (No 92); Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 8) 2000 (No 156); 
and Tax Laws Amendment (2010 GST Administration Measures No 2) Act 2010 (No 74). 
8
   Reflective of the high number of provisions it contains — just over 800 individual sections. 
9
   The style of drafting of the GST Act is quite unique. The legislative provisions appear to be written 
from the purchaser’s point of view (hence reference to “acquisitions”) and would appear to be written 
for the general public, rather than for advisors or lawyers. Generally each provision outlines a general 
proposition and then is subject to cut-outs. 
10
 Rewritten New Zealand income tax legislation has also removed complex numbering through the use 
of alpha-numeric numbering.  
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Division 195 which is described as the “dictionary”. Most defined terms are 
highlighted by an asterisk. However, not all defined terms are highlighted. 
The GST Act comprises six Chapters and each Chapter is made up of Parts and 
Divisions. Each Chapter has consecutively numbered Parts that restart from Part 1 in 
each Chapter. Divisions are numbered sequentially from Division 1 (in Chapter 1) to 
Division 195 (in Chapter 6). They do not restart from Division 1 in each chapter – 
this allows individual provisions to be cited with their Division number. For example 
s 10 is cited as “s 2-10” (ie, Division 2 – s 10). Divisions are also cited with their 
respective Parts. For example “Part 2-2” (ie, Part 2 – Division 2). All GST 
administration, collection and recovery provisions are contained in a Tax 
Administration Act.11  
The GST Act also contains provisions for empowering subordinate legislation (eg, 
regulations and determinations). This is because much of the GST Act does not 
contain the mechanical aspects of the GST system (eg, prescribed information to be 
contained in a tax invoice, or the rate of GST).12  
C. Input Tax Rules 
GST in Australia is a tax imposed on consumers and payable on taxable supplies or 
taxable importations.13 To enure only the final consumer pays the tax, the GST Act 
provides a mechanism to reimburse entities for the payment of any output tax 
incurred from an acquisition by way of input tax credits.  
The GST Act entitles a registered entity to claim input tax credits for creditable 
acquisitions14 used to the extent of the creditable purpose.15 Registered entities claim 
                                               
11
 Taxation Administration Act 1953. Originally, GST administration provisions were inserted in a new 
Part 6 of the Act. However, from 1 July 2006, Part 6 was repealed and replaced by a new Chapter 3 in 
Schedule 1 of the GST Act. 
12
 Interestingly, the rate of GST is set outside of the GST Act by regulation. This contrasts markedly 
with New Zealand, who chose to include the rate within the GST Act in order to ensure any rate 
changes had the full consideration of Parliament, rather than just the executive body. 
13
 In Australia, importations have different rules and a parallel set of provisions. For the purposes of this 
paper their consideration has been excluded to avoid complexity. 
14
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 11-20. 
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input tax credits based on the extent of their creditable purpose when they make the 
acquisition. The amount of the input tax credit that an entity is entitled too depends 
on the extent that the acquisition is for a creditable purpose. 
The input tax rules are contained in Division 11 of the GST Act.16 An entitlement to 
input tax credits arises from acquisitions that are solely or partly for a creditable 
purpose. Creditable purpose is defined in s 11-15. Unlike New Zealand, Australia has 
adopted an apportionment approach to input tax entitlement from the outset.  
Section 11-15(1) provides that an entity acquires a thing for a creditable purpose to 
the extent that the acquisition is for the purposes of carrying on an enterprise.17 This 
includes an acquisition that is partly for a creditable purpose.18 The creditable 
purpose tests in s 11-15 focuses on a registered entity's intended or planned use of an 
acquisition.19 The meaning of the phrases “to the extent”, “carrying on”, “relates to” 
and “would be” are central to understanding an entitlement to input tax credits and 
are discussed briefly below. 
The starting point — a positive test 
As Hill J recognised in HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v FCT,20 the test for entitlement to 
input tax credits in s 11-15(1) is a positive one: 
“… In both the GST provision and the income tax provisions, there is a need to pass first 
through a positive test. In the case of GST, the positive test is the requirement that the 
acquisition has been in whole or in part acquired in carrying on an enterprise. In the income 
tax context, there is the need to find that the loss or outgoing be incurred in gaining or 
producing assessable income, or in carrying on a business. In both cases apportionment 
arises where the positive test is only partly satisfied.” 
                                                                                                                                     
15
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 7-1. The term “input tax credit” is defined 
in s 195-1 and means “an entitlement arising under ss 11-20 or 15-15.” 
16
 Division 11 is entitled “Creditable Acquisitions” and is located in Chapter 4, Part 4 of the GST Act. 
17
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 11-15(1).  
18
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 11-5(a). 
19
 GSTR 2009/04 at [8]. 
20
 HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v FCT [2005] FCAFC 126 at [21], (2005) 60 ATR 106 at 112-113. 
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The test is also very broad. It makes no distinction between capital or revenue. The 
Explanatory Memorandum of the GST Bill stated that:21 
“3.25 The creditable purpose test is broader than the test of the deductibility for income tax 
in Section 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. For example: input tax credits may 
be available in relation to the acquisition of capital items where your capital purchases are 
not deductible for income tax. The acquisition of services for preparing your tax returns must 
satisfy the creditable purpose test, even though these are only deductible under a specific 
provision for income tax.” 
Carrying on your enterprise 
While the entitlement test is positive, it is also conditional. Entitlement to input tax 
credits can be denied if the supply is not acquired in carrying on a business 
enterprise.22 The term “carrying on” is defined in s 195-1 to include the 
commencement or termination of an enterprise. The term “enterprise” is broadly 
defined and includes activities where the taxpayer is engaged in a business.23 This 
broad approach to entitlement is consistent with New Zealand’s approach.. 
To the extent 
The expression “to the extent” indicates apportionment is required and is drawn from 
the well settled income tax principles set down by the Australian High Court in 
Ronpibon Tin NL v FCT.24 According to these principles, where costs are capable of 
dissection, one must apportion between identifiable components. The methodology 
used to apportion must also be fair, reasonable, and appropriate.25 This is consistent 
                                               
21
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Bill 1998 (explanatory memorandum) at [3.25]. 
22
 A number of Division 11 cases relate to the meaning and scope of “enterprise”.  
23
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 9-20. The activities of charitable and 
religious organisations, government bodies and trusts are considered to be an enterprise. There are 
several exclusions including activities of employees and activities done as a private hobby. 
24
 Ronpibon Tin NL Tongkah Compound NL v FCT (1949) 78 CLR 47 (HCA). Cited with approval in 
HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v FCT [2005] FCAFC 126, (2005) 60 ATR 106 at [37].  
25
 Ronpibon Tin NL Tongkah Compound NL v FCT (1949) 78 CLR 47 (HCA) at 55-56. The fair and 
reasonable principle was used by the High Court in the context of the apportionment of expenditure 
serving more than one object indifferently. The ATO’s view in GSTR 2006/4 at [32-33] is that the fair 
and reasonable principle applies equally to the choice of method for allocating or apportioning 
acquisitions in all circumstances.  
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with New Zealand interpretations.26 The extent of the entity’s creditable purpose is 
based on their planned use of the acquisition or importation.27 There must be an 
intention at the time of making the acquisition.  
Exclusions 
If s 11-15(1) is the positive test, then the negative tests are those set out in s 11-15(2) 
and further refined in ss 11-15(3)-(5). Acquisitions of input taxed supplies,28 or of a 
private or domestic nature,29 are not treated as acquisitions for a creditable purpose 
and are excluded.  
Relates to making supplies  
The expression “relates to making supplies that would be input taxed” in s 11-
15(2)(a) has been examined by the courts on several occasions. However, HP 
Mercantile Pty Ltd v FCT30 remains Australia’s leading case on the interpretation of 
Division 11 and widely cited as the approach to interpreting GST legislation by 
subsequent cases and rulings.  
The court established that the expression “relates to” signified a connection between 
two subject matters. The connection or association signified by the words “relates 
to” can be direct or indirect, substantial, or real.31 The words do not infer the need 
for tracing between acquisition and actual supply. However, the relationship has to 
                                               
26
 Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd (No 2) v CIR [1974] 2 NZLR 737, (1974) 1 NZTC 61,169 (CA). 
27
 GSTR 2006/4 at [17]. 
28
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 11-15(2)(a). Input tax supplies are known 
as “exempt supplies” in New Zealand. Input taxed supplies (or exempt supplies) will normally not 
attract output tax, and an entity that makes an exempt supply will not be able to obtain an input tax 
credit for the tax payable on acquisitions it makes in the course of its enterprise of making input taxed 
supplies. A definition of what constitutes an input taxed supply is found in Division 40 of the GST 
Act. Financial supplies, residential rent, residential premises, precious metals, school tuckshops and 
canteens, and fundraising events conducted by charitable institutions are classified as input taxed 
supplies. Financial supplies that are input taxed are set out in the regs 40-5.09 and 40-5.10 of the GST 
Regulations. 
29
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 11-15(2)(b).  
30
 HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v FCT [2005] FCAFC 126, (2005) 60 ATR 106.  
31
 Hill J observed at [36] that s 11-15(5) would appear to contemplate that an acquisition having an 
indirect connection with a financial supply would otherwise fall within s 11-15(2)(a). 
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be relevant, not one that is trivial. A remote connection will not suffice. The court 
also observed that the word “making” indicates that the relationship must relate to 
the making of the supply, not the supply itself. Finally, the word "would" suggests 
conditionality, not futurity.  
Choi has suggested the tests in HP Mercantile do not provide sufficient guidance and 
would be difficult for taxpayers to apply in any practical manner and that further 
litigation is required to provide sufficient clarity.32 While the principles have been 
criticised for lacking imprecision, they have stood the test of time. The case has not 
been over-turned or distinguished and the lack of subsequent litigation would 
suggest they may not be as imprecise as suggested. The broad approach of the court 
in HP Mercantile has also been endorsed in subsequent GST rulings. In contrast, 
New Zealand courts held divergent views on the interpretation of the equivalent 
input tax test (ie, principal purpose) for a lengthy period of time.  
It remains to be seen whether a call for more litigation provides the clarity Choi 
seeks. Indications are that the law is settled and that the disputes are more often one 
of fact. According to James et al, 33 while the courts maybe of assistance:34 
“Once the interpretational approach has been decided upon, apportionment issues become 
more concerned with fact than law, and as such are more likely to be negotiated between the 
taxpayer and the administrator, than they are to be the subject of judicial pronouncement.” 
The recent American Express case,35 which examined the application of the indirect 
(revenue) apportionment methodology, does not appear to have provided the clarity 
Choi might have anticipated. Admittedly, the apportionment issue in this case was 
probably one more about the facts (eg, turning on the scope of an agreed formula), 
than the law. If this is the case, then the American Express decision would appear to 
                                               
32
 E Choi “Principles of creditable purpose following HP Mercantile” (2006) 6 Australian GST Journal 
117 at 119. 
33
 C James, I Jeffrey, and H Miller “Apportionment Principles: Part I” (2004) 4(1) Australian GST 
Journal 24 and “Apportionment Principles: Part II” (2004) 4(2) Australian GST Journal 10. 
34
 C James, I Jeffrey, and H Miller “Apportionment Principles: Part II” (2004) 4(2) Australian GST 
Journal 10 at 26. 
35
 FCTv American Express Wholesale Currency Services Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 122, (2010) 77 ATR 
12. 
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suggest that most of the interpretational issues surrounding the apportionment rules 
are settled and the arguments are one of fact. 
Financial acquisitions threshold  
Normally, financial supplies will be treated as exempt supplies. However, s 11-15(4) 
provides a claw-back from this position, where the financial supplies for a 12 month 
period are below the lesser of $50,000 or 10 per cent of the total amount of the input 
tax credits claimed. 36 A qualifying taxpayer under s 11-15(4) is entitled to an input 
tax credit for the full input tax imposed on the acquisition used partly for a creditable 
purpose and partly to make a financial supply. Qualifying financial acquisition 
threshold (FAT) supplies attract a reduced input tax credit of 75 per cent.37  
The policy reason behind this claw-back from exemption was to ensure that the 
financial sector did not bring what were outsourced activities before the GST Act 
was enacted, back in-house after the GST Act was enacted.38 This claw-back from 
the financial supply exemption is a unique feature of the Australian GST Act and has 
corresponding change-in-use adjustment thresholds.39  
Input tax credit calculations — apportionment  
Input tax credits that are partly creditable are apportioned40 according to a formula:41  
Full input tax credit × Extent of creditable purpose × Extent of consideration 
                                               
36
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 189-15. The $50,000 and/or 10% threshold 
is known as the ‘financial acquisitions threshold’ (FAT). The thresholds were originally present in s 
11-15(4) and later removed to Division 189. The 10% rate was originally 5%. 
37
 Division 70 of the GST Act and reg 70-5.03 of the GST Regulations. The arbitrary figure of 75% was 
determined after consultation with the finance industry (eg, if the function was taken in-house it 
would have cost 25% more than out-sourcing). 
38
 The financial acquisition threshold is explained in GSTR 2003/9. 
39
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 129-15(2). 
40
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 11-25. 
41
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 11-30(3). 
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Effectively, the formula prescribes a method of apportionment based substantially 
upon quantifying the extent of the creditable purpose as a percentage of the total 
purpose of acquisition and apportioning the input tax credits on a pro rata basis.  
The Commissioner may also agree to other ways of calculating the extent to which a 
creditable acquisition is for a creditable purpose.42  
The ATO has provided detailed guidance on the calculation of creditable purpose in 
GST ruling GSTR 2006/443 and for financial supplies in GSTR 2006/3.44 The rulings 
endorse the approach taken by the High Court in Ronpibon Tin45 and contain several 
approved apportionment methods (and examples) that are broadly categorised as 
direct or indirect methods. Taxpayers are able to select the best method that provides 
the most advantageous result without the preferred approach being treated as an 
avoidance arrangement.46 Taxpayers are also able to select an alternative method, 
provided it accords with what is “fair and reasonable”, reflects the intended use of 
the acquisition, and is appropriately documented.47 
However, the ATO consider the application of depreciation (based on estimated 
useful life) not to be a fair and reasonable method of apportionment.48 This is 
because depreciation apportions value over the estimated useful life (EUL) of the 
asset, rather than the actual use of the asset over the relevant periods. In contrast, 
New Zealand’s new apportionment rules have allowed taxpayers the option of 
utilising EUL for adjustment purposes.  
                                               
42
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 11-30(5). 
43
 GSTR 2006/4 replaced GSTR 2000/15.  
44
 GSTR 2006/3 replaced GSTR 2000/22. Additional guidance is provided by the ATO on calculating 
input tax credits on motor vehicles in GSTR 2006/1 (formerly GSTR 2000/2). 
45
 Ronpibon Tin NL Tongkah Compound NL v FCT (1949) 78 CLR 47 (HCA). 
46
 GSTR 2006/4 at [35]. 
47
 GSTR 2006/4 at [34-35].  
48
 GST 2009/04 at [128]. It is noted (see discussion below on proposed reforms to the Australian rules), 
that submissions have suggested utilising EUL for particular assets in order reduce compliance costs, 
as this is already done for income tax purposes.  
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Direct methods seek to identify a direct quantifiable measure of the use of the 
acquisition. According to the ATO, measures based on inherent characteristics or 
factors (referred to in management accounting and costing systems as drivers) 
directly connected with the acquisition usually give a fair reflection of the use of the 
thing.49 Australian Accounting Standards (or prudential requirements of equivalent 
rigour), are considered an appropriate foundation for applying the direct method. The 
use of direct methods for apportioning the intended use of acquisitions to the 
activities of an enterprise appears to be the preferred default method by the ATO “as 
it would best reflect the intended use of your acquisitions”.50  
Indirect methods are based on estimated usage and extrapolate measurable ratios to 
what is not so readily measurable. For this reason, the ATO acknowledge they may 
not give an accurate measure of the creditable use, but they do provide a reasonable 
measure.51 The 2 main types of indirect method are input based and output based 
methods. Input based methods employ a measure based on costs. For example, 
identifiable costs of acquisition directly related to supplies are extrapolated to costs 
that cannot be easily apportioned (eg, overheads). Output based methods utilise 
measures of output (revenue from sales) in a similar fashion. Of the two indirect 
methods the ATO prefer an input based method.52 
The former New Zealand adjustment approach does away with the need for any 
apportionment measures when determining the entitlement to input tax credits. 
Rather, it allocates 100 per cent input tax credits under a principal purpose test. The 
weakness with this approach is that the principal purpose test was not only open to 
competing interpretations, but still remains rather fluid — there is no minimum 
threshold under a principal purpose test (unless it is meant to be a more than 50 per 
cent threshold — which it is not), so there is still room to litigate.  
                                               
49
 Some examples of these factors and characteristics are provided in GSTR 2006/4 and include: distance 
(ie, kilometres travelled); time (ie, processing time); volume (ie, transaction numbers); space (ie, floor 
area); or staff numbers. 
50
 GSTR 2006/4 at [106]. 
51
 GSTR 2006/4 at [112]. 
52
 GSTR 2006/4 at [115]. 
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Litigation 
To date there has been only one line of reported cases that has litigated the 
apportionment methodology used to obtain input tax credits.53 Although, this does 
not discount the possibility that there may have been other disputed instances 
involving apportionment, there is no quantifiable data to indicate the contrary.54 
Instead most of the litigation (which is relatively sparse) has centred on input tax 
credit entitlement and whether acquisitions qualify or are excluded (eg, exempt 
supplies). Alternatively, this low level of litigation could be explained on the basis 
that many disputes are resolved by way of adjustments. Equally, a low level of 
litigation could suggest that the rules are working well.  
D. Change-in-Use Rules 
Registered entities claim input tax credits based on the extent of their creditable 
purpose when they make an acquisition. They may later use the acquisition in a 
different way to what was originally intended (eg, for a private or exempt use). To 
ensure the registered entity remains liable for GST only to the extent of their 
creditable purpose, the GST Act provides an adjustment mechanism called the 
change-in-use rules.55  
                                               
53
 FCT v American Express Wholesale Currency Services Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 122, (2010) 77 ATR 
12. A successful appeal from FCT v American Express International Inc [2009] FCA 683, (2009) 73 
ATR 173 (Emmett J). The case involved a special formula agreed to between the ATO and the 
taxpayer under s 11-30(5). The formula (which was not a statutory concept) applied an indirect 
method that looked to the extent to which its supplies to others were input taxed. The issue before the 
Court was whether certain amounts (called “Fee Payments”) received by American Express (which 
were derived from input-taxed supplies), should be treated as “revenue” for the purposes of the agreed 
formula: “[1 - (revenue derived from input taxed supplies) × 100] / total revenue”. The ATO believed 
they should be included in the numerator and the denominator of the revenue formula. American 
Express argued that the Fee Payments should only be included in the denominator, therefore 
increasing the extent of creditable purpose (and input tax credit). The majority of the Full Federal 
Court found for the ATO holding that the Fee Payments were not in relation to a payment system and 
therefore did not fall under the exception to financial supplies. An appeal to the High Court is 
expected. 
54
 As will be discussed below, there have been well over 800 cases filed since the GST Act was enacted, 
yet only 142 reported cases. 
55
 The GST Act contains a number of adjustment provisions separated into specific Divisions. Each 
Division addresses a different type of adjustment. For example: (1) cancellation of a supply or 
acquisition; (2) changes in consideration (eg, a change in price due to a discount); (3) changes in GST 
status (eg, when goods intended for export are not exported within the time limit and may change 
status from GST free to taxable); (4) changes in intended use; (5) debts becoming bad or overdue for 
12 months or more; or (6) changes in enterprise or registration status. 
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The change-in-use rules are contained in Division 12956 of the GST Act. 57 The rules 
provide for an adjustment where there is a subsequent difference between the 
planned use and actual application.58 Section 129-40 is the operational provision and 
provides a four step process to working out the adjustment.59 
For the purposes of s 129-40, the term “creditable purpose” is defined in s 129-50. 
While this repeats the test found in s 11-15 to determine when an acquisition is 
acquired for a creditable purpose, it contains 2 important differences. First, it refers 
to “apply”60 rather than “acquire”, and secondly it refers to “making supplies that are 
input taxed” rather than to “making supplies that would be input taxed”. Both 
differences confirm that the change-in-use provisions are focused on the actual 
application of the acquisition, not its intended use. 61 This was confirmed in Re 
GXCX v FCT.62 
                                               
56
 Contained in Chapter 4, Part 4 of the GST Act. Division 129 contains the following four subdivisions: 
Subdivision 129-A outlines the general rules about making adjustments; Subdivision 129-B outlines 
when an adjustment must be made; Subdivision 129-C outlines how an entity will determine whether 
it must make an adjustment for an acquisition; Subdivision 129-D contains the rules for working out 
the quantum of the adjustment; and Subdivision 129-E provides the attribution rules for Division 129 
adjustments. 
57
 For the purposes of this paper, Division 130 has not been discussed. However, it is noted that Division 
129 is subject to Division 130 which contains two provisions: ss 130-1 (what this Division is about) 
and 130-5 (goods applied solely to private or domestic use). Division 130 focuses on acquisitions 
made solely for a creditable purpose that are subsequently applied solely for a private or domestic use 
and provides for a 100% increasing adjustment for goods subsequently consumed by the registered 
entity. A Division 130 adjustment is available only where there has not been a previous adjustment 
under Division 129.  
58
 Alternatively, an adjustment arises where there is a difference between the actual application (to the 
end of the previous adjustment period) and the actual application (ie, the end of the current adjustment 
period). 
59
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 129-40(3) was inserted in 1999 by 
Amendment Act (177) from 1 July 2000. Related ATO publications include: rulings GSTR 2000/24, 
GSTR 2003/6, GSTR 2006/3, GSTR 2006/4, GSTR 2009/4; advice ruling GSTA TPP/61, and GSTA 
TPP/67.  
60
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 129-55 defines the word “apply”. 
61
 A criticism of the adjustment rules is the subtle difference in tests between entitlement to input tax 
credits (under s 11-15) and their subsequent adjustment (under s 29-40) produces a mismatch between 
measuring input tax credits based on intention (or planned use), and measuring adjustments based on 
application at the point of inquiry. 
62
 Re GXCX v FCT [2009] AATA 569, (2009) 73 ATR 380. 
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Where the actual use is less than planned use, the registered entity returns the 
difference. This is known as an increasing adjustment and will increase the amount 
of GST liable on a taxable supply. Where the planned use is less than the actual use, 
the registered entity receives an increase in the entitled input tax credit. This is 
known as a decreasing adjustment and will decrease the amount of GST liable on a 
supply.  
The differences are calculated on an apportionment basis with the respective 
formulae provide in ss 129-70 (increasing adjustment) or s 129-75 (decreasing 
adjustment). The formulae provide: 
Increasing adjustment = full input tax credit × (intended\former use – actual use) 
Decreasing adjustment = full input tax credit × (actual use - intended\former use) 
If an acquisition was acquired for a non-creditable purpose and later applied for a 
creditable purpose, the registered entity would be entitled to a decreasing adjustment 
(under s 129-75), which reduces the GST liability and increases the refund. 
Alternatively, if a supply was acquired for a creditable purpose and later applied for 
a non-creditable purpose, the registered entity would be required to make an 
increasing adjustment (under s 129-70) which increases the GST liability and 
decreases any refund. 
No adjustments are required for acquisitions under a specified minimum threshold.63 
A $1,000 minimum threshold applies to acquisitions that do not relate to business 
finance.64 Where an acquisition relates to business finance, a $10,000 minimum 
threshold applies.65 An acquisition will relate to business finance where the 
acquisition is in connection with financial supplies and has no element of private or 
domestic use.66 The effect of the distinction between acquisitions that are related to 
                                               
63
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 129-10. 
64
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 129-10(2). 
65
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 129-20(2).  
66
 The expression “relates to business finance” is defined s 129-10(3) as an acquisition that is related to 
“making financial supplies” (and not of a private or domestic nature). The definition of a financial 
acquisition in s 189-15 is “an acquisition that relates to the making of a financial supply”.  
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business finance and those that are not, is to group exempt acquisitions (that are not 
related to business finance) with the treatment of acquisitions for private and 
domestic use.67 This distinction in the type of use for adjustment purposes is 
illustrated in Figure 2.2 and is useful in understanding the changes being proposed to 
the adjustment rules by the Board of Taxation and Treasury (discussed below).  
Figure 2.2: Adjustment Period Distinctions Related to Use 
Private use Exempt use
Business 
finance
Not Business Finance
Current rules
Proposed rules
 
A unique feature of the rules is the creation of adjustment periods (under s 129-20) 
which provide for a maximum number of adjustments that can be made for a change 
in use.68 The distinction between acquisitions that are related to business finance and 
those that are not, is extended to establishing the number of adjustment periods.  
In addition, the number of adjustment periods is determined by the GST-exclusive 
value of the acquisition.69 The resulting matrix of elements is illustrated in Table 2.1. 
An entity can also elect to have yearly adjustments where their GST turnover is $2 
million or less per annum. 
 
                                               
67
 Effectively, this is another mismatch between the input credit rules and adjustment rules. Recall, that 
input tax credits are not available for exempt or private use under s 11-15(2). 
68
 This contrasts markedly with the deemed supply mechanism that exists in the former New Zealand 
adjustment rules, where the number of adjustments is conceptually unlimited. 
69
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 129-20(2) and (3). 
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Table 2.1: Adjustment Period Thresholds 
Expenditure Value Number of Adjustment Periods 
Not Business Finance Business Finance  
$0-$1,000 $0-$10,000 0 
$1,001-$5,000 * $10,001-$50,000 * 2 
$5,001-$499,999 $50,001-$499,999 5 
$500,000 + $500,000 + 10 
* GST exclusive amounts. 
 
Litigation 
There has only been one reported case on Division 129. The lack of litigation would 
suggest the rules are working well. The case also illustrates the difference in focus 
between the New Zealand adjustment cases that focus on intention and the 
Australian rules that focus on application.  
In Re GXCX v FCT70 the taxpayer developed 69 apartments that were marketed for 
sale before and during construction. By December 2001, 22 remained unsold and a 
decision was made to rent them until sold. The apartments were rented on 6-month 
leases. By 2009, a further 10 had been sold, and the remaining 12 were unsold. The 
taxpayer claimed input tax credits on the construction costs of $1,200,000 on the 
basis that it intended to sell the apartments on completion. In the taxpayer’s June 
2003 quarterly business activity statement it included an adjustment of $52,837 due 
to a change in creditable purpose (eg, the decision to rent the remaining 22 
apartments was exempt). The ATO considered the adjustment calculation was 
incorrect and reassessed the adjustments, increasing them to $210,300 (although 
subsequently adjusted to $137,140.00). The question before the court was whether an 
intention to sell in the future amounted to an “actual application” for the purposes of 
the method statement in s 129-40. The taxpayers argued that the 22 apartments were 
applied for dual purpose: sale (a creditable purpose) and residential rental (a non-
                                               
70
 Re GXCX v FCT [2009] AATA 569, (2009) 73 ATR 380. 
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creditable purpose); and that the expression “application” encompassed a holding for 
future sale.  
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) accepted that a taxpayer could hold a 
dual purpose, with the New Zealand cases of Morris71 and Carswell72 cited with 
approval for this proposition, although distinguished on the facts. Hack J observed 
that:73  
“… in Morris it was found that the flats were always available for sale. I cannot, on the 
evidence of the directors, reach the same conclusion in this matter. There were no overt acts 
demonstrating the fact that the apartments were available for sale and the evidence of the 
directors, set out above, demonstrates that the intention was not to sell in the short term. The 
intention to sell was predicated upon the market reaching a level where the capital growth 
could be realised.” 
While the AAT accepted that the taxpayer held the intention to sell at some time in 
the future it did not regard the holding of that intention, without more, as amounting 
to an “application” of the goods and services for a creditable purpose. Rather, the 
application during this period was entirely for a non-creditable purpose (eg, an 
exempt supply of residential renting). Hack J observed that:74 
“… the language of the statute focuses upon the present application during the period of time 
made relevant by Subdiv 129-B of the GST Act. The method statement in s 129-40 of the 
GST Act directs attention to ‘the extent (if any) to which you have applied the thing acquired 
... for a credible purpose.’ Whilst ‘apply’ is defined in s 129-55 of the GST Act it is defined 
inclusively. But what seems to me of greatest importance is the tense used in the method 
statement; it refers to ‘have applied’.” 
The case highlights the difference between the New Zealand and Australian 
adjustment rules and confirms the prior interpretation of those rules in GST rulings. 
In New Zealand, establishing an intention will get you across the line. This is 
because the New Zealand approach is effectively deeming a new supply utilising the 
                                               
71
 CIR v Morris [1998] 1 NZLR 344, (1997) 18 NZTC 13,385 (HC). 
72
 CIR v Carswell Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,149 (HC). 
73
 Re GXCX v FCT [2009] AATA 569, (2009) 73 ATR 380 at [33]. 
74
 Re GXCX v FCT [2009] AATA 569, (2009) 73 ATR 380 at [34]. 
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input tax rules. The Australian adjustment rules require more, they require an 
application of the acquisition for the creditable purpose. The case highlights that 
there is little dispute surrounding the rules for entitlement to input tax credits or 
entitlement to adjustments. Rather, the dispute is with the calculation of those 
adjustments.  
The ATO has since stated in a GST Ruling75 that the act of marketing a premises for 
sale together with other factors (eg, an earlier history of sales), will be sufficient 
evidence of an application of those premises for a creditable purpose.  
E. Summary of the Rules 
Input tax credits are provided for creditable acquisitions.76 An acquisition is a 
creditable acquisition when it is acquired solely or partly for a creditable purpose77 A 
creditable purpose exists to the extent it is acquired in carrying on an enterprise.78 A 
creditable purpose will not include acquisitions for a private use or exempt use 
(except for financial acquisitions). Where there is a change-in-use input tax credits 
are adjusted to the extent of the change for private or exempt use above $1,000, or 
for acquisitions elated to business finance above $10,000. Figure 2.3 illustrates this 
process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
75
 GSTR 2009/4 at [45-46].  
76
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 11-10. 
77
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 11-5.  
78
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 11-15. 
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Figure 2.3: The Adjustment Process 
Acquisition
Creditable acquisition Exempt usePrivate use
FAT < $50k or 10%
Input tax credits
Creditable 
acquisitionChange of use
FAT < $50k or 10%
Business finance >$10,000Private >$1,000
Change
Adjustment
 
F. Examples 
The following examples are provided to illustrate the rules and methods discussed 
above. 
Example 2.1: Computer (Capital property)79 
The GST rate is 10 per cent. Cian is a graphic designer and purchases a computer for 
$4,000 (plus GST of $400) to use both for business (80 per cent) and private 
purposes (20 per cent). The principal purpose of the computer is for the taxable 
activity of graphic design. Cian files tax GST returns every two months. In the 
second year of operation, private use increases to 40 per cent due to his children’s 
use of the computer. No other changes in use occur over the life-time of the 
computer.  
                                               
79
 Based on examples in GST Ruling 2009/04, Example 14, at [153-156]. 
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Under an apportionment approach, the supply would be apportioned in the input tax 
claim between taxable (($400 × 80 per cent = $360) and non-taxable use ($400 × 20 
per cent = $80). Cian will also be required to track the goods for any changes in use 
for two adjustment periods This is because the transaction falls within the first 
adjustment bracket (ie between $1,000 and $5,000). 
An adjustment for change-in-use in year two is required. This is because the amount 
of change is above the 5 per cent de minimis and is not within the safe harbour 
threshold of $1,000. The second year adjustment will require Cian to remit an 
additional $80.80 
Adjustments Apportionment Approach 
  Adjustment 
Input tax credit $360 $80 
Adjustment 1  $80 
Adjustment 2  $0 
Balance $280 $160 
 
Example 2.2: Property Development (Real property)81  
The GST rate is 10 per cent. Louise, a property developer purchases a house and 
land for $500,000 and intends to sell the development on completion. Louise is not a 
builder or associated with one. The land cost $300,000 (plus GST of $30,000) and 
the house $200,000 (plus GST of $20,000). The market value of the property is 
$650,000. The development does not sell and the development is rented until a buyer 
can be found. The rent returns $25,000 per annum. Insurance and rates cost $10,000 
per annum (plus GST of $$1,000). The depreciation rate for the house is 10 per cent 
per annum. Louise claims an input tax credit of $50,000 on the purchase price of 
$500,000. Louise’s intended application of the property is 100 per cent for creditable 
purpose. As the actual application of the property is less than its intended 
application, Louise has an increasing adjustment for her acquisition.  
                                               
80
 GSTR 2006/04 at [128] suggests that a reasonable estimate based on a diary or log of the use of the 
computer over a period of one month would be sufficient. 
81
 Based on examples in GST Ruling 2009/04, Examples 6 to 11, at [69-97]. 
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Under an apportionment approach the total supply is $650,000 + $25,000 = 
$675,000. The taxable use of the house is: $650,000 / $675,000 = 96 per cent. The 
non-taxable use is 100 per cent - 96 per cent = 4 per cent. The first adjustment is 
$25,000 × 4 per cent = $1,000. The second adjustment calculates the total supply as 
$675,000 + $25,000 = $700,000. The taxable use of the house is now: $650,000 / 
$700,000 = 92 per cent. The non-taxable use is 96 per cent - 92 per cent = 4 per cent. 
The second adjustment would be $25,000 × 4 per cent = $1,000. As the transaction is 
above $500,000, there will be a maximum of 10 annual adjustments.  
Adjustments Apportionment Approach 
  Adjustment 
Input tax credit $50,000  
Adjustment 1  $1,000 
Adjustment 2  $1,000 
Adjustment 3  $1,000 
Adjustment 4  $1,000 
Adjustment 5  $1,000 
Adjustment 6  $1,000 
Adjustment 7  $1,000 
Adjustment 8  $1,000 
Adjustment 9  $1,000 
Adjustment 10  $1,000 
Balance $40,000 $10,000 
 
Part 2: Implementation and Operation — Empirical Evidence 
The practical implementation of the input tax and change-in-use apportionment rules 
suggests that the rules are well understood. However, the recent Board of Taxation 
review and recent literature has raised concerns about the compliance costs that 
apportionment methods place on taxpayers. It remains to be seen whether reforms 
will mitigate these concerns. 
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G. Judicial Activity 
The latest Australian statistics for February 2010 indicate that over the last 10 years 
there have been 839 GST cases filed with the courts.82 Of those cases filed with the 
courts, 132 had been decided by the courts, with an additional nine cases to be 
determined (a total of 141).83  
These figures appear to support earlier observations from D’Ascenzo and White. In 
2006, D’Ascenzo reported that GST cases filed in Australian courts had risen from 9 
cases in the 2001-02 financial year to 141 cases by the end of the 2005-06 financial 
year.84 At the same time, White reported that in the 5 years to April 2005 more than 
180 GST cases had been filed in Australian courts.85 Ignoring the small disparity in 
figures (no doubt due to timing), it is interesting to note the rapid growth of cases 
being filed in the last five years, from between 141 to 180 cases filed by 2005, to 839 
cases filed by 2010 — a growth rate in excess of 300 per cent. 
The rapid growth of cases being filed in the last five years is confirmed by 
international experience, which reports that consumption tax litigation dramatically 
and suddenly increases after a peaceful introduction. Analysis by White of the New 
Zealand experience would tend to confirm this trend.86 Certainly, an examination of 
cases relating to change-in-use in New Zealand has also indicated such a trend. 
                                               
82
 See Table 2.2 (below). 
83
 GST minutes (ATO, March 2010) at [15.6] (GST litigation update). Document available at 
<http://ato.gov.au/taxprofessionals/content.asp?doc=/content/00239910.htm&page=31&H31> 
(viewed 20 March 2011). 
84
 M D’Ascenzo “The Australian Approach to GST Administration” in R Krever and D White (eds) GST 
in Retrospect and Prospect (Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2007) 389 at 411. 
85
 D White “Appellate Interpretation of NZ’s GST Legislation: An Initial Survey: 1986–2005” (2005) 5 
Australian GST Journal 2 at 15 citing the Australian Taxation Office GST Litigation Report, reported 
in KPMG Australia, GST – 5 Years On (2005) 6. Document available at 
<www.kpmg.com.au/Portals/0/GST-5yearson.pdf> (viewed 20 March 2011).  
86
 D White “Appellate Interpretation of NZ’s GST Legislation: An Initial Survey: 1986–2005” (2005) 5 
Australian GST Journal 2 at 9 (Figure 3). 
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Interestingly, the ATO have suggested that case filings peaked after 7 years and are 
now in decline. Yet the rate of reported cases continues to climb (although not as 
rapidly as the spike in 2008). According to the ATO:87 
“The number of new cases filed in 2008-09 has dropped by 22% compared to 2007-08. The 
reductions have occurred in income tax disputes involving small business and large 
corporates as well as GST matters. The decline in GST disputes is similar to overseas 
experiences where the introduction of a consumption tax is followed by a period of 
adjustment which tends to peak after about 7 years and is then followed by a steady decline 
in the number of disputes.” 
Table 2.2: GST Litigation (2000-2010) 
How finalised? Number of cases % of total 
Court/Tribunal Decision – favourable to the Commissioner 91 10.8% 
Court/Tribunal Decision – favourable to the taxpayer 24 2.9% 
Court/Tribunal Decision – favourable to the Commissioner in 
part, favourable to the taxpayer in part 
17 2.0% 
Total 132  
Cases heard – awaiting decision 9 1.1% 
Total 141 16.8% 
Settled before Hearing 221 26.4% 
Case withdrawn by Taxpayer/Major concession by taxpayer 174 20.7% 
Case conceded by ATO 188 22.4% 
Taxpayer’s case struck out/dismissed 74 8.8% 
Other (including FOI, ABN, ADJR and 'watching brief' matters) 41 4.9% 
Total 839 100.0% 
Source: GST minutes (ATO, March 2010) at [15.6] (GST litigation update).88  
                                               
87
 ATO Annual Report, Section 2.4 (2009) 44. Document available at 
<www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/cor00216293AR0809Part02.pdf> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
88
 GST minutes (ATO, March 2010). Document available at 
<http://ato.gov.au/taxprofessionals/content.asp?doc=/content/00239910.htm&page=31&H31> 
(viewed 20 March 2011). 
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According to the ATO data, reported cases only makes up only 17 per cent of all 
cases filed (see Table 2.2 above).  
An audit of GST cases in Thomson Reuters TaxPoint database (as at October 2010) 
records 142 reported GST cases (illustrated in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5). Including 
the various State Supreme Courts, the number of reported GST cases increases to 
185.  
Figure 2.4: Reported GST Cases 2000-2010 (Accumulated)89 
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Source: Thomson Reuters (Australia) TaxPoint GST Cases (excluding State Supreme Court cases). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
89
 Based on data contained in ThomsonReuters (Australia) TaxPoint GST Cases (as at 20 October 2010). 
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Figure 2.5: Reported GST Cases 2000-2010 (Federal Courts)90 
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Source: Thomson Reuters (Australia) TaxPoint GST Cases (excluding State Supreme Court cases). 
Of all reported GST cases, only eight lines of cases (12 cases in total) have examined 
Division 129 or Division 11.91 And only one case of those eight lines of cases has 
examined Division 129.92 The level of judicial activity would indicate there is an 
acceptable level of certainty with the rules (illustrated in Figure 2.6).93  
 
 
                                               
90
 Based on data contained in ThomsonReuters (Australia) TaxPoint GST Cases (as at 20 October 2010). 
91
 Section 11-15 cases: HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v FCT [2005] FCAFC 126, (2005) 60 ATR 106, appeal 
from Recoveries Trust v FCT (2004) 57 ATR 1038 (AAT); Peerless Marine Pty Ltd and FCT [2006] 
AATA 765, (2006) 63 ATR 1303; Peet Ltd v Richmond (No 2) [2009] VSC 585 (Vic SC); FCT v 
Secretary to the Department of Transport (Victoria) [2010] FCAFC 84, (2010) 76 ATR 306, appeal 
from Secretary to the Department of Transport (Victoria) v FCT [2009] FCA 1209, (2009) 73 ATR 
690; Trustee of the Family Trust v FCT [2010] AATA 876; and Russell v FCT [2011] FCAFC 10, 
appeal from Russell v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 1224, 74 ATR 466. Section 11-30 
cases: American Express Wholesale Currency Services Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 122, (2010) 77 ATR 
12, appeal from FCT v American Express International Inc [2009] FCA 683, (2009) 73 ATR 173.  
92
 A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999, s 129-40. See GXCX v FCT [2009] AATA 
569, (2009) 73 ATR 380.  
93
  A total of 102 cases have cited a Division 11 provision. A total of four cases have cited a Division 
129 provision.  
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Figure 2.6: Timeline of Division 11 and Division 129 Cases 
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The decline in case filings and an increase in reported cases would suggest that more 
cases are not being withdrawn, dismissed, or settled out of court. This might indicate 
either a more refined examination of widely accepted rules, or a greater focus on 
disputes of fact. Yet, irrespective of case filing rates, the number of reported GST 
cases is still relatively low, in comparison to New Zealand.  
The even smaller proportion of reported Division 129 and Division 11 cases would 
appear to suggest that there is a high degree of clarity and compliance with the rules. 
Of course it might also suggest that there is a lower level of audit activity or 
enforcement of those rules. In contrast, the equivalent rules in New Zealand have 
experienced a high degree of uncertainty and confusion, reflected in a high level of 
litigation.94 
H. Revenue Authority Guidance 
Over an 11 year period, the Australian Tax Office (ATO) has provided a total of 103 
finalised GST rulings (see Table 2.3). A number of rulings have been amended 
(some 3-4 times), withdrawn, or replaced with an updated ruling. Each finalised 
ruling was pre-empted with a draft ruling for broad consultation and at the time of 
                                               
94
  There have been 46 cases in New Zealand that have considered the adjustment rules (ie, the “principal 
purpose test or deemed supply mechanism). It is little wonder that New Zealand has after 25 years and 
three major reviews, finally stepped back from its principled position (ie, to tax consumption when it 
happens) and pragmatically reformed their equivalent input tax and change-in-use rules. 
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writing 5 draft rulings were still yet to be finalised. Of the 103 finalised GST rulings, 
21 rulings provided guidance on adjustments or input tax apportionment rules (see 
Table 2.4 and illustrated in Figure 2.7). As Choi acknowledges, these rulings 
“provide evidence of the considerable work undertaken by the Tax Office to provide 
guidance on the issue of apportionment”.95 
However, a criticism of the apportionment and input tax credit rulings is they do not 
expand on the various methods for calculating the extent of creditable purpose 
beyond the principles enunciated in Ronpibon Tin. 96 Nor do they provide any 
analysis of their limitations. Kraal concludes that Ronpibon Tin therefore remains the 
benchmark for GST apportionment. A similar point could be made with regard to the 
consideration and application of HP Mercantile97 by various GST rulings. 
Kraal’s criticism while alluding to the fact that the rulings are not prescriptive 
enough to provide sufficient certainty and therefore reduce compliance costs over-
looks the need to maintain flexibility. As James et al suggests, 98 it is more important 
that the ATO establishes guidelines that are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the 
very broad range of circumstances in which apportionment calculations are 
performed.99 Certainly the low level of reported litigation would appear to suggest 
that such an approach is working. 
 
 
                                               
95
 E Choi “Principles of creditable purpose following HP Mercantile” (2006) 6 Australian GST Journal 
117 at 125. 
96
 D Kraal “GST Apportionment and Industry Superannuation Funds” (2008) 8 Australian GST Journal 
265 at 271. Document available at 
<www.taxboard.gov.au/content/reviews_and_consultations/legal_framework_for_administration_of_
gst/submissions/Kraal%20submission.pdf> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
97
 HP Mercantile Pty Ltd v FCT [2005] FCAFC 126, (2005) 60 ATR 106. 
98
 C James, I Jeffrey, and H Miller “Apportionment Principles: Part I” (2004) 4(1) Australian GST 
Journal 24 and “Apportionment Principles: Part II” (2004) 4(2) Australian GST Journal 10. 
99
 C James, I Jeffrey, H Miller “Apportionment Principles: Part II” (2004) 4(2) Australian GST Journal 
10 at 24. 
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Table 2.3: ATO Rulings (1999-2010) 
Year Rulings Amendments Withdrawals Adjustments, 
or Input tax 
Pending 
Drafts 
1999 1 2 1 0  
2000 37 44 6 7  
2001 8 7 1 1  
2002 6 8 1 1  
2003 16 13 1* 4  
2004 9 8 1 3  
2005 6 4 0 1  
2006 11 11 0 2  
2007 2 0 0 0  
2008 3 1 0 2 3 
2009 4 2 0 0 1 
2010 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 103 100 11* 21 5 
* + 2 partial withdrawals  
Table 2.4: Input Tax Credit and Adjustment Related Rulings (1999-2009) 
Year Division 11 Division 129 
 About Discussed About Discussed 
1999     
2000 1 * 4 2 * 2 
2001  1 
  
2002    1 
2003  1 1 1 
2004  1  2 
2005  1   
2006 3  2  
2007     
2008 2 
 
 1 
2009 1 **  
 
 
Total 7 8 5 7 
* Includes a withdrawn ruling. ** Draft ruling also pending. 
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Figure 2.7: Timeline of GST Rulings Discussing Division 11 and Division 129 
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I. Compliance Concerns 
What is notable with the current apportionment rules is the high level of compliance 
costs. The current rules are generally viewed in the literature and by taxpayers as an 
unnecessarily burdensome area of GST law.  
According to PWC, the apportionment rules are:100  
“… one of the most problematic areas of the GST legislation …” 
The Australian Bankers Association (ABA) who are well placed to judge the 
apportionment rules, have observed that:101 
“The existing Division 129 provision places an unreasonable compliance burden on 
taxpayers and this inevitably leads to a lack of integrity in relation to the practical application 
                                               
100
 E Mayne Review of the Legal Framework for the Administration of the Goods and Services Tax: A 
Report to the Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs (The 
Board of Taxation, Canberra, December 2008) 31 at [2.2.14]. 
101
 Australian Bankers Association Submission on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the 
Board of Taxation’s Review of the Legal Framework for the Administration of the Goods and Services 
Tax (22 June 2009) 1-2.  
 114 
of the Division. … the ongoing cost and effort associated with tracking acquisitions and 
making adjustments has overwhelmingly exceeded the magnitude of ‘change of use’ 
adjustments.” 
Kraal102 too has observed that the superannuation funds industry also considers the 
adjustment rules to be complex, costly, and time consuming. According to Kraal,103 
anecdotal evidence indicated that the superannuation funds industry generally did not 
claim back their full entitlement to input tax credits via indirect methods (ie revenue 
or balance sheets methods) because it was perceived as too complex or costly to 
obtain external professional advice on the process. Other funds delay their claims for 
up to 3 years because they fail to undertake timely reviews of their apportionment 
rates. According to Kraal,104 the reason for these problems is the attempt to smooth 
out fluctuations, volatility, and subjectivity from using indirect methods when 
selecting the most “fair and reasonable” apportionment method.105  
The high number of submissions to the Board of Taxation and Treasury on the 
reform of the adjustment rules confirms these observations. Adjustments were raised 
as an area of concern at each of the consultation sessions that the Board of Taxation 
held during August 2008. At consultation sessions, the change-in-use rules were 
frequently raised as a mater of concern. They were considered to be excessively 
onerous, and to result in significant compliance difficulties for businesses. Several 
submissions suggested that fully complying with obligations under current rules was 
not possible for many taxpayers. Particular concerns were raised in relation to 
property and construction activities. 
                                               
102
 D Kraal “GST Apportionment and Industry Superannuation Funds” (2008) 8 Australian GST Journal 
265. 
103
 D Kraal “GST Apportionment and Industry Superannuation Funds” (2008) 8 Australian GST Journal 
265 at 272. 
104
 D Kraal “GST Apportionment and Industry Superannuation Funds” (2008) 8 Australian GST Journal 
265 at 273. 
105
 Kraal’s solution to these compliance concerns is to recommend that a specific rate of input tax credit 
entitlement be provided for the superannuation funds industry (similar to the reduced credit 
acquisition rules) that would replace the variety of indirect methods of apportionment described 
within various rulings. This would remove the need for industry to rely on complex, costly and time 
consuming methods of apportionment. 
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Views were expressed about the change-in-use rules imposing significant burdens. 
Taxpayers considered they were required to track too many acquisitions for too long. 
Further, there were also too many different periods and thresholds for acquisitions, 
rendering record-keeping and accounting excessively complex (the need to classify 
acquisitions into acquisitions related to business finance and other acquisitions was 
especially criticised). Finally, submissions considered that the required calculations 
are often difficult and the record-keeping onerous (especially given that in some 
circumstances it may be required for up to 15 years). 
In both public consultation sessions and in submissions, concern was expressed 
about the meaning of “apply” and “application” in the GST change-in-use provisions 
and elsewhere in the GST Act. This was largely in the context of their interaction 
with the rules regarding residential property and new residential property. 
Kraals’ call to reduce business tax compliance costs is supported by industry 
observations that demand that any law reform in this area must address the key 
causes of cost and complexity if it is to provide for a meaningful reduction in the 
associated regulatory burden on business.106 
J. Reform Proposals 
Background 
Similar to New Zealand, a review of the GST regime was undertaken 10 years after 
enactment. On 11 June 2008, the Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition 
Policy and Consumer Affairs, the Hon Chris Bowen MP, asked the Board of 
Taxation to undertake a review of the legal framework for the administration of the 
goods and services tax (GST) and to report its recommendations to the Government 
by the end of December 2008. 
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Issues paper 
In July 2008, the Board of Taxation released an issues paper to facilitate public 
consultation.107 The issues paper provided an overview of the legal framework for 
the administration of the GST and included a series of questions to assist 
stakeholders in preparing submissions. In August 2008, the Board of Taxation held 
extensive consultations with stakeholders in Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Darwin 
and Perth.  
Submissions closed on 15 September 2008. The Board of Taxation received 57 
submissions, 38 of which are available to the public and can be obtained from the 
Board of Taxation’s website.  
Board of Taxation proposals 
In December 2008, the Board of Taxation submitted its report in response to the July 
2008 Issues Paper to the Assistant Treasurer.108 The report put forward the Board of 
Taxation’s final recommendations to the Government for consideration.  
The consultation raised 90 issues where taxpayers thought the current approach was 
too complex, too costly or not properly achieving its intended aims. In responding to 
the 90 issues, the Board of Taxation made a total of 46 recommendations — 36 were 
substantive recommendations and 10 of a technical nature.109 Four recommendations 
were made in respect of adjustments.110  
                                               
107
 E Mayne Issues Paper (The Board of Taxation, Canberra, 18 July 2008). Document available at 
<www.taxboard.gov.au/content/reviews_and_consultations/legal_framework_for_administration_of_
gst/issues_paper/downloads/legal_framework_for_administration_of_gst_issues_paper.pdf> (viewed 
20 March 2011). 
108
 E Mayne Review of the Legal Framework for the Administration of the Goods and Services Tax: A 
Report to the Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs (The 
Board of Taxation, Canberra, December 2008). Document available at 
<www.taxboard.gov.au/content/reviews_and_consultations/legal_framework_for_administration_of_
gst/report/downloads/legal_framework_for_administration_of_gst_report.pdf> (viewed 20 March 
2011). 
109
 Of the other 44 issues raised, 21 were out of scope of the terms of reference of the review. 
110
 Recommendation 4 (Change-in-use – adjustments); Recommendation 5 and 8 (Adjustments for 
cession of registration and for pre-registration acquisitions); and Recommendation 7 (Technical 
amendment – adjustments). 
 117 
The Board of Taxation found that:  
“The present law is overly complex, having too many differing thresholds and drawing a 
generally unhelpful distinction between business finance and other types of activity. The 
periods over which adjustments are to be made often are excessive. Moreover, there is often 
insufficient consistency between the compliance obligations created by various GST 
provisions dealing with change in use as well as in similar rules in other areas of the tax 
law.” 
Recommendation 4 (adjustments for changes in use) concluded that:111 
“The GST law should be amended to provide that higher thresholds, together with fewer and 
shorter adjustment periods, should apply for adjustments (for example, two years for 
acquisitions less than $100,000, five years for those over $100,000, and ten years for real 
property). Where possible, the existing provisions should be consolidated within the GST 
law and aligned with other relevant rules elsewhere in the tax system. 
Adjustments for private use should be explicitly aligned with the percentage of private use 
for income tax purposes. Adjustments for input taxed use should only occur where the 
change in use is significant (for example, greater than 10 per cent change in use).” 
The Board of Taxation recommendation to consolidate the thresholds for both 
private and exempt use was clearly aimed at removing unnecessary confusion and 
administrative expense (eg, one threshold above $100,000, and the other below it, 
while keeping the existing threshold under which no adjustment is required — plus a 
separate adjustment period for real property).112 Additionally, adjustments for input 
taxed supplies would only occur where the change in use was significant (eg, greater 
than 10 per cent change in use). Adjustments for private use would be explicitly 
aligned with the extent of private use for income tax purposes.  
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property should have an adjustment period more than 10 years (at [2.2.37]), but the final 
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Table 2.5: Board of Taxation Threshold Proposals 
Current Thresholds  Proposed Thresholds 
Not Business Finance Business Finance Number of  
Adjustment Periods 
 
$0-$1,000 $0-$10,000 0  
$1,001-$5,000 * $10,001-$50,000 * 2 < $100,000 
$5,001-$499,999 $50,001-$499,999 5 > $100,000 
$500,000 + $500,000 + 10 Real property 
* GST exclusive amounts. 
 
As the Board of Taxation observed:113 
“Taxpayers considered they were required to track too many acquisitions for too long. 
Further, there were also too many different periods and thresholds for acquisitions, rendering 
record-keeping and accounting excessively complex (the need to classify acquisitions into 
acquisitions related to business finance and other acquisitions was especially criticised).” 
The Board of Taxation also suggested that adjustment periods should be aligned with 
the filing date for income tax returns. This would reduce the period over which 
adjustments were required, simplify the timing of adjustments, and allow use of 
information already gathered for income tax returns. To eliminate the need for 
ongoing calculations and paperwork presently associated with minor shifts in 
activity, the Board suggested adjustments should occur only where there was a 
significant change in use (eg, a change of more than 10 per cent from the intended or 
prior use). 
The Board also suggested that GST and income tax law, in relation to private use 
adjustments, should be linked to reduce the need for specific GST calculations 
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(although it had earlier suggested the private use distinction with business finance 
should be removed):114 
“Private use adjustments should be explicitly linked to the extent of private use for income 
tax. Combined with the alignment of adjustment periods with the lodgement period, the 
proposals should ensure affected taxpayers only need to perform minimal GST specific 
calculations.” 
Treasury response — the first report 
On 29 July 2009, the Treasury released its first consultation paper on the Board of 
Taxation’ report.115 The purpose of the Treasury’s first consultation paper was to 
provide additional information on how the announced Government measures might 
operate and to seek feedback on their design and implementation. 
The Treasury proposal confirmed the Board of Taxation’s proposed thresholds and 
treatment of real property. However, it differed in relation to the creation of a new 
separate private use threshold. Under the Treasury proposal the two former threshold 
groups were merged. However, private use (which was formerly part of the “not 
related to business finance” group) was separated into a new threshold group.  
The proposed thresholds would all be based on the “GST exclusive” monetary value 
of the acquisition. At present, only the first threshold is GST exclusive. It was also 
proposed that change-in-use adjustments would be aligned with the due date for 
filing income tax returns. In addition, no adjustment (either increasing or decreasing) 
would be made unless the change in use varied by 10 per cent or more from the 
original percentage on which the original attribution of input tax credits was based, 
or any subsequent adjustment. 
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Table 2.6: Proposed Changes to Adjustment Thresholds and Periods  
Current Rules Proposed Rules 
Change in Use Threshold Adjustment Periods Threshold Adjustment Periods 
Non Business 
Finance 
  Private Use  
 $0 - $1,000 0 $0 - $999  0 
 $1,001 - $5,000 * 2 $1,000 - $9,999  2 
 $5,001 - $499,999 5 $10,000 +  5 
 $500,000 + 10   
 
  $1,000,000 + ** 10 
 
    
Business Finance   Exempt Use  
 $0 - $10,000 0 $0 - $10,000  0 
 $10,001 - $50,000 * 2 $10,000 - $99,999  2 
 $50,001 - $499,999 5 $100,000 - 
$999,999  
5 
 $500,000 + 10 $1,000,000 +  10 
* GST exclusive amounts.  
 
Treasury response — the second report 
On 11 September 2009, the Treasury released its second consultation paper in 
response to submissions received.116 The second report responded to submissions on 
the first report’s proposals and also responded to the technical issue raised about the 
scope of Division 130 and the meaning of the terms “apply” and “application” – 
terms used consistently in Divisions 129, 130, and 138.  
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Treasury considered that a 100 per cent adjustment under Division 130 was not 
appropriate where the enterprise had received some economic value from the goods 
while they had been used by the business. Accordingly, Division 130 would be 
limited to just trading stock and raw materials. For goods other than trading stock or 
raw materials that are removed from use in an enterprise and subsequently used 
wholly for private or domestic purposes, increasing adjustments would be made 
under Division 129. To assist in reducing compliance costs, it was further proposed 
that Division 130 adjustments would only be required annually and aligned with the 
due date for filing income tax returns.  
As a result of submissions from the second report, the original Division 129 
proposals were further refined (see Table 2.7).  
Table 2.7: Revised Changes to Proposed Adjustment Thresholds and Periods  
Current Rules Revised Proposal 
Threshold Adjustment 
Periods 
Threshold (July) Threshold (Sept) Adjustment Periods 
Not Business 
Finance 
 Private Use Private Use  
$0 - $1,000 0 $0 - $999  $0 - $1,999 0 
$1,001 - $5,000 * 2 $1,000 - $9,999  $2,000 - $14,999 2 
$5,001 - $499,999 5 $10,000 +  $15,000 + 5 
$500,000 + 10    
 
 $1,000,000 +  ** $1,000,000 +  ** 10 
     
Business Finance  Exempt Use Exempt Use  
$0 - $10,000 0 $0 - $10,000  $0 - $19,999 0 
$10,001 - $50,000 * 2 $10,000 - $99,999  $20,000 - $499,999 2 
$50,001 - $499,999 5 $100,000 - $999,999  $500,000 + 5 
$500,000 + 10 $1,000,000 +   10 
   $5,000,000 + ** 10 
* GST exclusive amounts. ** Applies to real property only. 
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Treasury increased the safe harbour threshold for private use adjustments from 
$1,000 to $2,000 and the upper threshold to $15,000 (originally proposed at 
$10,000). The adjustment periods remained unchanged. Exempt supply adjustments 
were reduced from three to two bands with the lower threshold starting at $20,000 
(originally proposed at $10,000) and the second band starting at $500,000. A 
separate band for only real property was also provided, starting at $5 million. 
Industry response 
The response from industry was less than enthusiastic with the Treasury’s first round 
of proposals.117 Many submissions were critical of the reforms in not going far 
enough. The Corporate Tax Association (CTA) believed the recommendations 
needed to go further to achieve real compliance savings, and the Australian Financial 
Markets Association (AFMA) considered that any law reform had to address the key 
causes of cost and complexity if it was to provide for a meaningful reduction in the 
associated regulatory burden on business. 
According to the CTA, anything beyond five adjustment periods would maintain 
compliance costs “that well outweighs the associated revenue collected.” The CTA 
considered that moving to five adjustment periods would also align the operation of 
Division 129 with existing record retention requirements.  
The Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA) was equally concerned that 
the proposed modifications to thresholds would not have a significant impact on 
compliance costs. Proposed thresholds for input taxed were still far too low for non-
real property transactions. To track every acquisition over $100,000, in relation to 
business finance, and determine not only the intended use of each acquisitions at the 
time of acquisition, but then recalculate an actual use at the time of review was 
considered very onerous for financial institutions that had numerous products and 
businesses.  
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According to the AFMA, financial institutions could have hundreds, if not 
thousands, of transactions over $100,000 in a normal year. The AFMA 
recommended that acquisitions that related to input taxed use should only have two 
adjustment periods with an initial threshold of $500,000 for two periods, and more 
than $5,000,000 for five periods. Table 2.8 illustrates the AFMA proposal in 
comparison to Treasury’s changing position. The AFMA also proposed an 
alternative approach to simplifying tracking costs. It suggested prescribing a non-
exhaustive list of common acquisitions (eg, acquisitions effectively consumed in the 
period acquired) that need not be tracked for the purpose of Division 129.  
Table 2.8: AFMA Proposed Thresholds 
 ABA Proposal Treasury Proposals 
   July September 
 Threshold Periods Threshold Periods Threshold Periods 
Exempt 
Use 
      
 $500,000 - $5,000,000 2 $10,000 - $99,999 2 $20,000 - $499,999 2 
 $5,000,000 + 5 $100,000 - $999,999 5 $500,000 + 5 
 NA 10 $1,000,000 + 10 NA 10 
 
The Australian Bankers Association (ABA) did not support the Treasury’s proposed 
threshold changes as they considered they would not “provide a sufficient level of 
administrative relief”. Rather the ABA considered that there had to be substantial 
change to the scope of the existing Division 129 for real benefits to accrue. The ABA 
strongly urged the Treasury to consider real and substantial change given the length 
of time the industry had waited for reform and the fact that it was likely to be another 
extended period of time before the adjustment provisions were again reviewed.  
In respect of the Treasury’s proposal to increase adjustment periods for the low-
threshold acquisitions, the ABA was of the opinion that it did not strike an 
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appropriate balance, as they were unlikely to minimise compliance costs when 
considered in conjunction with the increase in adjustment periods.  
The ABA proposed establishing two specific categories of acquisitions for which 
“change of use” adjustments would be required: (1) information technology 
hardware and (2) real property. The ABA’s proposal is illustrated in Table 2.9 and is 
compared against the Treasury’s changing position. 
Table 2.9: ABA Proposed Thresholds 
 ABA Proposal Treasury Proposals 
   July September 
 Threshold Periods Threshold Periods Threshold Periods 
IT Hardware $500,000 5 NA  NA  
Real Property $1,000,000 - 
$10,000,000 
5 $1,000,000 10 $5,000,000 10 
Exempt Use       
   $10,000 - $99,999  $20,000 - 
$499,999 
2 
   $100,000 - 
$999,999 
 $500,000 + 5 
 $10,000,000 
+ 
10 $1,000,000 + 10 NA 10 
 
CPA Australia fully supported the decision to amend the adjustment rules and align 
adjustments for private use with the percentages of private use applicable in income 
tax law.118 However, CPA Australia observed that the current calculation of 
adjustments under Division 129 led to anomalous outcomes when viewed from a 
timing perspective. This was because current calculation of adjustments under 
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Division 129 did not match entitlement to input tax credits in Division 11, because 
the tests were different. One was based on intention and the other on application. It 
recommended that both Divisions should apply an “intention” criterion.  
CPA Australia also considered that Division 129 should be amended so that 
adjustments take into account the effective life of the asset, rather than the fixed 
adjustment periods, based on the value of the asset. This could be achieved by 
linking the adjustment period with effective life of an asset in the depreciation 
provisions contained in Division 40 of the ITAA 1997.  
CPA Australia supported the recommendation that adjustments should only be 
required where the change in use exceeded 10 per cent. However, the ABA 
considered a higher rate of 20 per cent had significant merit. 
K. Analysis 
Apportionment design 
GST is a business tax and operates consistently with the day to day operation of 
business and normal accounting practices.119 Being a business tax, the GST system is 
ideally geared towards existing accounting practice and therefore minimising 
compliance costs for businesses. However, the practical reality is that business and 
accounting functions within many organisations are “not designed around GST 
requirements alone”.120 Rather, businesses are often geared towards management 
accounting, financial reporting, and income tax considerations. For this reason, 
businesses are often not ideally suited to providing information relevant for 
apportionment purposes.  
According to James et al, there is a delicate trade-off to be managed between the 
desire to achieve accurate apportionment results, and the cost of doing so. As 
compliance costs fall on taxpayers, it is important to recognise that any methodology 
                                               
119
 It was this aspect of GST that appealed to Rt Hon R Douglas and convinced him that GST, not retail 
sales tax (RST), was the better indirect tax. See I Dickson “The NZ GST Policy Choice: An Historical 
Perspective” in Krever R and White D (eds) GST in Retrospect and Prospect (Brookers Ltd, 
Wellington, 2007) 45 at 49. 
120
 C James, I Jeffrey, H Miller “Apportionment Principles: Part II” (2004) 4(2) Australian GST Journal 
10 at 27. 
 126 
must not impose an onerous burden. The management of these competing objectives 
is the key to devising a good apportionment model.121 According to James et al, it is 
essential in designing an approach to calculating input tax recovery to obtain an 
understanding of the business and its processes.122 The approach to apportionment 
needs to be flexible so that taxpayers may select a methodology which is appropriate 
to their circumstances but still produces a fair and reasonable result. 
With these considerations in mind, it is therefore good tax design practice to 
maximise opportunities to leverage off other accounting considerations, to minimise 
compliance costs.  
Compliance costs 
What is notable with the current adjustment rules is the high level of compliance 
costs. The current adjustment rules are generally viewed by taxpayers as an 
unnecessarily burdensome area of GST law. The adjustment rules according to PWC 
are:123  
“… one of the most problematic areas of the GST legislation …” 
The number of submissions to the Board of Taxation and Treasury on the adjustment 
rules is testament to this concern. Adjustments were raised as an issue at each of the 
consultation sessions which the Board of Taxation held during August 2008. At 
consultation sessions, the change-in-use rules were frequently raised as a matter of 
concern. They were considered to be excessively onerous, and to result in significant 
compliance difficulties for businesses. Several submissions suggested that fully 
complying with obligations under current rules was not possible for many taxpayers. 
Particular concerns were raised in relation to property and construction activities. 
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The change-in-use rules were said to be imposing significant burdens. Taxpayers 
considered they were required to track too many acquisitions for too long. Further, 
there were also too many different periods and thresholds for acquisitions, rendering 
record-keeping and accounting excessively complex. The need to classify 
acquisitions into acquisitions related to business finance and other acquisitions was 
especially criticised. Finally, submissions considered that the required calculations 
are often difficult and the record-keeping onerous, especially given that in some 
circumstances it may be required for up to 15 years. 
In both public consultation sessions and in submissions, concern was expressed 
about the meaning of “apply” and “application” in the GST change-in-use provisions 
and elsewhere in the GST Act. This was largely in the context of their interaction 
with the rules regarding residential property and new residential property. While 
concern with a mismatch between the input tax and adjustment rules was 
highlighted, the ATO has since provided taxpayer’s operational clarity around the 
application of the adjustment rules. 
Adjustment rules — threshold changes 
The Australian reform of the adjustment thresholds is intriguing. And it is hard to 
understand why the system of two adjustment threshold mechanisms has effectively 
been shifted from ‘business finance’ to ‘private use’. This is especially puzzling for 
two reasons. First, Australia has special rules for financial acquisitions, so it is 
reasonably understandable that those acquisitions should be treated differently. 
Secondly, the Board of Taxation acknowledged that there was confusion in having 
two threshold mechanisms. So if the drive was to consolidate the thresholds, why 
then create a new private use threshold previously part of the “not related to business 
finance” threshold? 
Perhaps the answer relates to the fact private use often involves lower value 
acquisitions and requires separate treatment. The Board of Taxation certainly 
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acknowledged in its recommendation that private use needed to be explicitly linked 
to the extent of private use for income tax purposes.124  
In contrast, New Zealand’s new apportionment rules have adopted a single threshold 
mechanism for determining adjustment periods that makes no distinction between 
entity or transaction type.125 
Adjustment periods — an argument for flexibility 
A major criticism of the apportionment approach is the compliance costs associated 
with the adjustment process. At present, the system determines the adjustment period 
based on acquisition value, rather than the estimated life of the asset. The 
relationship between value and adjustment periods is arbitrary, and reflects tax 
revenue trade-offs more than the opportunity for an asset to change use over its life 
time. Surely the estimated useful life of an asset would be a better measure of the 
opportunity for an asset to change use over its life time. It is also a measure that is 
already provided for in the income tax depreciation rules. 
If the value of the acquisition is the determining factor for allocating adjustment 
periods, then perhaps the system should leverage off the income tax depreciation 
rules, which have already calculated value based on estimated useful life.  
This suggestion is not new. Submissions to the Board of Taxation raised similar 
arguments. According to CPA Australia, the current calculation of adjustments 
(under Division 129) leads to anomalous outcomes when viewed from a timing 
perspective. The limitation of the assessment period results in many scenarios where 
the adjustment of input tax credit claims does not reflect the overall application of a 
thing over its effective life. For example, a taxpayer may apply things used in 
constructing real property for input taxed purposes for a period of 4 years and then 
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use them for making taxable supplies for 6 years. At the end of all of the adjustment 
periods under Division 129, the taxpayer will have effectively claimed 60 per cent 
input tax credits, being 6 out of 10 years of creditable use. However, the current 
mechanism dos not allow for the prospect that the taxpayer may continue to apply 
the things for a creditable purpose for the next 20 years left in the effective life of the 
asset. 
CPA Australia sensibly suggest that Division 129 should be amended so that 
adjustments take into account the effective useful life (EUL) of the asset, rather than 
the fixed adjustment periods, based on the value of the asset.126 In keeping with the 
need to provide flexibility, the system should provide taxpayers the opportunity to 
select the most appropriate adjustment period. As the taxpayer is in the best position 
to assess associated compliance costs, this might mean that adjustment periods 
should offer taxpayers the choice to select adjustment periods based on EUL or 
value. 
Safe harbour and de minimis changes 
Compliance costs are an important consideration in the good design of the 
adjustment rules. At present the Australian adjustment rules provide only two 
opportunities to avoid an adjustment: 
• A safe harbour for supplies of $1,000 or less; or 
• 5 per cent de minimis on changes-in-use (capped on total supplies of $50,000 
for the 12-month period). 
The reforms propose an increase in the safe harbour threshold from $1,000 to 
$1,999. In addition, the de minimis rule will be increased to 10 per cent, but remain 
capped at $50,000. In contrast, Canada already has a 10 per cent threshold without a 
financial cap (eg “substantial change” test), and New Zealand has adopted a 10 per 
cent de minimis (capped at NZ$1,000) on all changes-in-use, with a 5 per cent de 
minimis on exempt supplies (capped on total supplies of NZ$90,000 for the 12-
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month period). Whether New Zealand will revisit a larger de minimis of 10 per cent 
in light of Australia’s reforms proposals being enacted, is hard to judge. The 
justifications given by officials for constraining the 10 per cent de minimis rule to 
NZ$1,000, in light of revenue and compliance concerns would suggest it is unlikely.  
L. Conclusion 
The adjustment rules have clearly been successful in terms of legal compliance. The 
number of reported GST cases that have considered the input tax and adjustment 
rules is very low, both in terms of reported cases in Australia and in comparative 
terms with New Zealand. The small proportion of reported cases that have 
considered input tax and adjustment rules would appear to suggest that there is may 
be a higher degree of clarity and compliance with the rules, than in New Zealand. It 
would appear the legislative rules have been easier to comprehend and there has 
been less room for confusion or litigation. Of course it might also suggest that there 
is a lower level of audit activity or enforcement of those rules.  
Equally, the calculation methodology has not resulted in much litigation. Where it 
has, the cases appear to have turned on the facts, rather than the law. Viewed 
broadly, the low litigation rate must be considered a substantial cost saving for both 
taxpayers and officials. Whether this is attributable to the manner in which the rules 
have been crafted, the legislative drafting, or the guidance provided by the ATO is 
unclear. It may well be due to the interplay of all three elements.  
In terms of certainty and efficiency, the current rules have been subject to criticism. 
It has been suggested that the rules are difficult to comply with due to a lack of 
quality prescriptive guidance. Empirical evidence would appear to suggest the 
contrary. Litigation is not rife and recent cases on the application of the adjustment 
rules have not been appealed. Where the courts have considered apportionment, the 
issues have turned on matters of fact, rather than law.  
It has also been suggested that the mismatch between the legal tests for input tax 
credit entitlement and their subsequent adjustment produces anomalies. While the 
rules do produce a mismatch, the ATO has been quick to accommodate taxpayer 
concerns and has adopted a pragmatic position in GST Rulings which has provided 
clarity for taxpayers. Clearly the challenge for the ATO is to continue improving its 
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guidance. But to date, it would appear to have done a far better job than New 
Zealand in providing certainty for taxpayers. 
A feature of the adjustment rules is the creation of adjustment periods based on the 
type of use and the value of the acquisition. The use of adjustment periods provides a 
degree of certainty for taxpayers so that adjustments are unable to go on indefinitely. 
The deemed supply approach in the former New Zealand adjustment rules did not 
provide this level of certainty.  
In terms of compliance costs the current rules have not been as successful. A major 
criticism of the rules is the arduous tracking and reporting of adjustments that is 
required. However, much of the criticism is centred not on the over-arching 
architecture of the rules, but with the operational aspects of the rules (ie the 
adjustment period thresholds). This criticism is also coming from larger taxpayers 
who have substantially higher volumes of transactions to monitor and report on. For 
the majority of smaller taxpayers there appears to be less complaint with the 
operation of the rules.  
The proposed changes to the adjustment thresholds should go some way to reducing 
compliance cost concerns. An initial threshold of 10 per cent change is a good safe 
harbour. Whether specific industries or assets should be provided higher thresholds 
remains to be seen. The creation of higher thresholds and a separate class of 
transaction for real property in determining the appropriate adjustment period will 
provide more targeted compliance requirements but may create inefficiency and 
inequity. Whether other assets or activities receive similar attention also remains to 
be seen. It will be interesting to see how the draft legislation evolves. Clearly, there 
is still room to make improvements. 
In terms of legal compliance and certainty the rules have been very successful. The 
trade-off with operational compliance costs in the adoption of adjustment periods 
should not ignore the litigation cost savings, or the certainty that adjustment periods 
provide. The alternatives (eg, deemed supply) could well impose much higher 
compliance and administrative costs. Overall, the Australian experience suggests that 
the apportionment approach provides a good basis for determining input tax credit 
entitlement and the appropriate level of GST liability for transactions.  
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III. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
“The change in use provisions are the most difficult rules contained in the GST Legislation 
and could result in significant costs for a person who does not properly apply the rules on a 
timely basis.” ~ Allan Schinnour 1 
A. Introduction 
It has been 19 years since the introduction of GST legislation in Canada. This is 
certainly a more than adequate period of time to conduct a review. Similar to the 
New Zealand experience, the change-in-use rules have largely remained untouched 
since their introduction. Surprisingly there have been few reviews of the legislation 
and certainly none that have undertaken a broad review of the complete GST system. 
A unique feature of the Canadian experience is the application of both an adjustment 
and apportionment approach to change-in-use. By default, the change-in-use rules 
adopt an apportionment approach to input tax credit entitlement and remittance. 
However, for capital personal property an adjustment approach (eg, a “primary 
purpose” test) is applied that mirrors to a large extent the early New Zealand 
approach. This dual application of two different approaches is an interesting feature 
of the Canadian experience and provides a unique opportunity to compare the two 
different approaches in the same jurisdiction. Unlike Australia or New Zealand, 
Canada appears to have taken a more pragmatic approach to the change-in-use rules 
and decided that for particular types of transactions different rules will be applied.  
This chapter seeks to provide some insight into the Canadian experience and an 
assessment of whether the apportionment approach has been successful. If lack of 
legislative and judicial activity is a measure of success, has the Canadian experience 
shown that an apportionment approach has been more successful than an adjustment 
approach? What apportionment lessons can we learn from the Canadian experience?  
Accordingly, this chapter first examines the key provisions that provide the basis for 
entitlements to input tax credits and the change-in-use rules (both on an 
apportionment and adjustment basis). The chapter also examines the evolution of the 
“fair and reasonable” test (that is central to the application of apportionment 
                                               
1
  AW Schinnour “GST Tips & Traps” (1994) Vol 7(1) Canadian Petroleum Tax Journal 1 at [53]. 
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approach). The second part of this chapter then examines whether empirical evidence 
provides any enlightenment on whether an apportionment approach has been 
successful or not.  
Part 1: The Rules 
B. Background 
The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) is responsible for the administration and 
collection of GST and harmonised sales tax (HST) for participating provinces. GST 
in Canada is a broad low single-rate tax.2 In 1998-1999 the net GST revenue was 
$20.68 billion (derived from total collected GST of $50.174 billion, less $23.534 
billion of input tax credits, rebates, and credits).3 In 2008-09 (ten years later) net 
GST revenue was $25.7 billion (derived from total collected GST of $167.0 billion, 
less $141.3 billion of input tax credits, rebates, and credits).4  
Similar to New Zealand and Australia the rules for claiming entitlement to input tax 
credits on acquisitions and adjustments for change-in-use are provided for in the 
GST legislation, interpreted through case law, and guided by rulings. In fact, Canada 
based its GST model (and its name) on the New Zealand GST Act.5 However, unlike 
New Zealand or Australia, the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in Canada has had a 
very turbulent history.6 According to Bird, GST was the most “heartily disliked tax 
                                               
2
  Originally proposed at 9 per cent, it was enacted at 7 per cent, and subsequently reduced to 6 per cent 
in 2006 and its current rate of 5 per cent in 2008.  
3
  R Domingue and J Soucy The Goods and Services Tax: 10 Years Later (Economics Division, 15 June 
2000). Document available at <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/prb0003-e.htm> 
(viewed 20 March 2011). 
4
  Department of Finance The Fiscal Monitor (March 2010) 2. Document available at 
<www.fin.gc.ca/fiscmon-revfin/pdf/2010-03-eng.pdf> (viewed 20 March 2011).  
5
  B Ketterman “VAT? A Look Inside Canada’s Experience with Goods and Services Tax” (2006) 8 San 
Diego International Law Journal 259 at 265. See also BJ Arnold “The April 27, 1989 Federal Budget” 
(1989) 1 International Tax Notes 41. The Canadian Government's GST proposals were set out in a 
series of official documents released under the name of the Minister of Finance, Michael Wilson. 
These documents included: Tax Reform in 1987: Sales Tax Reform (Department of Finance, Ottawa, 
June 1987), known as “The White Paper”; The Goods and Services Tax (Department of Finance, 
Ottawa, April 1989); Goods and Services Tax: An Overview (Department of Finance, Ottawa, August 
1989); Goods and Services Tax: Technical Paper (Department of Finance, Ottawa, August 1989); and 
Goods and Services Tax (Department of Finance, Ottawa, December 1989). 
6
  B Ketterman “VAT? A Look Inside Canada’s Experience with Goods and Services Tax” (2006) 8 San 
Diego International Law Journal 259. The Canadian federal government originally planned to 
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in Canada”.7 Its introduction in 1991 was fraught with resistance at nearly every step 
and it was very nearly repealed two years later in 1993.8  
The GST legislation was also introduced at a time when Canada was going through a 
deep recession. According to Domingue & Soucy, the 1990s were one of the worst 
decades for Canadian economic performance and this situation lent itself poorly to 
tax reform of any kind.9 Table 3.1 illustrates the Federal and Provincial rates and 
adoption (or resistance) of HST in Canada.10 Against this political backdrop it is 
little wonder that the GST legislation and subsequently Harmonised Sales Tax 
(HST),11 has been designed in the manner it has —an indirect tax system that “no 
one in their right mind would have designed from scratch”.12  
                                                                                                                                     
introduce GST in 1987 as part of a two stage tax reform program — replacing an underperforming 
manufacturers’ sales tax with GST. However, resistance from the provincial governments (who were 
opposed to a consolidation of provincial taxes) and small businesses (who opposed the heavy 
compliance burden that was expected to result), mixed with a lack of political will (no doubt a 
reflection of heavy public opposition), meant the reform proposals did not get traction until 1989. A 
major political problem in introducing GST was the prior existence in the provinces (except Alberta) 
of retail sales taxes (RST) ranging from 7 per cent to 12 per cent. Generally, the provincial sales taxes 
exclude services from the tax base. When the Bill was passed by Parliament on 10 April 1990, it was 
only due to the application of a little known constitutional rule (enabling the stacking of votes) that it 
successfully passed through the Senate (although only after lengthy filibustering attempts) and 
assented on 13 December 1990.  
7
  RM Bird Where Do We Go From Here? Alternatives to the GST (KPMG Centre for Government, 
Toronto, 1994). See also RM Bird and PP Gendron “Sales Tax in Canada: The GST- QST-PST 
System” (2009) 63 Tax Law Review 517.  
8
  The Liberal Government’s election manifesto promised to replace GST and the House of Commons 
Finance Committee charged with reviewing GST subsequently recommended replacing it with a 
harmonised Federal-Provincial sales tax (ie, HST). See Creating Opportunity: the Liberal Plan for 
Canada (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada, 1993), and Standing Committee on Finance Replacing the 
GST: Options for Canada (House of Commons, Ottawa, June 1994).  
9
  R Domingue and J Soucy The Goods and Services Tax: 10 Years Later (Economics Division, 15 June 
2000).  
10
 Table 3.1 is based on Table 1 in RM Bird and PP Gendron “Sales Tax in Canada: The GST- QST-
PST System” (2009) 63 Tax Law Review 517. The provincial rate in Quebec increased to 8.5 per cent 
1 January 2011 and to 9.5 per cent from 1 January 2012 with corresponding adjustments to the 
consolidated federal rate. 
11
 Harmonised sales tax (HST) was introduced in 1997 to harmonise (and consolidate) all provincial 
taxes into GST. It is a broad multi-rate system (that accommodates the different tax rates it replaces in 
each province) with higher rates than GST (although part of the revenue equating to approximately 
half the HST tax rate is remitted back to the provinces). Effectively, HST seeks to accomplish the 
consolidation aspiration that GST originally promised, but was unable to deliver. On introduction the 
GST legislation was partially harmonised with Quebec and it was not until 1997 that Newfoundland, 
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick agreed to harmonise. Incidentally, these three provinces are also the 
poorest provinces in Canada and it has been suggested that the cost of collection may have played a 
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Table 3.1: Indirect Tax in Canada  
Jurisdiction Name 
of Tax 
Type  
of Tax 
Fed 
Rate 
(%) 
Prov 
Rate 
(%) 
Administration Comments 
Canada GST / 
HST 
VAT 5 / 13  Federal except in 
Quebec, where it 
is provincial 
The Federal GST rate is 5% 
and applied throughout all 
provinces. Government also 
administers PST in 
participating HST provinces 
(consolidated rate of 13%) 
Alberta GST VAT 5 0 Federal Alberta has no PST 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
HST VAT 13 8 Federal  HST revenues collected in 
HST provinces are 
distributed to participating 
provinces based on 
estimated taxable 
consumption 
Nova Scotia  HST VAT 15 10 Federal Same as for Newfoundland 
(except sum is 15%) 
New 
Brunswick  
HST VAT 13 8 Federal Same as for Newfoundland 
Prince Edward 
Island 
PST RST 15 10 Provincial Applied to retail sales price 
(including GST) 
Quebec  QST 
(TVQ) 
VAT 12.5 7.5 Provincial Applied to GST base plus 
GST 
Ontario  HST VAT 13 8 Federal Same as for Newfoundland 
Manitoba  PST RST 12 7 Provincial Applied to retail sales price 
(excluding GST) 
Saskatchewan  PST RST 10 5 Provincial Applied to retail sales price 
(excluding GST) 
British 
Columbia 
HST VAT 12 7 Federal Same as for Newfoundland 
(except sum is 12%) 
                                                                                                                                     
part n opting into a Federal collection system. See B Ketterman “VAT? A Look Inside Canada’s 
Experience with Goods and Services Tax” (2006) 8 San Diego International Law Journal 259 at 268, 
fn 56. On introduction of HST, Alberta was the only province with no retail sales tax policy. British 
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario applied provincial sales tax (PST) to the selling price 
and simply added it to the GST, whereas Prince Edward Island and Quebec applied PST to the total 
amount of the selling price and the GST. The HST legislation still has yet to be fully harmonised with 
all the provinces. Ontario and British Columbia subsequently adopted HST in 2010. 
12
 RM Bird and PP Gendron “Sales Tax in Canada: The GST- QST-PST System” (2009) 63 Tax Law 
Review 517. 
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It has been suggested that the GST legislation’s painful birth was due in part to 
“certain structural defects”.13 Perhaps it also explains why it has not received the 
type of broad-based central government reviews that have occurred in New Zealand 
and Australia. 
C. Legislation 
The Canadian Goods and Services Tax (GST) system is multi-layered. It comprises 
GST legislation (containing transitional measures),14 subordinate legislation (eg, 
regulations and remission orders),15 and a Harmonisation Sales Tax (HST)16 that 
attempts to harmonise Provincial Sales Taxes (PSTs) with the Federal GST system.17  
Canada’s GST rules are not contained in their own unique Act. Rather they are 
located within Part 9 of the Excise Act 1985.18 The GST Legislation was enacted on 
17 December 1990 and came into force from 1 January 1991. It is divided into 12 
Divisions which comprise various subdivisions (ss 122-368). The GST Act 
comprises a total of 379 active provisions.19  
                                               
13
 RM Bird and PP Gendron “Sales Tax in Canada: The GST- QST-PST System” (2009) 63 Tax Law 
Review 517. at 521 
14
 Excise Act RSC 1985, Part 9 (GST Legislation) and Part 8 (Transitional Measures).  
15
 Comprising: 45 Regulations, 47 General Remission Orders, and 84 Private Remission Orders. 
16
 The HST rules are integrated into the GST Legislation in Division 10 (HST Transitional Provisions). 
For additional detail see Canada Revenue Agency Technical Information Bulletin B-077, Transitional 
Provisions under the HST (28 February 1997), Harmonized Sales Tax Questions and Answers (23 
October 1996) and Canada Revenue Agency Fact Sheet HST: Transitional Rules (March 1997). As a 
result of introducing HST the change-in-use rules for capital property (ss 195 to 211), and many other 
specific provisions, were changed to replace the tax fraction representing the rate of GST (eg, “7/107” 
at the time) with the term “basic tax content”. 
17
 Harmonised Sales Tax (HST) was first announced on 23 April 23 1996 and subsequently released as a 
Bill (c.70) on 23 October 1996. The HST Legislation was assented on 20 March 1997 and came into 
force from 1 April 1997, in the participating provinces (ie, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador). HST replaces the Goods and Services Tax (GST) and Provincial Sales 
Tax (PST) in participating provinces. Ontario and British Columbia adopted HST from 1 July 2010. 
The HST rate is currently 13 per cent in all participating provinces except British Columbia where the 
rate is 12 per cent, and Nova Scotia where the rate is 15 per cent (from 1 July 2010). The Canada 
Revenue Agency (CRA) administers the HST for all participating provinces.  
18
 Hereafter referred to as the “GST Legislation”. 
19
 Division 1 (interpretation, ss 123 to 164.2); Division 2 (imposition, input tax credits and capital 
property (real and personal); ss 165 to 211); Division 3 (Tax on Importation of Goods; ss 212 to 216); 
Division 4 (Tax on Imported Taxable Supplies; ss 217 to 220); Division 4.1 (Tax on Property and 
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While the GST legislation has received a reasonable level of remedial legislative 
activity (in a large part a reflection of harmonisation), the input tax rules and change-
in-use rules have largely remained untouched since enactment. This level of stability 
over a period of 19 years appears to suggest the rules are working well. However, the 
volume of litigation would appear to suggest that there is not an even level of 
certainty across all of the rules.20 However, on closer examination much of the 
litigation with regard to input tax credit entitlement under an apportionment 
approach is related to boundary issues, rather than apportionment methodology. The 
number of cases related to change-in-use is much lower.21 When one compares the 
economic size of the jurisdictions, the proportion of cases is lower than for New 
Zealand or Australia.  
Despite its small size (only 379 provisions), the GST Legislation is quite 
prescriptive. This is especially the case with regard to the input tax credit and 
change-in-use rules. Unlike New Zealand or Australia (who tend to favour general 
rules and therefore few legislative provisions), Canada has adopted a much more 
prescriptive approach, that has resulted in very precise rules for particular types of 
property and entities.22  
                                                                                                                                     
Services Brought into a Participating Province; ss 220.01 to 220.09); Division 5 (Collection and 
Remittance of Division 2 Tax; ss 221 to 251); Division 6 (Rebates; ss 252 to 264); Division 7 
(Miscellaneous; ss 265 to 274.2); Division 8 (Administration and Enforcement; ss 275 to 335); 
Division 9 (Transitional Provisions; ss 336 to 347); Division 10 (Transitional Provisions for 
Participating Provinces; ss 348 to 363.2); Division 11 (Tax Inclusive Pricing; ss 364 to 368). New 
provisions are inserted as points (eg, s 164.1 is inserted below s 164). 
20
 Section 169 is cited in 295 cases (based on research conducted in Carswell’s TaxNetPro). See Figure 
3.4 (below). 
21
 There are 19 cases that have examined the change-in-use rules (based on research conducted in 
Carwell’s TaxNetPro). If the specific change-in-use rules for builders (ss 190, 191) are excluded the 
number of cases reduces to 16 cases. Gatineau (Ville) v R [2010] FCA 82; SLX Management Inc v R 
[2010] TCC 148; Lavoie v R [2009] TCC 501, [2009] GSTC 142; Gatineau (Ville) v R [2009] TCC 
130; [2009] GSTC 41; Nikel Ltd v R [2008] GSTC 195; Polley v R [2008] GSTC 99; Université de 
Sherbrooke v R [2007] GSTC 77, [2008] GSTC 27; British Columbia Transit v R [2006] GSTC 103; 
Simard v R [2005] GSTC 183, [2006] GSTC 172; Wiley v R [2005] GSC 164; Immeubles le Séjour 
Inc v R [2002] GSTC 98, [2003] GSTC 180; 510628 Ontario Ltd v R [2000] GSTC 58; MM Leasing v 
R [1995] GSTC 9 (FCA); Strachan v R [1999] GSTC 72; 475588 Ontario Inc v R [1994] GSTC 50; 
and Kramer Ltd v R [1994] GSTC 47. Excluding: Samson Bélair Deloitte & Touche Inc v R [2004] 
GSTC 155; [2006] GSTC 86; Manoussi v Davis [2006] QCCS 1631, [2009] GSTC 48; and Sand, Surf 
& Sea Ltd v R [2008] GSTC 71. 
22
 In Australia, property, entity, and value distinctions are utilised at the reporting and tracking stages, 
rather than at the stage of input tax credit and subsequent change-in-use entitlement. New Zealand’s 
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An obvious difference with the Australian and New Zealand rules is the distinctions 
made between types of property.23 The Canadian rules have provided a distinction 
between capital property,24 real property,25 and non-capital property.26 The later type 
of property (eg, non-capital property) provides the general rule. Non-capital property 
also includes prescribed property, although no property has yet been prescribed by 
regulation.27 These distinctions appear to be made to enable different rules and tests 
to apply to different types of property (and entities). Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 
summarises these distinctions.  
Table 3.2 Canadian Input Tax Credits and Change in Use Rules 
Asset Type Input tax credits (ITCs) Change-in-use rules 
 Section Test Method Section Method 
Personal  
property  
(non-capital) 
s 169 Intended use * use % ss 172 (non-
commercial), 
196.1 (capital) 
** 
Actual use (FMV) 
Personal 
property 
(capital) 
s 199 Primary purpose  
(> 50%) 
100% or 0% ss 199, 200 ** Deemed supply,  
< FMV or price 
paid 
Real property 
(capital) 
ss 169, 
208 
Intended use * use % ss 206, 207, 
208 ** 
Deemed supply, 
(apportion use) 
< FMV or price 
paid 
                                                                                                                                     
old rules made no distinctions at either the entitlement or tracking stages. However, the New Zealand 
rules (prior to reform in 2010) did codify the methodology for quantifying change-in- use which is 
something neither Australia nor Canada have done (or propose doing). In Australia, valuation 
methodologies are explained in binding rulings. Prior to legislative codification in New Zealand, the 
valuation methodologies were merely interpretation statements. 
23
 Unfortunately the legislation does not provide a guiding provision that identifies and clearly 
demarcates the distinctions being made in the GST Legislation and where the rules for each category 
are located. Rather Division 2 is divided into Subdivisions: (a) imposition of tax; (b) input tax credits; 
(c) special cases; and (d) capital property. These later subdivisions (eg, capital property) are then 
divided into: capital property (ss 195 to 198.2); capital personal property (ss 199 to 205); and capital 
real property (ss 206 to 211).  
24
 Excise Act RSC 1985, ss 195 to 205. The capital property (described in ss 199 to 205) is personal 
property and not real property. These sections do not apply to financial institutions. Capital personal 
property of financial institutions is governed generally by the rules for capital real property. 
25
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 206 to 211. 
26
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 169. 
27
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 195. 
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* 10:90 rule: must be 10% or more to qualify. Greater than 90% deemed 100% (s 141). 
** 10% minimum change threshold (eg, “insignificant” change ignored) (s 197). 
Table 3.3: Canadian Capital Property Rules (Division 2, Subdivision D)28 
 
An interestingly aspect of the Canadian rules is the use of two approaches — an 
apportionment approach for real property and non-capital property, and a threshold 
test (not too dissimilar to New Zealand’s “principal purpose” test) for capital 
property. The GST Legislation also identifies particular entities (eg, builders, public 
sector, and financial institutions) for different treatment (see Table 3.4).29 
Automobiles are also singled out for different treatment.30 
                                               
28
 D Sherman TaxNetPro GST Commentary (Carswell, Last updated: 16 November 2001). The table 
was kindly provided by David Sherman during email correspondence (24 November 2010). Note that 
the automobile capital cost threshold has increased from $24,000 to $30,000 and the GST rate has 
reduced from 7 per cent to 5 per cent since this table was last updated. “ITC” means input tax credit. 
“FMV” means fair market value. “CCA” means capital cost allowance. 
29
 Section 195.1 outlines the change-in-use rules for builders and tidies up an overlap between two 
provisions. Section 195.1 ensures that the change-in-use rules in ss 206 to 207 do not apply at the 
same time as the self-supply rules in s 191, by giving priority to the self-supply rules. Effectively, s 
195.1 deems any capital real property as inventory (for use in a commercial activity) until it is deemed 
to be sold under s 191.  
30
 Excise Act RSC 1985, ss 201, 202 and 203. 
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Table 3.4: Extent of Commercial Activity by Different Entities 
Asset Type Commercial 
Use 
ITC  
Individual 
ITC 
Corporation 
ITC  
Public Sector 
ITC  
Financial 
  s 208 s 206 s 209 ss 206, 141(6) 
<10% 0% 0% 0% use% 
10%-50% use % use % 0% use% 
50%-90% use % use % 100% use% 
Capital  
Real property 
and 
Non-Capital 
property >90% 10% 10% 100% use% 
  s 199 s 199 s 199 s 199 
<50% 0% 0% 0% use% Capital 
Personal 
property >50% 100% 100% 100% use% 
Source: Canada Revenue Agency GST Memoranda (New Series) ch 19.1 at [103]. 
D. Input Tax Credits 
The general rule — non-capital and real property 
Sections 169 and 170 provide the general rules for claiming input tax credits for non-
capital property (eg, inventory) and real property (eg, land).  
Capital property (eg, a business computer) is treated differently under separate 
rules.31 Passenger vehicles and aircraft are also treated differently under their own 
specific rules.32 Selected listed financial institutions (SLFIs) are specifically 
excluded from claiming input tax credits.33 There are also simplified rules (that do 
not require tracking and claiming specific input tax credits) for small businesses and 
public service bodies.34  
                                               
31
 Excise Act RSC 1985, ss 199. 
32
 Excise Act RSC 1985, ss 200, 201, and 2002. 
33
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 169(3). The identification of financial institutions is not unique and their 
separation (and different treatment) is also applied throughout the two other jurisdictions (eg, New 
Zealand and Australia) examined in this thesis. See Ryan ULC Value Added Taxation in Canada: 
GST, HST and QST (3rd ed, CCH Canada Ltd, Toronto, 2009) 557. 
34
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 227. 
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Generally, a registered entity is eligible to claim an input tax credit for GST paid on 
purchases of non-capital property or services acquired for use or supply in the course 
of a commercial activity.35 The focus of inquiry is at the time of acquisition.36  
Where a registered entity makes mixed supplies (eg, a combination of taxable and 
exempt supplies), a partial input tax credit (based on an apportionment approach) is 
available to the extent that the purchases relates to the making of taxable supplies. 
The apportionment method adopted must be “fair and reasonable” and used 
consistently throughout the year.37 Financial institutions are treated differently and 
must obtain prior approval by the CRA before adopting an apportionment method.38 
The apportionment approach is also subject to a 90:10 threshold rule.39 No 
apportionment is made for commercial activity below 10 per cent or above 90 per 
cent (except for financial institutions and residential carve-outs).40  
                                               
35
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 123(1) defines “commercial activity”.  
36
 The word “acquire” is not defined in the Act. The ordinary dictionary definition of the term “acquire” 
is to get, obtain, have control over or possess. With respect to property, relevant case law indicates 
that property is “acquired” by obtaining ownership or possession. The words “consumption” and 
“use” are also not defined in the Act. 
37
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 141.01(5), formerly s 147 (repealed). Section 141.01 was introduced to 
clarify the requirement to apportion GST paid on indirect inputs, as well as direct inputs (eg, over-
head expenses). It remains unclear whether a business that pays an amount in legal fees to settle a 
lawsuit against it arising in the course of making taxable supplies could claim an ITC. Section 
141.01(2) would appear to prevent a claim. It has been suggested that s 141.1(3) might operate to 
allow the credit to be claimed. However, given there is no direction of priority between the 
provisions, Parliament must have intended the later amendment to preside over the earlier provision, 
if there is a conflict. The new provision also consolidated in s 147. The amendment received Royal 
Assent on 12 May 1994 and applied retrospectively from 1 January 1991 (the introduction of the GST 
Legislation). See Department of Finance News Release 93-027 (30 April 1993). For a discussion of 
the reasons for the introduction of this provision, see: R Resendes “Proposed New Input Tax Credit 
Rules and Retroactive GST Changes” in Commodity Tax Symposium (Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, 1993) tab 27; D Huggett “Legislative Thievery” (July/August 1993) 21(3) Canadian Tax 
News 1; A Taitz and WJ Millar “Apportionment Requirement Confirmed” (June 1993) 7(5) GST & 
Commodity Tax Newsletter 33; RG Kreklewetz and V Vipul “Limitations on Claiming Input Tax 
Credits: British Columbia Transit v The Queen” (February 2007) 17(2) Taxation Law (Ontario Bar 
Association Taxation Law Section Newsletter) 23. 
38
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 141.02. 
39
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 141.  
40
 Financial institutions must apportion on an exact basis under s 141(6), and must use special ITC 
allocation rules under s 141.02. The 90:10 rule also does not apply to residential premises. Under s 
141(5) the residential portion of a commercial activity is deemed to be separate from commercial 
activity (ie, a residential carve-out). This exception to the 90:10 rule (ie, re-enabling exact 
apportionment below 10 per cent) is intended to allow apportionment of operating expenses related to 
 143 
In a departure from convention, Canada ignores exempt transactions in businesses 
that make “substantially all” supplies in taxable circumstances. If “substantially all” 
of a property is used (or intended to be used) in commercial activities, then all of the 
property is deemed to be used (or intended to be used) in commercial activities.41 
The expression “substantially all” has been interpreted to mean 90 per cent or 
more.42 Effectively, a 100 per cent input tax credit is available where purchases 
relate exclusively (eg, 90 per cent or more) to commercial activities. Equally, if 
“substantially all” of a property is used (or intended to be used) in other activities 
(eg, for personal use or in making exempt supplies), then all of the property is 
deemed to be used (or intended to be used) in other activities.43 Effectively, a 0 per 
cent input tax credit will apply where purchases relate exclusively (eg, 90 per cent or 
more) to non-commercial activities (ie, commercial activity is below 10 per cent).44  
Where a taxable supply is made for a single consideration and includes other 
supplies reasonably regarded as incidental, the other supplies are deemed to form 
part of the taxable supply.45 Supplies made for separate consideration cannot be 
regarded as incidental.46  
                                                                                                                                     
the commercial activities, even if the commercial activity falls below 10 per cent. See On-Guard Self-
Storage Ltd v Canada [1996] GSTC 9 (TCC). See also the Canada Revenue Agency GST Memoranda 
(New Series), Chapter 19.1 (October 1997) at [101, 102 and 104]. The Canada Revenue Agency GST 
Memoranda is the equivalent to the former IRD Technical Rulings Manual (NZ) which ceased 
updated publication in 1998. IRD staff now use TIB database’s as their principal guidance manual. 
41
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 141(1) and (2). 
42
 The 90 per cent figure has no statutory basis. 
43
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 141(3) and (4). 
44
 Section 141(5) provides an exception to the 10 per cent threshold for commercial property that makes 
up less than 10 per cent of a residential complex. This is achieved by deeming the residential complex 
a separate supply from the remaining property (ie, any commercial property). This deeming provision 
is intended to enable the operating expenses of the commercial arm of the residential complex to 
claim input tax credits. Effectively, s 141(5) allows a claim for ITCs that are not available under s 
141(3) or (4). 
45
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 138. 
46
 In New Zealand, the Courts have grappled with what is “reasonably incidental”. In Taxation Review 
Authority (TRA) Case S81 (1996) 17 NZTC 7,505 at [24], Judge Barber considered that the supply of 
flats in a property development might be considered to be reasonably incidental to property 
development. While the TRA decision was overturned in CIR v Morris (1997) 18 NZTC 13,385 
(HC), this line of reasoning was not challenged. The Canadian approach introduces the additional 
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Section 170(1) provides a number of explicit restrictions on entitlement to input tax 
credits that are provided in s 169.47 Section 170(2) also requires claims for input tax 
credits to be reasonable. 
Capital property (personal) 
Section 199(2) sets out rules for claiming input tax credits on capital personal 
property.48 A full input tax credit is available where the registrant intends to use the 
property “primarily” in commercial activities.  
The terms “primary use” or “used primarily” are not defined in the GST Legislation. 
Generally, case law has held that “primarily” means “more than 50 per cent” and this 
interpretation is supported by the CRA. 49 However, the courts have also been open 
to a more flexible interpretation of “primarily” as meaning “first importance, 
principal, or chief” in appropriate circumstances.50 To date all cases that have 
applied the test have exceeded the 50 per cent threshold and it will be interesting to 
observe if the courts are willing to step below 50 per cent, where there are more than 
two purposes at play — an approach that would be consistent with the New Zealand 
“principal purpose” test. 
                                                                                                                                     
aspect of ‘single consideration’ into the required mix. This is a tangible fact that the Courts can more 
readily use in determining an incidental supply.  
47
 These restrictions and are explained in GST Memoranda (New Series) ch 8.2. Restrictions include: 
club membership fees, home office expenses, supplies primarily or exclusively for personal 
consumption, use or enjoyment.  
48
 Capital property is defined in s 123(1) and is consistent with the equivalent income tax meaning, 
subject to an exclusion for certain classes of depreciable property. Section 169 provides the rules for 
capital real property.  
49
 Canada Revenue Agency GST Memorandum (Old Series) ch 400 (18 May 1990) at [60-77]. In Mid-
West Feed Ltd v Minister of National Revenue (1987) 87 DTC 394 (TCC), Couture CJ held that the 
world “primarily” means in excess of 50 per cent of the total use of the asset. This is in contrast to 
New Zealand’s “principal purpose” test which began life as a “more than 50 per cent” test in early 
Taxation Review Authority decisions, but was subsequently interpreted by the Courts as a dominant 
purpose test, where something less than 50 per cent was possible: Morris v CIR (1997) 18 NZTC 
13,385 (HC). 
50
 Calgary (City) v R [2009] GSTC 85 at [71]. See also Lacina v R [1997] GSTC 69 (FCA); Burrows v 
R [1998] GSTC 78 (TCC); Berube v R [2001] GSTC 129 (TCC); and Colleges of Applied Arts and 
Technology Pension Plan v R [2003] GSTC 143 (TCC).  
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The courts have acknowledged that the focus of the test is on the purpose of the 
acquisition, not its use. Although Bowman J observed that use was probably a fair 
indicator of purpose:51 
“’… ‘for use primarily...’ (en vue d'être utilisé) requires the determination of the purpose of 
the acquisition, not the actual use. Nonetheless, I should think that as a practical matter if 
property is in fact used primarily for commercial purposes it is a reasonable inference that it 
was acquired for that purpose.” 
If the intention of the registered entity at the time of acquisition is to use the capital 
personal property primarily in non-commercial activities, no input tax credit will be 
available at that time. A registered entity may not claim input tax credits for the 
acquisition or improvement of real capital property if the property is acquired 
“primarily” (eg, more than 50 per cent) for the individual's personal use and 
enjoyment or the personal use and enjoyment of a related individual.52 
Basic tax content 
The ‘basic tax content’ (BTC) is the net GST rate of the depreciated value of the 
property.53 BTC is calculated on the depreciated value of the property at its current 
fair market value, but not on the appreciated value where the value of the property 
has increased. Fair market value is the fair market value of a property less any 
applicable taxes (eg, provincial levies).54  
 
 
 
                                               
51
 510628 Ontario Ltd v R [2000] GSTC 58 at [11]. 
52
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 208(1) to (4). 
53
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 123(1). The term “basic tax content” replaced the former “tax fraction” term. 
The change in terminology was brought about by the introduction of Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) in 
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland (from 1 April 1997) which had different tax rates of 
GST and the possibility that property could be moved from one HST province to another. Outside the 
HST zones is 5/105. See GST Memorandum (New Series) ch 8.3 for further details. 
54
 The provincial levies that are excluded when determining the fair market value of real property are 
specified in regulations.  
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The general formula is: 
(A - B) × C 
where 
A = the total of: 
(i) tax payable on the claimant's last acquisition or importation of the property; 
(ii) tax payable in respect of improvements to the property acquired, imported or 
brought into a participating province after the property was last acquired or 
imported; 
(iii) tax that would have been payable in either of the preceding situations but for 
subsection 153(4) or section 167 applying or the fact that the property or 
improvements were acquired by the claimant for consumption, use or supply 
exclusively in commercial activities; and 
(iv) tax under section 218 and section 218.1 (tax payable on imported taxable 
supplies), and Division IV.1 (tax self-assessed on property brought into a 
participating province from a non-participating province) that the person would 
have been liable to pay if the property or improvement were not for consumption, 
use or supply exclusively in the course of commercial activities of the person; 
B = the total of 
(i) any tax included in A (above) that the person was exempt from paying under any 
other Act or law; 
(ii) all amounts of tax referred to in A(i) and A(ii) above which the claimant was 
entitled to recover by way of a rebate, refund, or remission or would have been 
entitled to recover, if the property or improvement had been acquired for use 
exclusively in activities that are not commercial activities, other than ITCs and 
amounts referred to in B(i); 
(iii) the amounts of tax referred to in A(iii) and A(iv) above which the claimant was 
entitled to recover by way of a rebate, refund, remission or otherwise under this or 
any other Act or law or would have been entitled to recover if the tax had been 
payable and the property or improvement had been acquired for use exclusively in 
activities that were not commercial activities, other than ITCs and amounts referred 
to in B(i); and 
C = the lesser of 1, and 
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((fair market value at the time the basic tax content is being determined) / 
(consideration payable on the last acquisition + consideration for improvements.)) 
For example, an item is purchased for $100 plus $5 GST, and is now worth $60. The 
BTC is: ($5 – 0) × 60/100= $3. 
According to Sherman, BTC is “by far the most complex definition in the GST 
legislation”.55 Unfortunately there is very little case law that has examined the 
topic.56 The basic tax content is mainly used in the capital property (personal and 
real) change-in-use rules.57 A consequence of the BTC formula is that appreciating 
values appear to have been removed from the change-in-use calculation, and thereby 
removed the source of many problems experienced in New Zealand.  
Financial services  
Generally, financial services are exempt supplies and are not entitled to any input tax 
credits. This exemption is extended to any mixed supplies that comprise financial 
services, where 50 per cent or more of the consideration for the supply relates to 
financial services.58 Mixed supplies below 50 per cent are apportioned so that only 
the non-exempt supply is entitled to input tax credits. However, financial services 
that are “incidentally” acquired or supplied during the course of commercial 
activities by a registered entity (that is not a listed or deemed financial institution) 
are not treated as exempt and no apportionment is required.59 This claw-out from 
exempt treatment reduces compliance costs by eliminating the need for 
apportionment of input tax credits between exempt supplies and commercial 
activities, where the exempt supply is incidental.  
 
                                               
55
 D Sherman “Editorial Comment” in Gatineau (Ville) v R [2010] FCA 82, [2010] CarswellNat 657. 
56
 British Columbia Transit v R [2006] GSTC 103 (TCC) is the only case to have examined the 
definition. 
57
 Excise Act RSC 1985, ss 195 to 211. 
58
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 139. 
59
 Excise Act RSC 1985, ss 185 (non-capital property) and 198 (capital property). Section 138 provides 
a similar rule for financial institutions. 
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E. Change-In-Use Rules 
Like many other jurisdictions, change-in-use rules apply to ensure the correct 
amount of tax has been collected. To prevent the constant application of the change-
in-use rules there is a threshold test which provides that the rules will not apply 
where there is an “insignificant” change in use.60 Generally, an insignificant change 
in use is one where there is less than a 10 per cent change, from the last time a 
change in use was triggered or the property was acquired.  
Non-capital property 
The change-in- use rules for non-capital property are contained in ss 172 and 196.1.  
Where non-capital property is acquired for commercial use, but subsequently 
diverted to personal use, a deemed supply is triggered and the value of the deemed 
supply will equal its fair market value at the time of the deemed supply.61 Section 
172(1) effectively operates to require repayment of the input tax credit claimed under 
s 169.62 While a change is use from non-capital property to capital property is 
available, there is no legislative provision for the opposite (eg, a change in use from 
capital to non-capital property), and the courts have rejected any notion that it could 
work the other way, in the absence of a legislative provision.63  
Where non-capital property is subsequently used as capital property (or incorporated 
into capital property as an improvement), the non-capital property is deemed to have 
been sold for its fair market value at the time of the deemed supply.64 Where non-
capital property is converted into capital property or incorporated into capital 
property as an improvement, the registered entity is required to self-assess and remit 
                                               
60
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 197. This rule is similar to the 90:10 threshold rule for ITC entitlement in s 
141. 
61
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 172(1). See Canada Revenue Agency GST Memoranda (New Series) ch 3.1, 
“Liability for Tax” (August 1999) at [101 and 103]. See Callahan v R [1996] GSTC 15 (TCC). 
62
 Section 172(1) does not apply to capital property. The change-in-use rules for capital property apply 
instead (see below). Section 172(1) also does not apply to a change from a commercial use to one 
making exempt supplies. 
63
 Holand Leasing Ltd v R [1995] GSTC 8 at [18] (TCC). 
64
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 196.1. 
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GST based upon the fair market value of the property at that time. If the appropriated 
property is used in commercial activities they will be entitled to offset the GST 
liability from the deemed sale with an input tax credit. However, if the use is not for 
commercial activities they will incur a GST liability from the deemed sale. 
The conversion of non-capital property into capital property by deemed sale also 
allows the change-in-use rules for capital property65 to apply to property that was not 
capital property (or not intended to be capital property), when it was first acquired. 
Real property 
Section 206 contains the change in use rules for real property.66 The provision deals 
with four scenarios: (1) non-commercial to commercial;67 (2) commercial to non-
commercial;68 (3) increasing commercial use;69 and (4) decreasing commercial use.70  
Where the real property changes from non-commercial to commercial the registered 
entity is deemed to have received a supply of the real property at the time of the 
change. The amount of GST which is deemed to have been paid is equal to the lesser 
of GST on the fair market value of the property at that time and the actual amount of 
GST paid on the acquisition of the property (minus any rebates).71 The extent to 
which the property is then used in commercial activities under s 169, then determines 
the amount input tax credit entitlement.  
Where there is an increase in commercial use, the registered entity is entitled to 
claim an input tax credit equal to the percentage of the increase in use times the 
                                               
65
 Excise Act RSC 1985, ss 195 to 211 (discussed below). 
66
 As stated above the rules are subject to a 10 per cent minimum threshold test. Any changes below 10 
per cent are considered “insignificant” and the change in use will not be triggered. 
67
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 206(2). 
68
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 206(4). 
69
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 206(3). 
70
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 206(5). 
71
 This deemed supply approach is similar to the New Zealand’s former approach for triggering 
recalculation of input tax credit entitlements.  
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lesser of the tax originally paid (minus any rebates) and the GST exigible on the fair 
market value of the property at that time. Where there is a decrease in commercial 
use, a similar calculation is undertaken, except the registered entity will pay back the 
difference to the CRA. The resulting tax liability has the effect of recapturing 
previously claimed ITCs and takes into account the current fair market value of the 
property where it has depreciated in value. 
Where the real property changes from commercial to non-commercial the registered 
entity is deemed to have sold the property at that time and to have collected GST. 
Capital property 
Sections 199 and 200 contain the change in use rules for capital personal property. 
Effectively, the provisions provide a self-supply mechanism that enables the 
recalculation of input tax credit entitlement.  
Section 196 is the triggering mechanism for capital property.72 Effectively, the 
provision expands the concept of “use” to encompass the “intended use” or 
“purpose” and deems the actual use of the property after the acquisition to be the 
intended use at the time of acquisition. Thus, if the actual use is other than the 
deemed intended use, the change-in-use rules for capital property are triggered.73  
Section 199(3) provides for circumstances where there is an increase in commercial 
use. When a change in use of capital personal property occurs from being used 
primarily in non-commercial activities to use primarily in commercial activities (eg, 
commercial use is greater than 50 per cent) the registered entity is deemed to have 
purchased the property and paid GST equal to the basic tax content of the property 
(eg the fair market value of the property or the initial price paid — whichever is 
lower).74 The registered entity is then entitled to claim a full 100 per cent input tax 
credit at that time.  
                                               
72
 Section 196 provides that it applies “for the purposes of this Part”. However, it only applies to 
property that is intended to be used as “capital” property. This may well be a drafting oversight. A 
more correct drafting would restrict it to the relevant Subparts. 
73
 This mechanism is subject to s 197 (discussed above). 
74
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 199(3). 
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Section 200 provides for circumstances where there is a decrease in commercial use. 
When a change in use of capital personal property occurs from being used primarily 
in commercial activities to use primarily in non-commercial activities (eg, 
commercial use less than 50 per cent, therefore not primarily a commercial use), the 
registered entity is deemed to have sold the property and to be liable for GST based 
upon the fair market value of the property at that time.75  
Financial institutions 
Generally, financial institutions are subject to the same change-in-use provisions as 
other registered entities. However, for financial institutions the rules are modified.76 
Any capital personal property that costs more than $50,000 is deemed to be capital 
real property and subject to the real property rules, not the capital personal property 
rules.77 Importantly, the “substantially all” rule (discussed above) does not apply to 
financial institutions. Accordingly, capital real property will only cease to be used 
for commercial activities only when it is used totally for other purposes.78  
General overview 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the operation of the two different approaches (noting that real 
capital property receives the same treatment as non-capital property). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
75
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 200(2). 
76
 These modifications to the general rules are extended to apportionment methods (discussed below). 
77
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 204(1) and (2). 
78
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 206(4). For registered entities, the term “exclusively” means 90 per cent or 
more, but for a financial institution, “exclusively” means 100 per cent. Listed financial institutions 
also have a different ‘basic tax content’ formula. 
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Figure 3.1: Non-Capital and Capital Property Treatment Flowchart 
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F. Apportionment Methodology 
The GST Legislation does not explicitly provide for any method that must be used to 
apportion property or services acquired partly for commercial activities.79 Rather the 
use of any method (direct or indirect) is at the option of the registered entity. The 
legislation merely provides that the method chosen “shall be fair and reasonable in 
                                               
79
 This contrasts to New Zealand’s former adjustment rules, where the apportionment methodology was 
codified. 
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the circumstances and shall be used consistently throughout the year”.80 However, 
for financial institutions the CRA must provide prior approval of the method used.81  
Once a method has been adopted by the registered entity it must be “used 
consistently throughout the year” and be supported by documentation. Any adopted 
method used must be supportable by sufficient documentation to show that it was 
fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances. The CRA also require that the 
supporting documentation should address why the method was appropriate and deal 
with possible distorting factors when using an output method (ie, an indirect revenue 
based approach).82 
Registered entities 
The apportionment of inputs between exempt and taxable outputs for purposes of 
determining input tax credits may have had very little judicial examination in 
Canada,83 but it has had substantially more examination than in Australia or New 
Zealand.84 The few cases that are reported do provide some guidance on what is 
considered “fair and reasonable”.85 Importantly, what is considered “fair and 
reasonable” does not have to be the “best” method.86 Unfortunately, recent court 
                                               
80
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 141.01(5). Both New Zealand and Australia utilise a “fair and reasonable” 
test. 
81
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 141.02. 
82
 Policy Statement P063 (Output Based Method for Input Tax credit Allocation). 
83
 There have only been 10 cases: Navaho Inn v R [1995] GSTC 21 (TCC); Cosmopolitan Music Society 
v R [1995] GSTC 19 (TCC); Royal Canadian Legion Branch No 164 v R [1996] GSTC 98 (TCC); 
Magog (City) v R [2000] GSTC 81 (TCC), [2001] GSTC 98 (FCA); Blanchard v R [2001] GSTC 94 
(TCC); Pension Positive Inc v R [2002] GSTC 56 (TCC); Immeubles Le Sejour Inc v R [2003] GSTC 
180 (TCC); Bay Ferries Ltd v R [2004] GSTC 135 (TCC); Iles-de-la-Madeleine v R [2008] GSTC 24 
(TCC); and Nikel v R [2008] GSTC 195 (TCC). 
84
 New Zealand’s pending adoption of the “fair and reasonable” test will undoubtedly lead to reliance on 
the Canadian and Australian experience for guidance. This is not to suggest that the New Zealand 
Courts are not familiar with determining what is “reasonable”.  
85
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 141.01(5). Section 141.02 provides the rules for financial institutions and 
limits the “fair and reasonable” test by requiring financial institutions to have methods approved by 
the CRA. 
86
 Magog (Ville) v R [2001] GSTC 138 (FCA); Bay Ferries Ltd v R [2004] GSTC 135 (TCC); Nikel Ltd 
v R [2008] GSTC 195 (TCC).  
 154 
decisions have been somewhat obscure about whether an alternative method, that is 
“more” fair and reasonable (but not the best method), could be applied.  
In the recent case of Nickel Ltd v R87 the court early in the judgment suggest that as 
long as the taxpayer’s method is fair and reasonable, the fact that there may be 
another method that is “more” fair and reasonable does not matter.88 However, later 
in the judgement (see quote below) the court appears to suggest that alternative 
practical methods, that might have given a “more reasonable” apportionment (and 
that “might have changed the outcome of the case”), were not argued. As the court 
observed:89 
“… It is appropriate to take into account practical considerations, specifically that methods 
used must be relatively straightforward for the taxpayer to comply with and the Minister to 
administer. 
Given that it is not apparent that there is a practical allocation method that gives a more 
reasonable allocation, given that the complex is professionally managed, that the condo is 
available for rent whenever the Appellant is not using it, that there are facilities in the 
complex aimed at obtaining year-round customers, and given the expenditures the Appellant 
incurs to keep the condo on the market during the year, notwithstanding that there are serious 
weaknesses in the Appellant's method, I find that it is a fair and reasonable method. 
                                               
87
 Nikel Ltd v R [2008] GSTC 195 (TCC). In Nikel, the registered entity bought a condominium in a 
year-round resort complex and claimed 100 per cent input tax credits. The condominium was 
available for private use for 36 days and for the remaining days of the year was available for rental as 
a commercial activity. Over a 2-year period the condominium was used 16 to 33 days a year for 
private use and but available for rental 131 to 268 days a year, although it was actually rented out 53 
to 74 days a year. The CRA sought to recover part of the claimed input tax credits on the basis of a 
reduced commercial use of the property under s 207(2). The Tax Court of Canada (TCC) found for 
the taxpayer. Although the Court found Nikel’s method of treating all days “available for rent” as 
commercial use had “serious weaknesses” (and underestimated personal use), it was nevertheless a 
fair and reasonable method, and thus was acceptable despite not being the best method. The Court did 
not accept that the CRA’s alternative method of counting only “actual rented days” as commercial use 
was appropriate. In Sherman’s opinion, the fact that there was a reasonable expectation of rentals 
year-round (albeit often with low occupancy rates), was sufficient to justify Nikel's method. 
88
 Nikel Ltd v R [2008] GSTC 195 (TCC) at [29]. citing Magog (Ville) v R [2001] GSTC 138 (FCA) 
with approval. 
89
 Nikel v R [2008] GSTC 195 (TCC) at [41-43]. The Court noted that the CRA (respondent) “did not 
argue any alternative approaches to the assessment method. Whether the existence of an alternative 
allocation method that is reasonable and practical to apply in circumstances such as these (if such a 
method exists), would change the outcome was a question for another case” (fn 16). 
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Given my conclusion there is no change in use of 10% or more. As a result of the operation 
of section 197 of the GST, there is no deemed supply pursuant to subsection 207(2) of the 
GST and no resulting output tax.” 
With respect, it would appear that this obiter observation in the judgment (and 
footnotes) of the court’s judgment in Nickel v R is not supported by earlier 
judgments from the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) or Tax Court of Canada (TCC). 
Rather, the earlier decisions appear to require that the apportionment method merely 
has to be in the ball park of what is fair and reasonable to qualify, thus allowing the 
court to avoid the situation of having to pick better methods, should there be more 
than one in the park. As Noel J in Magog (Ville) v R observed:90 
“The only issue before the judge was whether the method elected by the appellant was fair 
and reasonable, as required by subsection 141.01(5). She did not have to determine which of 
the two methods in question was the best. Moreover, Memorandum 700-5-1 acknowledges in 
its 23rd paragraph that more than one method may be fair and reasonable within the meaning 
of the Act ..” 
Thus the role of the court is one of determining if the method in question is fair and 
reasonable. If it’s not, then alternatives may then be explored. This is certainly the 
approach adopted in Bay Ferries Ltd v R,91 which examined whether an output or 
input method of apportionment was fair and reasonable. As the court 
acknowledged:92 
“… This decision clearly and definitively supports non-interference with a taxpayer's chosen 
method provided it is fair, reasonable and consistent.” 
                                               
90
 Magog (Ville) v R [2001] GSTC 138 (FCA) at [15].Cited with approval in Nikel Ltd v R [2008] GSTC 
195 (TCC) at [29]. 
91
 Bay Ferries Ltd v R [2004] GSTC 135 (TCC). The taxpayer operated a passenger ferry service 
between Canada and the United States and revenue from ferry tolls was zero rated. The taxpayer also 
received revenue from leasing space onboard the vessel to food vendors and from vending machines 
(both exempt supplies). The taxpayer apportioned their taxable and exempt supplies on square footage 
basis (eg, an input method). They concluded that 30.29 per cent of the vessel was used for taxable 
supplies and reduced this figure to 25 per cent due to the fact that some spaces were shared equally 
with crew. The CRA disagreed and applied an output method, on the basis that the input method was 
not fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The CRA contended that only 1.2 per cent of the 
taxpayer’s total revenue came from these supplies (eg, an output method). Consequently, the CRA 
determined that substantially all of the taxpayer's expenses were incurred in the supply of ferry 
services. As 90 per cent of total revenue can from exempt activities, no input tax credit was allowed. 
The Court found for the taxpayer. 
92
 Bay Ferries Ltd v R [2004] GSTC 135 (TCC) at [38]. 
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Adding:93 
“I believe that a taxpayer must always be able to satisfactorily substantiate that the chosen 
method is, in fact, fair and reasonable and consistent. But if he is able to do so, subsection 
141.01(5) allows a registrant a broad latitude of flexibility in choosing a method, provided it 
can be shown to be fair and reasonable. This implies that the chosen method will reasonably 
reflect the actual use of the property and services and the manner in which it conducts its 
business generally.” 
With regard to the application of the input method, the court acknowledged that it 
provided a higher degree of consistency and could be applied whether the taxpayer 
leased the space to a food operator or decided to provide the services itself. 
According to the court, an allocation method should not distort the financial reality 
of the commercial activity. While the leasing of space was a small fraction of the 
taxpayer’s total revenue, the evidence clearly supported the fact that it was an 
essential part of the taxpayer’s commercial activity. These factors may provide some 
guidance in situations where the taxpayer’s method is found not to be suitable and 
alternatives are examined.  
Financial institutions 
Financial institutions are required to use an apportionment method that is specifically 
provided by the CRA.94 It is clear from the CRA’s position (before the introduction 
of these rules), that the requirement for prior approval provides a mechanism to 
ensure that financial institutions do not take advantage of revenue-based approaches 
to apportionment which may not be indicative of input use (eg, revenue from late 
payment charges on accounts receivable may be significant, but requires little 
property or minimal services to generate).95 Large banks, insurers, and securities 
                                               
93
 Bay Ferries Ltd v R [2004] GSTC 135 (TCC) at [40]. 
94
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 141.02(14) and (15). To avoid the complexities associated with financial 
institutions these rules were introduced from 1 April 2007. 
95
 Canada Revenue Agency GST Memorandum (Old Series) ch 700. These memoranda are 
progressively republished in the GST Memorandum (New Series) ch 17. A similar approach of “prior 
approval” is provided in New Zealand’s new apportionment rules, although in most cases taxpayers 
are likely to use the prescribed statutory method. It would appear the approval process in New 
Zealand is to enable a carry over of existing agreements with financial institutions, and also to keep 
compliance costs to a minimum, as New Zealand shifts to a new apportionment method. In contrast to 
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dealers are also required to use a prescribed percentage or obtain pre-approval from 
the CRA to use their own ITC allocation methods.96  
G. Examples 
The following examples illustrate and compare the operation of the respective rules.  
Example 3.1: Capital Personal Property97 
The GST rate is 5 per cent. Cian is a graphic designer and purchases a computer for 
$4,000 (plus GST of $200) to use both for business (80 per cent) and private 
purposes (20 per cent). The principal purpose of the computer is for the taxable 
activity of graphic design. Cian files tax GST returns every two months. In the 
second year of operation private use increases to 40 per cent, due to his children’s 
use of the computer. No other changes in use occur over the life-time of the 
computer. 
The computer is capital personal property. As Cian is not a financial institution and 
the transaction is below $50,000 the apportionment rules do not apply. The test to be 
applied is whether the property is used primarily (eg, more than 50 per cent) in the 
course of the registered entity’s commercial activities. If it is, a 100 per cent input 
tax credit is available upon acquisition (eg, $200 input tax credit).  
Adjustments Apportionment Approach 
  Adjustment 
Input tax credit $200 $0 
Adjustment 1  $0 
Adjustment 2  $0 
Balance $200 $0 
 
                                                                                                                                     
New Zealand and consistent with Canada, Australia allow any method of apportionment provided it is 
“fair and reasonable”. 
96
 Excise Act RSC 1985, s 141.02(7) to (8) and (18) to (22). A similar approach to pre-approved 
methods is available in both Australia and New Zealand’s apportionment rules. 
97
 Based on an example in Canada Revenue Agency GST Memorandum (New Series) ch 8.1 at [43]. 
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If the property was used 50 per cent for commercial activities and 50 per cent for 
personal use, no input tax credit would be available, as the property is not used 
“more” than 50 per cent in the course of commercial activities. If the commercial 
activity subsequently falls to 50 per cent or less, the full input tax credit is remitted. 
While Cian’s commercial use has fallen to just 60 per cent in the second year of 
operation, it remains above 50 per cent so no adjustment is required. 
Example 3.2: Changing Value of Capital Real Property98 
The GST rate is 5 per cent. Louise, a property developer purchases a house and land 
for $500,000 and intends to sell the development on completion. Louise is not a 
builder or associated with one (in Canada builders are subject to the self-supply 
rules). The land cost $300,000 (plus GST of $15,000) and the house $200,000 (plus 
GST of $10,000). The market value of the property is $650,000. The development 
does not sell and the development is rented until a buyer can be found. The rent 
returns $25,000 per year. Insurance and rates cost $10,000 per annum (plus GST of 
$500). The depreciation rate for the house is 10 per cent per annum. Louise claims 
an input tax credit of $25,000 on the purchase price of $500,000.  
The basic tax content (BTC) of the property at the time of the acquisition is: 
BTC = (A - B) × C 
= (($25,000) - 0) × the lesser of: 1 or ($650,000 / ($500,000)) 
= $25,500 × the lesser of: 1 or 1.3 
BTC = $25,000 × 100%  
ITC entitlement = $25,000 
Louise is entitled to a $25,000 input tax credit. Operating costs are apportioned 
similarly. 
As there has been a change-in-use an adjustment is required. An apportionment 
allocation could be based on one of several methods provided the method is fair and 
                                               
98
 Based on examples in Canada Revenue Agency GST Memoranda (New Series) ch 19.4.2 at [21-36]. 
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reasonable and reasonably reflects the actual use of the property and services. As use 
is concurrent, an output based method is a good candidate. The following breakdown 
of the actual use from direct allocation can be provided: 
Non-taxable $25,000 (rent) 
Taxable $65,000 (depreciation) 
Total $90,000 
$25,000 / $90,000 = 28% (non-taxable activity) 
The basic tax content (BTC) of the property after the annualised adjustment is: 
BTC = (A - B) × C 
= (($25,000) - 0) × the lesser of: 1 or ($650,000 / ($500,000)) 
= $25,500 × the lesser of: 1 or 1.3 
BTC = $25,000 × 72% (100% – 28%) 
ITC entitlement =$18,000 
Louise has to remit $7,000 ($25,000 - $18,000). Operating costs are apportioned 
similarly. No further adjustments are required unless there is a change in the input 
tax credit entitlement. For example, non-taxable activity increases another 2 per cent 
(due to rent increase of $30,000 in following year) to a total of 30 per cent so that the 
ratio decreases from 72 per cent to 70 per cent.  
Non-taxable $55,000 ($25,000 + $30,000) (rent) 
Taxable $130,000 ($65,000 +65,000) (depreciation) 
Total $185,000 
$25,000 / $90,000 = 30% (non-taxable activity) 
BTC = (A - B) × C 
= (($25,000) - 0) × the lesser of: 1 or ($650,000 / ($500,000)) 
= $25,000 × the lesser of: 1 or 1.3 
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BTC = $25,000 × (72% - 2%)  
ITC entitlement =$17,500 
Louise has to remit an additional $500 ($18,000 – $17,500).  
If the property development reduces its taxable activities to below 10 per cent (eg, 
the property is used 90 per cent or more for non-commercial purposes), all the input 
tax is returned. Operating expenses are not subject to 90:10 rule and can be 
apportioned below 10 per cent or above 90 per cent.  
The number of adjustments are not unrestrained (ie, indefinite), but are constrained 
by the BTC calculation methodology. Effectively, the BTC calculation operates 
according to a “used-up” model.  
Part 2: Implementation and Operation — Empirical Evidence 
Does the litigation evidence of the two different approaches to the change-in-use 
rules provide an indication that apportionment is to be preferred?  
From the litigation evidence, it appears that the practical implementation of the input 
tax credit rules for non-capital and real property is more often an area of dispute in 
Canada than capital personal property. Furthermore, the volume of litigation appears 
to suggest that disputes are more concerned with entitlement (eg, a question of 
scope) than in determining the amount of input tax credits (through the application of 
an apportionment or adjustment approach).  
H. Judicial Activity 
The volume of GST litigation in Canada is far higher than in Australia or New 
Zealand. An audit of GST cases in Thomson Reuters TaxNetPro database records a 
total of 2,424 reported GST cases in Canada (illustrated in Figure 3.2). The volume 
of reported cases per year in Canada appears to have stabilised around 160-170 case 
per year since 2003 (illustrated in Figure 3.3).99 Initially this might be surprising 
given New Zealand has had 6 more years than Canada to litigate their GST 
                                               
99
 The CRA report a lower average figure of 57 GST cases per year. See Canada Revenue Agency 
Annual Report (2007-08) 58. Document available at <www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/nnnl/2007-
2008/prfrmnc-e/rc4425-08eng.pdf> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
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legislation. However, given the comparative size of the Canadian economy (and 
number of potential transactions that provide an opportunity for disputes), this might 
be expected.  
Figure 3.2: Total Reported GST Cases 1991-2010 (Accumulated)100 
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Figure 3.3: Total Reported GST Cases 1991-2010 (Per Year)101 
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100
 Figures obtained from Carswell’s TaxNetPro by searching reported GST cases in the year field (as at 
20 November 2010). 
101
 Figures obtained from Carswell’s TaxNetPro by searching reported GST cases in the year field (as at 
20 November 2010). 
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Figure 3.4: Reported GST Cases 1991-2010 (Per Section)102 
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The volume of litigation between the apportionment line of cases103 and the 
adjustment line of cases that apply the primary purpose test104 does not immediately 
provide any clear indications as to the comparative success of the two distinct 
approaches. The adjustment line of cases, comprise 58 reported cases,105 compared 
to the apportionment line of cases that comprise approximately 334 cases (although 
295 of those cases relate to input tax entitlement).106  
A better comparison can be made in relation to those cases that have only examined 
change-in-use issues. Of those cases that are identified as change-in-use cases (and 
excluding the self-supply rules for builders in s 191 and transitional rules cases), all 
11 cases relate to capital property.107 Of those 11 cases, 5 cases related to the 
                                               
102
 Figures obtained from Carswell’s TaxNetPro by searching reported GST cases for provisions in the 
headnote field (as at 20 November 2010). 
103
 Excise Act RSC 1985, ss 169, 172, 196.1, 206, 207 and 208. 
104
 Excise Act RSC 1985, ss 199 and 200. 
105
 Three cases have been cited in both s 199 (23 cases) and s 200 (38 cases). Of the 23 cases related to s 
199, 18 cases related to entitlement to input tax credits under s 199(2) and one case related to change 
in use under s 199(3). 
106
 Of the 295 cases, 191 relate to s 169(1). 
107
 Figures obtained from Carswell’s TaxNetPro by searching for the expression “change in use” across 
the headnote field. 
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adjustment line of cases (ss 199 and 200) and 6 cases related to the apportionment of 
real property (ss 206, 207 and 208). Unfortunately, this does not provide a clear 
winner, apart from perhaps the fact that there are very few cases identified as relating 
to change-in-use, in comparison to the total number of reported GST cases (eg, 
11/2424).  
A comparison might also be obtained by comparing cases that have examined 
apportionment (16 cases),108 or are related to the “fair and reasonable” application of 
apportionment under s 141.01 (39 cases).109 This does appear to illustrate that there 
is far less litigation about the application of apportionment (16 or 39 cases) than in 
relation to the adjustment line of cases (58 cases). However, comparing the total 
number of cases under ss 199(3) and 200 (which also total 39 cases) would suggest 
there is no difference in the extent of litigation. 
Overall, it would appear there are no strong comparative differences in the litigation 
of the apportionment or primary purpose approaches to change-in-use within 
Canada. Whether this is compounded by a parallel difference in transaction type (eg, 
personal vs real property) is unclear. It could be suggested that capital personal 
property (eg, business assets) maybe less prone to rigorous audit due to its nature and 
lower value. Real property, on the other hand is normally higher in value and 
therefore may be more prone to the watchful eye of the CRA, in its protection of the 
tax revenue base. However, it has been suggested by some commentators that a 
common exploitation of GST in Canada is the personal use of business assets (ie, 
business assets are frequently used for personal use).110  
                                               
108
 Figures obtained from Carswell’s TaxNetPro by searching for the expression “apportionment” across 
the headnote field. 
109
 Figures obtained from Carswell’s TaxNetPro by searching for the provision across the headnote 
field. Although TaxNetPro records 47 related cases under its “judgments” tab.  
110
 B Ketterman “VAT? A Look Inside Canada’s Experience with Goods and Services Tax” 8 San 
Diego International Law Journal (2006) 275 citing G Carlson Value Added Tax: European 
Experience and Lessons for the United States (1980) 59, fn 5.  
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Whether this is a reflection of audit activity is hard to determine. The general 
impression provided by the CRA is that audit activity is high.111 Certainly the 
increasing number of disputes resolved by the CRA commodity tax dispute 
resolution service (see Table 3.5), would appear to indicate it is high.112  
Table 3.5: Commodity Tax Disputes 
Year Intake Resolved 
2007-08 7,146 6,504 
2008-09 6,906 6,903 
2009-10 8,151 6,778 
 
Audit activity 
According to the CRA, one indicator of audit compliance is GST registration, which 
steadily improved from when the CRA first began measurement in 2003-04, from 
86.6 per cent to 98.4 per cent in 2007-08 (dropping to 93.5 per cent in 2009-10).113 
Another indicator of audit compliance is GST revenue, which according to the CRA 
Annual Report was steadily growing until several GST rate reductions (illustrated in 
Figure 3.5).114  
Other data also appears to suggest compliance is high. For example, the estimated 
percentage of businesses identified by the CRA with significant non-compliance fell 
from over 9 per cent in 1998-99 to less than 4 per cent in 2003-04.115 By 2008-09, it 
                                               
111
 Canada Revenue Agency Annual Report (2009-10) 74 and Canada Revenue Agency Annual Report 
(2007-8) 20-21. Document available at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/nnnl/menu-eng.html (viewed 
20 March 2011). 
112
 The CRA provides a commodity tax dispute resolution service that includes GST issues, as part of a 
wider tax dispute resolution system. Taxpayers can dispute GST assessments through a CRA 
provided dispute resolution process and if they are not satisfied can then appeal to the Courts. Income 
tax disputes comprised about 90 per cent of the files received by this service. 
113
 Canada Revenue Agency Annual Report (2009-10) 31. 
114
 Canada Revenue Agency Annual Report (2007-08) 25. 
115
 Canada Revenue Agency GST/HST Regulatory Compliance Evaluation Study Non-Registration 
(Government of Canada, Ottawa, July 2008). Document available at <www.cra-
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was estimated at 5.5 per cent and the total dollar value of identified non-compliance 
ranged between C$12.2 million (in 2007-08) and C$14.4 million (in 2009-10).116  
Figure 3.5: Growth in Net GST/HST Revenue117 
 
The CRA also launched a major ‘risk analysis’ program in 2000 (though not fully 
implemented until 2004) which was partly focused on fraudulent refund claims. For 
three fiscal years (2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04), approximately 1,300 GST returns 
with fraudulent refund claims (totalling C$9 million) were detected.118 In the 2006-
07 fiscal year the CRA observed that about 600,000 “non-compliance occurrences” 
resulted in additional GST assessments of C$1.1 billion and 63,000 GST audits 
yielded an additional C$600 million.  
The evidence would appear to suggest that the level of audit activity is high. 
However, it is unclear whether this translates to an equal audit focus on capital 
personal property, as well as real property. It might be that the level of litigation 
around capital personal property is far lower than what it perhaps could (or should) 
be, and this may have skewed the litigation data to give a false impression that the 
                                                                                                                                     
arc.gc.ca/gncy/ntrnl/2008/rgst-cmp-vl-eng.html> cited in RM Bird and PP Gendron “Sales Tax in 
Canada: The GST- QST-PST System” (2009) 63 Tax Law Review 517 at 538, fn 89. 
116
 Canada Revenue Agency Annual Report (2009-10) 36-37. 
117
 Canada Revenue Agency Annual Report (2009-10) 38. 
118
 Canada Revenue Agency The Canada Revenue Agency: The First Five Years (Government of 
Canada, Ottawa, 2005) 61, cited in RM Bird and PP Gendron “Sales Tax in Canada: The GST- QST-
PST System” (2009) 63 Tax Law Review 517 at 538, fn 88.  
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adjustment approach (eg, primary purpose test) is no worse or better than an 
apportionment approach. Furthermore, almost a decade after the introduction of the 
GST, the Auditor-General of Canada was still pointing out serious flaws in GST 
administration, particularly with respect to audit.119  
I. Revenue Authority Guidance 
The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) publishes a wide variety of technical 
publications on how the GST and HST legislation is applied.120 Unlike New Zealand 
or Australia, the CRA does not issue general public rulings. However, the CRA does 
issue private rulings (called “application rulings”) and considers itself bound with 
respect to the particular taxpayer that the ruling is issued, and provided the material 
facts were not misstated and the law or administrative policy has not changed since 
the ruling was issued.121  
Table 3.6 illustrates the volume of guidance (ie, rulings, interpretation and policy 
statements, and HQ letters) provided in relation to the main apportionment and 
adjustment provisions. Figures 3.6 to 3.11 illustrates the publication volume and 
timing of these documents. Generally, there have been few rulings issued, except in 
regard to s 169. Of the rulings issued, the majority appear to have been issued in the 
first 10 years. The main method of guidance for registered entities appears to be HQ 
Letters that make pronouncements on the interpretation of legislation in relation to 
specific issues for particular entities. Similar to interpretation and policy statements, 
the HQ letters are not binding. It would appear that the preferred method of CRA 
guidance in the last 10 years has been HQ letters. Unfortunately these documents 
lack the detail provided in rulings or interpretation statements.  
                                               
119
 Office of the Auditor General of Canada Report of the Auditor General of Canada (Government of 
Canada, Ottawa, 1999). 
120
 For example, the Canada Revenue Agency Memoranda Series, Technical Information Bulletins 
(TIBs), Interpretation and Policy Statements, Quarterly Newsletters, Information Sheets, and 
Application Rulings. Documents available at <www.cra.gc.ca/gsthsttech>, <www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/menu/GTIB_50-e.html> (TIBS), <www.cra-arc.gc.ca/menu/GTPP_50-e.html> 
(interpretation statements). 
121
 See Phelps Appliances Ltd v Deloitte & Touche [1999] GSTC 13 (BCSC), where the CRA refused to 
honour a ruling because not all of the facts had been disclosed. 
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Table 3.6: CRA Guidance Materials (1991-2010)122 
Section Application Rulings HQ Letters Interpretation &  
Policy Statements 
141.1 3 36 12 
169 52 35 24 
199 5 10 6 
200 3 3 1 
206 3 13 0 
208 1 4 2 
Total 67 101 45 
 
Overall, the documents do provide evidence of considerable work undertaken by the 
CRA to provide guidance on the issue of apportionment and to a lesser extent 
adjustments. This may well have contributed to a lower level of litigation in relation 
to the total volume of reported GST cases when compared to New Zealand or 
Australia. 
Figure 3.6: CRA Documents for Section 141.1 (1991-2010) 
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122
 Figures were acquired from research across Carwell’s TaxNetPro listed under the “government” 
publications tab of each provision (20 November 2010). 
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Figure 3.7: CRA Documents for Section 169 (1991-2010) 
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Figure 3.8: CRA Documents for Section 199 (1991-2010) 
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Figure 3.9: CRA Documents for Section 200 (1991-2010) 
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Figure 3.10: CRA Documents for Section 206 (1991-2010) 
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Figure 3.11: CRA Documents for Section 208 (1991-2010) 
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J. Compliance Concerns  
Why does the Canadian GST legislation create a distinction between capital and non-
capital property? No such distinction exists in the Australian or New Zealand GST 
legislation.123 The answer may lay in initial compliance concerns raised when the 
GST legislation was first being formulated.  
                                               
123
 Calls for a similar distinction for capital assets has been suggested (in relation to financial acquisition 
thresholds) in submissions on the reform proposals of Australian GST Act. For example, Australian 
Financial Markets Association (AFMA) Submissions on the Treasury Report (12 June 2009) 3. 
Document available at 
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According to a Technical Paper on GST124 (that provided an overview of the 
objectives and operation of the proposed GST legislation), the capital property 
distinction was created to reduce the “complex calculations and burdensome record-
keeping” that would be involved if apportionment was adopted for capital property 
—particularly, when the useful life of capital property extended over a number of 
years.  
As the Technical Paper acknowledges:125 
“Under the normal input tax credit rules, a credit for the GST paid on a capital good would 
be allowed to the extent that the asset is for use in a commercial activity. For example, if the 
asset was for use 60 per cent in a commercial activity, then 60 per cent of the GST would be 
creditable on acquisition. Adjustments would be required, however, every time the 
commercial usage of the asset changed. Given that the useful life of capital goods generally 
extends over a number of years, the frequent application of change-of-use rules would 
involve complex calculations and burdensome record-keeping in many cases. 
Therefore, to simplify the operation of the GST, an exception to the normal input tax credit 
rules will apply in the case of capital goods. Unlike inventory and other business purchases 
which will be creditable to the extent they are for use in a commercial activity, a full input 
tax credit will be allowed in respect of a capital good if it is acquired for use primarily in a 
commercial activity. If this condition is not satisfied, then no part of the tax will be 
creditable. Similar rules will apply in determining any input tax credits in respect of 
improvements to capital goods. 
Where the use of a capital asset for which an input tax credit has been claimed subsequently 
fails to satisfy the primarily commercial use test, the registrant will be deemed to have 
disposed of the asset and be required to account for GST on the asset's fair market value at 
that time.” 
But has this policy aim been achieved? According to Bird, the administrative burden 
of GST “does not seem excessive”, although Bird acknowledges that it is difficult to 
                                                                                                                                     
<www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1578/PDF/Australian_Financial_Markets_Association.pdf> 
(viewed 20 March 2011). 
124
 Department of Finance Technical Paper on GST TP0889 (Canada, 8 August 1989). See also TP1289 
Technical Paper on GST (19 December 1989). 
125
 Department of Finance TP0889 Technical Paper on GST (8 August 1989) at [2.3]. 
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be very precise since little information is available.126 However, for many 
commentators, the ITC rules place a significant administrative and compliance costs 
on registered entities.127 For many small businesses and especially service firms, 
GST constituted an unwanted additional compliance burden.128 As Schinnour 
observes:129 
“These rules combined with the change in use rules place significant onus on the registrant to 
track the use of capital and real property both in calculating the initial input tax credit 
entitlement and in accounting for any subsequent changes in use.” 
The change-in-use rules are considered quite complex, due to the different rules for 
capital goods. Schenk has suggested that the rules could be simplified (and the 
“capital property” distinction removed) by limiting the rules to changes to assets 
above a set threshold value — a proposal that is striking similar to the Australian 
approach.130 
Schinnour’s observation would appear to suggest that regardless of litigation 
volume, tracking use under either an apportionment or adjustment approach 
continues to impose high compliance costs on taxpayers. It would also appear to 
suggest that there is no sizeable advantage in Canada for either approach — if the 
measure of success is tracking costs. 
It may well be that this desire to reduce the compliance burden for change-in-use 
was the underlying reason for New Zealand initially adopting a similar input tax 
credit test (eg “principal purpose”).131 Unfortunately, the New Zealand courts appear 
                                               
126
 RM Bird and PP Gendron “Sales Tax in Canada: The GST- QST-PST System” (2009) 63 Tax Law 
Review 517 at 538.  
127
 J Whalley and D Fretz The Economics of the Goods and Services Tax (Canadian Tax Foundation, 
Toronto, 1990). 
128
 Plamondon and Associates Inc GST Compliance Costs for Small Business in Canada (Department of 
Finance, Ottawa, 1993), cited in RM Bird and PP Gendron, “Sales Tax in Canada: The GST- QST-
PST System” (2009) 63 Tax Law Review 517 at 540, fn 93.  
129
 AW Schinnour “GST Tips & Traps” (Spring 1994) 7(1) Canadian Petroleum Tax Journal 1 at [59]. 
130
 A Schenk and O Oldman Value Added Tax: A Comparative Approach (Cambridge Tax Law Series, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 124. 
131
 Certainly there were concerns raised in submissions to the GST Bill. The Australian reform 
submissions have also raised similar concerns. 
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to have increased the compliance burden by subsequently adopting a less stringent 
test that increased the opportunity for change-in-use adjustments (and therefore the 
compliance costs of tracking).  
K. Analysis 
Given the length of time the GST legislation has had to bed down it should not be 
surprising that a sizeable bank of case law has been established — a picture not 
dissimilar to New Zealand’s own experience. However, what is surprising is that the 
amount of case law on the change-in-use rules that has been established is not 
substantial.132 This is especially the case when you compare the relative size of the 
economies or the tax revenue generated from the respective GST systems is taken 
into account.  
In comparison to both New Zealand and Australia, the Canadian GST legislation has 
adopted a very prescriptive approach, rather than providing more general (and 
flexible) rules. The approach is far from simple.133 The legislation has made a 
conscious effort to provide a high level of consistency with the income tax 
legislation when it was initially drafted and this is evident in the change-in-use rules. 
The object was no doubt in order to provide greater clarity and reduce the need to re-
litigate similar issues. As Bird and Gendron, observe:134 
“… GST in Canada is definitely not a simple tax. The original law was long and complicated 
owing to the many special treatments of different sectors and activities already mentioned. It 
was also complex because many aspects of the income tax law were carried over into the 
GST. … the scope of the Canadian GST was deliberately designed to be more 
comprehensive than that of most European VATs” 
The result is very lengthy and repetitive provisions that focus on specific transactions 
(eg, vehicles or land), assets (eg, capital vs real vs non-capital), and entity (eg, 
                                               
132
 For example, “primary purpose” is either 11/2424 or 39/2424, and “apportionment” is either 16/2423 
or 39/2424. 
133
 Numerous other instances of the complexity of the GST system are detailed in RM Bird “The Cost 
and Complexity of Canada's VAT: The GST in International Perspective” (1994) 8 Tax Notes 
International 37. 
134
 RM Bird and PP Gendron “Sales Tax in Canada: The GST- QST-PST System” (2009) 63 Tax Law 
Review 517 at 534. 
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builders) types. Unfortunately, it is difficult to conclude with any certainty whether 
the prescriptive approach adopted by Canada has provided a greater degree of 
certainty for taxpayers (as evidenced by the low volume of litigation) and therefore 
reduced compliance costs, due to the existence of other complicit factors (eg, a high 
volume of CRA guidance, or the consistency with income tax legislation). In fact it 
might well be suggested that the amount of CRA guidance is evidence of the high 
cost in interpreting and translating complex rules, so that they can be easily applied 
by taxpayers (thus avoiding potential litigation).  
While there have been minor technical changes that have accommodated the arrival 
of HST, there has not been any fundamental reform of the change-in-use rules. The 
lack of reform (or lack of widespread calls for reform) in this area would appear to 
indicate that the rules are generally working well. Unfortunately, it is also difficult to 
conclude if the absence of reform indicates that it is working well, or that the 
political system has avoided a wider examination of the GST system, for fear of 
opening the door too wide to its repeal. 
L. Conclusion 
The adoption of both approaches to change-in-use has provided a unique opportunity 
to compare the approaches under similar conditions, as well as compare them to the 
approaches in New Zealand and Australia. Unfortunately, it is hard to conclude 
which approach (apportionment or adjustment) has performed better in Canada. 
Whether this is attributable to the manner in which the rules have been crafted, the 
legislative drafting, audit activity, or the guidance provided by the CRA is unclear. It 
may well be due to the interplay of all these elements.  
Clearly, the change-in-use rules have been successful in terms of legal compliance. 
The number of reported GST cases that have considered the change-in-use rules is 
very low, both in terms of reported cases in Canada and in comparative terms with 
New Zealand and Australia. This would appear to suggest that there is a high degree 
of clarity and compliance with the rules. While audit activity appears to be high, it is 
not clear if there is an audit bias towards non-capital and real property that uses an 
apportionment approach. Anecdotal observation indicates there could well be such a 
bias. If this is the case, then it is probable that the apportionment approach produces 
more favourable cost savings in terms of reduced litigation, than the evidence 
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provides. Equally the low level of litigation may demonstrate a high degree of clarity 
with the rules due to substantial guidance from the CRA. The fact the legislation has 
drawn on comparable change-in-use rules from the income tax legislation may have 
helped. It certainly does not appear to have hindered.  
Judicial consideration of the “fair and reasonable” test in Canada will be of 
substantial assistance to New Zealand courts and will provide much needed certainty 
with the application of the new rules.  
Clearly, the distinctions made between capital and non-capital are worth exploring in 
more detail, if different approaches have resulted in reduced litigation for both. As 
alluded to above, this may just be the result of adopting existing income tax rules. 
Certainly, calls in Australia for such distinctions to be made in order to reduce 
compliance costs warrant further investigation both in New Zealand and Australia. 
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IV. REMOVING DRAFTING STYLE AND STRUCTURE FROM THE 
POLICY DEBATE 
“if taxes had existed in the Garden of Eden, the serpent would not have needed an apple; the 
promise of a simpler tax system alone would have seduced Eve.”1  
A. Introduction 
During the course of comparing the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand change-
in-use provisions it became apparent that each jurisdiction has adopted different 
policies in resolving and measuring change-in-use. Australia had adopted 
apportionment, New Zealand had originally adopted a threshold adjustment approach 
(eg, principal purpose), and Canada had a mix of both policies depending on the 
nature of the property (eg, capital vs non-capital vs real).2  
It also became apparent that each jurisdiction had adopted styles of drafting (eg, 
plain language or classic legislative drafting). New Zealand was the only jurisdiction 
that had different drafting styles between direct and indirect tax legislation. In 
contrast, Australia and Canada have maintained similar drafting styles between 
direct and indirect tax legislation and this appeared to more readily enable concepts 
to be shared where appropriate (eg, apportionment). At present, Australia has 
completed the rewrite of its GST legislation (rewritten upon enactment) into plain 
language, and has made it half-way through a rewrite of its income tax legislation. In 
contrast, New Zealand and Canada have not rewritten their respective GST Acts, 
although New Zealand has completed rewriting its Income Tax Act.  
Within this matrix of different policies and drafting styles, each jurisdiction has 
experienced different outcomes. Both Australia and Canada have experienced 
minimal litigation. In contrast, the original New Zealand rules have experienced a 
much higher level of litigation activity. Why was this? Does drafting style explain 
the different outcomes, or is it policy (ie, an apportionment or adjustment approach)?  
                                               
1
  A Abreu “Untangling Tax Reform: Simple Taxes, Complex Choices” (1996) 33 San Diego Law 
Review 1355, as cited in GS Cooper “Legislating Principles as a Remedy for Tax Complexity” (2010) 
British Tax Review 334. 
2
  Canada, had not adopted the methodological thresholds used in Australia (and to be adopted in New 
Zealand from 1 April 2011) in applying an apportionment approach, preferring instead the common 
law approach developed from Canadian income tax law. 
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With this question in mind, it appeared that this comparative study provided a good 
case study to determine whether the expression of New Zealand’s change-in-use 
rules (and the wider GST Act) are unnecessarily complex in comparison to other 
jurisdictions. Significantly, this study provides for the first time, a much broader 
assessment of the readability of the entire New Zealand GST Act and the potential 
impact it might be having on compliance costs for business taxpayers. 
B. Tax Complexity and Legislative Simplification 
Definitions of tax complexity  
There are many definitions of tax complexity. No doubt this is because complexity 
(and simplicity), like various other concepts used to measure performance (eg, 
efficiency or equity), are concepts lacking simple definitions.  
White,3 suggests a complex law is one that requires a greater volume of information 
(other than the legislation) in order to accurately predict the outcome of a dispute.4 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that tax complexity is primarily related to 
compliance costs.5 The higher the cost of compliance (eg, large volumes of 
litigation), the more complex the legislation will be. According to James et al,6 the 
New Zealand GST Act, for its comparative size, attracts almost as much litigation as 
income tax. At present, the New Zealand GST Act has accumulated approximately 
349 reported GST cases (and growing) since its enactment (with 532 reported cases 
having cited or considered GST provisions).7  
                                               
3
  MJ White “Why are Taxes so Complex and Who Benefits” (1990) Tax Notes International 341 at 
342. See also AJ Sawyer “Why Are Taxes So Complex and Who Benefits (1996) Tax Notes 
International 1,337 at 1,338. 
4
  This argument is consistent with the principle of predictability. 
5
  J Slemrod “Complexity, Compliance Costs and Tax Evasion” in JA Roth and JT Sloth (eds) Taxpayer 
Compliance (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1989) 156, cited in M Richardson and A 
Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An Empirical Analysis” (1998) 
14 Australian Tax Forum 325 at 328. 
6
  S James, A Sawyer and I Wallschutzky “The Complexities of Tax Simplification: Progress in 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom” (1998) 14 Australian Tax Forum 29 at 32. 
7
  See Chapter 1 (The New Zealand Experience). As discussed in Chapter 1, the New Zealand change-
in-use rules have experienced a disproportionately high volume of litigation (in comparison to either 
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Such attempts at providing a broad definition often invite categorisation of different 
types of complexity. Milliron8 identified four dimensions of complexity: the nature 
of the topic; the quantitative nature of presentation; the vulnerability of law to 
misuse; and the readability of law. During the consultative phase of the Australian 
tax rewrite, the Ralph Committee suggested three broad categories of complexity: 
technical complexity (eg, ascertaining the meaning of tax law); structural complexity 
(eg, poor structuring of provisions and the unintended or inconsistent interaction of 
different provisions); and compliance complexity (eg, the excessive burden of 
compliance activity, information demands, record keeping).9 A comprehensive 
review of the various compliance studies is provided by McKerchar,10 Tan & 
Sawyer,11 and Sawyer.12  
This case study will evaluate the tax complexity of the respective change-in-use 
provisions across the three jurisdictions in terms of structural and technical 
complexity.13 It will not only evaluate readability (ie, the ability to ascertain meaning 
and be understood), but will also examine their structure (ie, total words and 
paragraphs-per-provision, use of definitions, exceptions, provisos and external 
legislative references). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Australia or Canada), and this would tend to suggest that the New Zealand GST rules are overly 
complex. 
8
  VC Milliron “A Behavioural Study of the Meaning and Influence of Tax Complexity” (1985) 23 
Journal of Accounting Research 794 at 807. 
9
  Review of Business Taxation A Strong Foundation (23 November 1998) at [3.1]. Document available 
at: <www.rbt.treasury.gov.au/publications/paper1/index.htm> (viewed 20 March 2011).  
10
 M McKerchar The Impact of Complexity Upon Tax Compliance: A Study of Australian Personal 
Taxpayers (Australian Tax Research Foundation, Sydney, 2003) Chapter 2. 
11
 LM Tan and A Sawyer “A Synopsis of Taxpayer Compliance Studies: Overseas Vis-Vis New 
Zealand” (2003) 9 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 431. 
12
 AJ Sawyer “Enhancing Compliance Through Improved Readability: Evidence from New Zealand’s 
Rewrite ‘Experiment’” (2011) IRS Research Bulletin 225 (publication forthcoming). 
13
 The methodology and results of the study are explained below. 
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Reasons for tax complexity  
A number of explanations for tax complexity have been advanced by commentators. 
According to Richardson & Sawyer,14 the most common explanation is one 
advanced by Sir Ivor Richardson, who suggests that tax legislation is inherently 
complicated due to the nature of the topic and the perverse incentives for the main 
protagonists (eg, the revenue authority and tax advisors) to be continually in combat 
over the exploitation of those rules.15 According to Sir Ivor Richardson:16  
“the greater the burden of income tax, the greater the effort on the part of taxpayers, and their 
astute advisers, to utilise the advantages of the system so as to minimise the total tax paid in 
respect of their productive efforts. In turn, the draftsmen of tax legislation recognise that, to 
an extent not met in other areas, entry into commercial transactions and the shaping of 
commercial transactions will be influenced by the detail of legislation." 
Adding:17 
"Such legislation is invariably long and complex, reflecting the inevitable compromises that 
the subject matter demands, and it bears the hands of many draftsmen in the numerous 
amendments made over the years. So it is unwise to expect perfect logical symmetry in the 
drafting, particularly of provisions which are not closely related." 
However, Sir Ivor Richardson was also mindful that it was important that tax 
legislation should not become inordinately long and complex.18  
White goes further to suggest that the protagonists (eg, the revenue authority and tax 
advisors) have vested interests in maintaining tax complexity in order to maximise 
                                               
14
 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1998) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325 at 328. 
15
 ILM Richardson “The Concept of Income and Tax Policy” (1990) 4 Canterbury Law Review 187. 
16
 ILM Richardson “Appellate Court Responsibilities and Tax Avoidance” (1986) 3 Australian Tax 
Forum 3 at 4. 
17
 ILM Richardson “Appellate Court Responsibilities and Tax Avoidance” (1986) 3 Australian Tax 
Forum 3 at 8. 
18
 As the evidence provided in this paper suggests, not only are sentences inordinately long in the 
provisions of the New Zealand GST Act, but the GST Act as a whole can be categorised (on the basis 
of the FRE index) as inordinately complex and unreadable. 
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their respective incomes.19 Dabner & Burton describe this conflict in terms of liberal 
individualism which views taxation as the compulsory expropriation of a person's 
private property.20 From this perspective, the individual is entitled to minimise (by 
legal means), the extent to which the state expropriates an individual's wealth. Under 
this model the tax authority administers and applies the law with a view to 
maximising government revenue and pursuing government policy, whilst the tax 
advisor’s ethical obligation is to minimise the tax liabilities of its clients by 
employing tax planning techniques and asserting interpretations of the tax law that 
are to the advantage of their client. However, while these theoretical models (which 
are very similar to economic models of the selfish consumer) might explain an 
underlying motivation for maintaining complexity, they do not necessarily explain 
its birth, which comes from the policy acts (and omissions) of Parliament and 
expressed in the form of legislation. 
As Sir Ivor Richardson recognised, tax legislation does not necessarily have a fully 
coherent scheme or consistent pattern of purposes. It is this inherent complexity in 
income tax law that Prebble has described (on numerous occasions) as ectopic.21 
According to Prebble, the legal concept of income is based on unnatural foundations 
and tax law is dislocated from its subject matter. Unlike other laws, income tax law 
recharacterises the actual facts and legal relationships of business activity and is 
effectively divorced from commercial reality. While direct taxation (eg, income tax) 
is often identified as ectopic, indirect taxation (which has inherited many income tax 
concepts in its initial formulation and ongoing application) is also prone (albeit it to 
                                               
19
 MJ White “Why Are Taxes So Complex and Who Benefits?” (1990) Tax Notes International 341 at 
342, See also AJ Sawyer “Why Are Taxes So Complex and Who Benefits (1996) Tax Notes 
International 1,337 at 1,338. 
20
 J Dabner and M Burton “The Relationship Between Tax Administrators and Tax Practitioners: The 
Australasian Environment” (2008) 14 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 31 at [2.1]. 
21
 J Prebble “Should Tax Legislation be Written from a Principles and Purpose Point of View or a 
Precise and Detailed Point of View?” (1998) British Tax Review 112, updated in (2001) 7 New 
Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 235; J Prebble “Ectopia, formalism, and anti-avoidance 
rules in income tax law” (1994) in W Krawietz, N MacCormick, and GH von Wright (eds) 
Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems, Festschrift for Robert S 
Summers (Duncker and Humblot, Berlin 1994) 367; J Prebble “Philosophical and design problems 
that arise from the ectopic nature of income tax law and their impact on the taxation of international 
trade and investment” (1995) 13 Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 111; J Prebble 
“Can income tax law be simplified?” (1996) 2 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 187; 
and J Prebble “Why is tax law Incomprehensible?” (1994) British Tax Review 380. 
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a lesser extent due to its more constrained scope) to inherent complexity, 
disconnection, and perverse results. Although this inherent complexity and 
perversity in GST legislation is more often due to poor drafting, as the New Zealand 
Supreme Court recently recognised in Contract Pacific Ltd v CIR.22 According to 
Blanchard J:23 
“It has to be accepted that the section is poorly drafted. Necessarily, therefore it has to be 
given a remedial construction so that it can operate without producing perverse results which 
can never have been within the legislative purpose.” (emphasis added) 
While the provision examined by the Supreme Court does not relate to the change-
in-use rules, it nevertheless provides additional empirical evidence that the judiciary 
have experienced difficulty with the drafting style of the GST Act.24 This criticism is 
supported by the high litigation activity of the original New Zealand change-in-use 
rules and also the poor readability of many other provisions in the GST Act (as 
illustrated in the Appendix to this Chapter).  
Tax law may also be complex due to the underlying social and economic objectives 
that tax legislation is called upon to perform — objectives that may not always be 
consistent with other tax policies and might be forever changing with the tide of 
governments.25 According to James et al,26 if the underlying complexity of the tax 
system and the changing requirements of tax policy are not addressed, tax legislation 
will continue to be complex, regardless how many times it is rewritten. 
Unfortunately no application of plain language rewriting may be able to make a 
                                               
22
 Contract Pacific Ltd v CIR [2010] NZSC 136 (SC). 
23
 Contract Pacific Ltd v CIR [2010] NZSC 136 (SC) at [39]. The Court was considering s 46 GSTA 
1985 which comprises 530 words, 888 syllables, 27 paragraphs, and 7 sentences. The provision has a 
word-per-sentence score of 75.71 and a FRE score of -11.8 (or zero), which also happens to be the 
median average FRE score for the entire GST Act. In lay-terms, s 46 is your typical GST provision.  
24
 The Supreme Court was examining the application of s 43 GSTA 1985. Of concern is the empirical 
evidence of this study, which places the provision in the middle of the readability range. This range 
appears to suggest that the New Zealand GST Act is complex and difficult to read. 
25
 J Strader and CE Fogiliasso “An Investigation of Some Factors Affecting Taxpayer Non-
Compliance” (1989) 20 Accounting and Business Research 39. 
26
 S James, A Sawyer and I Wallschutzky “The Complexities of Tax Simplification: Progress in 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom” (1998) 14 Australian Tax Forum 29 at 33. 
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poorly defined policy intelligible.27 This position is supported by Cooper in his 
critique of plain language drafting and its underlying assumption that there is always 
a clear policy intent (or perhaps a series of basic principles), to be found.28  
However, while this critique of plain language drafting may be well founded, several 
empirical studies have also established that the rewriting process has simplified 
legislation in terms of significant reductions in sentence length and to a lesser degree 
understanding (as measured by the Flesch Reading Ease index).29 This evidence 
appears to support the argument that simplifying the language of complex legislation 
would at least be an improvement. Furthermore, while the drafter cannot always 
influence the complexity of policy, they are still responsible for (and capable of) 
ensuring everyone who is suppose to comply with it, is able to read and understand 
it.30  
A number of commentators have also suggested that tax complexity might have 
much to do with the manner in which tax rules are drafted and structured, than the 
underlying policy.31 For example, the reorganisation of the New Zealand Income 
Tax Act (eg, restructuring the organisation of the rules), provided a surprising 
improvement to readability, without changing the expression or the underlying 
policy of the rules themselves.32  
                                               
27
 Review of Business Taxation A Strong Foundation (23 November 1998) at [3.1]. 
28
 GS Cooper “Legislating Principles as a Remedy for Tax Complexity” (2010) British Tax Review 334 
at 340-341. 
29
 For example, K Saw and A Sawyer “Complexity of New Zealand Income Tax Legislation: The Final 
Instalment” (2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 213.  
30
 S Krongold “Writing Laws: Making The Easier to Understand” (1992) 24 Ottawa Law Review 495 at 
505.  
31
 L Kaplow “How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the Income 
Tax” (1996) 49 National Tax Journal 135; GS Cooper “Themes and Issues in Tax Simplification” 
(1993) 10 Australian Tax Forum 417; DJ Sherbaniuk “Tax Simplification – Can Anything Be Done 
About It?” in 1988 Conference Report: Report of the Proceedings of the 40th Tax Conference 
(Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, 1988) 13. 
32
 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1998) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325 at 352. 
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Finally, as Smith & Richardson argue, any effort to simplify tax legislation has to be 
desirable, if it improves taxpayer compliance and reduces compliance costs.33 
According to the Melbourne Institute, tax compliance costs in Australia have been 
estimated at 12 per cent of tax revenue.34 Estimates of tax compliance costs in New 
Zealand have been put at 7.3 per cent.35 Such high compliance costs should also 
provide a sufficient incentive for simplifying tax legislation, if it is established that it 
is complex. 
Tax simplification 
Tax simplification is frequently advocated on the basis it will increase efficiency and 
certainty. The general literature (and there is much of it) appears to suggest that an 
important factor in tax compliance and the consequent impact on compliance costs, 
is tax complexity. According to Anderson & Sawyer,36 tax complexity has long been 
recognised as one of the factors affecting taxpayer compliance. James & 
Wallshutzky,37 suggest that overly complex and incomprehensible legislation 
reduces voluntary compliance and increases compliance costs and that this is a major 
concern for tax systems that rely on self-assessment (eg, New Zealand).  
In terms of certainty, Lortie & Bergeron suggest that “good government requires that 
laws be expressed clearly”.38 The state has a fundamental obligation to ensure that 
                                               
33
 D Smith and G Richardson “The Readability of Australia’s Taxation Laws and Supplementary 
Materials: An Empirical Investigation” (1990) 20 Fiscal Studies 321. 
34
 Melbourne Institute Tax Reform, Equity and Efficiency (1998) 43, cited in G Richardson and D Smith 
“The Readability of Australia’s Goods and Services Tax Legislation: An Empirical Investigation” 
(2002) 30 Federal Law Review 475 at 477. 
35
 C Sandford and J Hasseldine The Compliance Costs of Business Taxes in New Zealand (Institute of 
Policy Studies, Wellington, 1992) cited in R Stephens “Economic and Equity Effects of GST in New 
Zealand” in R Krever and D White (eds) GST in Retrospect and Prospect (Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 
2007) 65 at 77. 
36
 W Anderson and A Sawyer “Legislative Complexity - The Need for Appropriate Variables and Some 
Likely Candidates” (1997) 3 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 3.  
37
 S James and I Wallshutzky “Tax Law Improvement in Australia and the UK: The Need for a Strategy 
for Simplification” (1997) 18 Fiscal Studies 445, cited in K Saw and A Sawyer “Complexity of New 
Zealand Income Tax Legislation: The Final Instalment” (2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 213 at 216. 
38
 S Lortie and RC Bergeron “Legislative Drafting and Language in Canada” (2007) 28 Statute Law 
Review 83. 
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the law (as manifested in the form of legislation) is carefully composed, clearly 
expressed, and of consistent high quality for it to be understood. Citizens 
(individuals and entities) are also obliged to know the law (as ignorance of the law is 
no defence). Legislation that is not readily accessible to citizens increases the cost to 
the public and the state. However, a number of commentators have pointed out that 
tax legislation is often interpreted by lawyers and the Judiciary, not the public.39 
While this is a valid argument, it fails to acknowledge that in a democracy, all people 
(not just lawyers) should understand the law. Fairness alone demands that the law 
should not be drafted on the assumption that a trained lawyer will be available to 
interpret it. As Donaldson MR observed:40 
“The efficiency and maintenance of the rule of law, which is the foundation of any 
parliamentary democracy, has at least two pre-requisites. First, people must understand that 
it is in their interests, as well as in that of the community as a whole, that they should live 
their lives in accordance with the rules and al the rules. Second they must know what those 
rules are.” 
Adding:41 
It is of vital importance … that they must be able to find this out for themselves by reading 
plain and simple words of guidance. The judges of this court are very skilled lawyers of very 
considerable experience, yet it has taken us hours to ascertain what is and what is not offside, 
even with the assistance of highly experienced counsel. This cannot be right.”  
As the court also acknowledges, even lawyers and Judges have difficulty interpreting 
poorly drafted legislation. As Krongold observes, “a statute that is difficult to 
understand makes decision-making more difficult, makes administration more costly, 
and increases the need for legal services.”42 
                                               
39
 For example, G Thornton “Drafters, the Nature of Drafting, and the Complexity of Tax Drafting” 
(1997) 3 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 148 and W Anderson and A Sawyer 
“Legislative Complexity – The Need for Appropriate Variables and Some Likely Candidates” (1997) 
3 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 3. 
40
 Merkur Island Shipping Co v Laughton [1983] 1 All ER 334; [1983] 2 WLR 45. 
41
 Merkur Island Shipping Co v Laughton [1983] 1 All ER 334; [1983] 2 WLR 45. 
42
 S Krongold “Writing Laws: Making The Easier to Understand” (1992) 24 Ottawa Law Review 495 at 
502. 
 184 
The general view is that tax complexity can only be reduced effectively by an entire 
overhaul of the tax system which would entail a rewrite of laws.43 This position is 
supported by Graetz, who has suggested that simplifying the tax system may be the 
most effective way to increase taxpayer compliance.44 The research of Woellner et 
al,45 also suggests that simplified drafting styles do provide benefits to both novice 
and experienced users and that this in turn “supports an inference that simplified tax 
legislation may assist in reducing total tax compliance costs”.46  
But is this enthusiasm for legislative simplification misplaced (as Cooper would 
suggest it is)?47 Was it legislative complexity or poorly defined policy that resulted 
in New Zealand’s original change-in-use rules experiencing a high level of litigation 
activity? Does an assessment of the readability of the respective change-in-use 
provisions provide any guidance?  
C. Prior Research 
To date, there has not been an empirical study of the complete New Zealand GST 
Act to determine its readability. While some GST Act provisions were included in 
Tan & Tower’s 1992 study, their inclusion was neither comprehensive, nor inclusive 
of the change-in-use provisions. However, the Tan & Tower study did provide a 
broad benchmark to make subsequent comparisons against (see Table 4.1 below).48  
According to the Tan & Tower study, the GST Act had an average range of 125 to 
128 words-per-sentence (with a sizeable standard deviation of 60 to 62 words) and 
                                               
43
 E Trombitas “Tax Reform Issue – No Need for a General Anti-Avoidance Provision in the Income 
Tax Act 1994” (1999) 5 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 121. 
44
 M Graetz The Decline (and Fall?) of the Income Tax (New York, WW Norton, 1997).  
45
 R Woellner, C Coleman, M McKerchar, M Walpole, and J Zetler “Can Simplified Legal Drafting 
Reduce the Psychological Costs of Tax Compliance? An Australian Perspective” (2007) British Tax 
Review 717. 
46
 R Woellner, C Coleman, M McKerchar, M Walpole, and J Zetler “Can Simplified Legal Drafting 
Reduce the Psychological Costs of Tax Compliance? An Australian Perspective” (2007) British Tax 
Review 717 at 733. 
47
 GS Cooper “Legislating Principles as a Remedy for Tax Complexity” (2010) British Tax Review 334 
at 337. 
48
 LM Tan and G Tower “The Readability of Tax Laws: An Empirical Study in New Zealand” (1992) 9 
Australian Tax Forum 355 at 365 (Table 1). Hereafter referred to as the “Tan & Tower” study. 
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an FRE score of zero. As Tan & Tower rightly observed, the GST Act was “very 
difficult to read”. However, the main reason for the poor FRE scores (and high 
reading difficulty), was due to very long sentences, rather than word or syllable 
length. As Tan & Tower observed, many readers of the GST Act would not have had 
much difficulty reading words containing an average syllable length of 1.57.  
Table 4.1: GST Legislation (Selected Provisions) – Average Readability  
GST Act Flesch Reading Ease Words per Sentence Syllables per Word 
 FRE STD WPS STD SPW STD 
Original 0.3 0.9 125.69 62.66 1.57 0.09 
Revised 0 0 128.11 60.41 1.56 0.08 
 
The Richardson & Sawyer study49 examined Parts A and B (see Table 4.2 below) of 
the rewritten income tax legislation (enacted in the ITA 2004) and was subsequently 
followed up by the Pau et el study50 (examining the rewritten Parts C, D and E) in 
2007, and the Saw & Sawyer study51 (examining the completed ITA 2007) in 2010. 
All three studies are important, not only in providing an assessment of New 
Zealand’s income tax legislation (using Flesch scores), but also in providing a 
benchmark to assess the readability of other New Zealand legislation (ie, the GST 
Act).  
Table 4.2: New Zealand Income Tax Legislation (2002) – Average Readability  
 Flesch Reading Ease Words per Sentence Syllables per Word 
ITA 1994 (rewrite) FRE STD WPS STD SPW STD 
Part A 44.65 12.34 39 11.03 1.26 0.17 
Part B 10.92 13.56 43.73 24.88 1.63 0.13 
Part A and B 16.11 18.09 43 23.35 1.58 0.19 
                                               
49
 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1998) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325 at 347 (Table 7). Hereafter referred to as 
the “Richardson & Sawyer” study. 
50
 C Pau, A Sawyer, and A Maples “Complexity of the New Zealand Tax Laws: An Empirical Study” 
(2007) 22 Australian Tax Forum 59. Hereafter referred to as the “Pau et al” study. 
51
 K Saw and A Sawyer “Complexity of New Zealand Income Tax Legislation: The Final Instalment” 
(2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 213. Hereafter referred to as the “Saw & Sawyer” study. 
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The Richardson & Sawyer study confirmed that the main contributor to difficulty in 
understanding and complying with tax rules was the use of long sentences, and that 
this remained a major inhibitor in improving FRE scores.52 As the Richardson & 
Sawyer study observed, the average sentence length of the pre-rewrite provisions 
significantly reduced after rewrite.53 As the above data illustrates, the words-per-
sentence in the rewritten income tax legislation averages around 43 words-per-
sentence (markedly lower than the rate in the GST Act). Unsurprisingly, the FRE 
scores are also substantially above those of the GST Act (especially in Part A).  
As originally observed by Tan & Tower,54 the Richardson & Sawyer study also 
recognised that there was a general reluctance within the legislative drafting to break 
sections or subsections into more than one sentence.55 However, guidance on the 
New Zealand income tax rewrite has provided that:56 
“sections and subsections need not be restricted to a single sentence and may be broken into 
shorter sentences.” 
While such guidance appeared not to have initially materialised during the rewrite (at 
least not according to the Richardson & Sawyer study), it is hoped that a rewrite of 
the GST Act will provide an opportunity to adhere more to the guidelines for shorter 
sentences. An interesting observation from the Richardson & Sawyer study was the 
impact of the re-organisation of the Income Tax Act on reducing sentence length. 
                                               
52
 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1988) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325 at 351-353. 
53
 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1988) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325, 344 (Table 2). According to the 
comparative data the average sentence length in the ITA 1976 was 324.1 words-per sentence, which 
was reduced to 93.4 when the provisions were reorganised in the ITA 1994, and reduced further to 
53.4 words-per sentence, post rewrite. In contrast, Tan & Tower observed that the average sentence 
length in the ITA 1976 was 135 words-per-sentence (with a standard deviation of 67.87 words).  
54
 LM Tan and G Tower “The Readability of Tax Laws: An Empirical Study in New Zealand” (1992) 9 
Australian Tax Forum 355 at 364. 
55
 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1988) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325 at 351.  
56
 B Birch and W Creech Rewriting the Income Tax Act 1994 – Objectives, Process, Guidelines: A 
Discussion Document (IRD, Wellington, December 1994) at [7.3]. 
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According to Richardson & Sawyer such a dramatic (and surprising) reduction of 
sentence length “was not predicted”.57 This outcome suggested:58 
 “a significant cause of the excessively long sentences in the ITA 1976 was poor 
organisation, as opposed to difficulty in the concise expression of complex ideas.”  
The Richardson & Sawyer concluded that a major inhibiting factor to improving 
FRE scores was a failure to reduce average sentence length — “a legacy of the 
decision not to simplify policy and underlying concepts.”59 
The most recent Australian empirical study on the Australian GST Act has been the 
2002 Richardson & Smith study60 (not to be confused with the earlier Smith & 
Richardson study61 on Australian income tax legislation). As discussed above, the 
study adopted the FRE index utilising the Word97 readability function in preference 
to a manual calculation process. However, unlike the Richardson & Smith study, all 
legislative provisions (including those below 50 words), except the defined terms 
section (referred to as the “dictionary” in the Australian legislation) have been 
included in this study.62  
The Richardson & Smith study observed that “efforts made to simplify any form of 
taxation legislation, including the GST, could be considered to be a desirable means 
of helping to reduce business taxpayer compliance costs”.63 However, the study 
                                               
57
 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1988) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325 at 349. 
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 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1988) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325 at 350. 
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 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1988) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325 at 353. 
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 G Richardson and D Smith “The Readability of Australia’s Goods and Services Tax Legislation: An 
Empirical Investigation” (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 475. 
61
 D Smith and G Richardson “The Readability of Australia’s Taxation Laws and Supplementary 
Materials: An Empirical Investigation” (1999) 20 Fiscal Studies 321. 
62
 In terms of comparative analysis, the online data is preferred for its accuracy, unless making 
comparisons to the Richardson & Smith study, in which case the Word97 data is used. 
63
 G Richardson and D Smith “The Readability of Australia’s Goods and Services Tax Legislation: An 
Empirical Investigation” (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 475 at 484. Hereafter referred to as the 
“Richardson & Smith” study. 
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concluded (see Table 4.3 below)64 that overall, the Australian GST Act remained 
very difficult to read and understand on the basis of an average FRE score of 40.3 
(below the benchmark of 60), and had implications for business taxpayers in the 
form of potentially higher GST compliance costs. Although the study did identify 
that the average sentence length (ie, words-per-sentence) was 20.9.65  
Table 4.3: Australian Tax Legislation – Average Readability 
Legislation Flesch (FRE) F-KGL Passive  
Sentence (%) 
Words-Per-
Sentence (WPS) 
GST Act  40.3 11.0 20 20.9 
ITAA 1936 38.44 10.79 17.1 39.02 
ITAA 1997 46.42 10.76 20.81 22.27 
 
The Pau et al study,66 confirmed that the income tax rewrite had made further 
readability improvements since the Richardson & Sawyer study (which had only 
examined Parts A and B of the ITA 2004). Similar to the Richardson & Smith study, 
the Pau et al study utilised Microsoft Word (albeit Word2003 instead of Word97) to 
correlate FRE scores. According to the Pau et al study, the average sentence length 
had shortened to approximately 34 words-per-sentence and a KRE score of 41.7 
since the earlier Richardson & Sawyer study (see Table 4.4 below). The Pau et al 
study concluded the rewrite project had been successful in improving the overall 
readability of the income tax legislation and that the considerable increase in the 
KRE score was largely due to a significant reduction in the average sentence length 
(from 324 words in the ITA 1976 to 34 words per sentence in the ITA 2004).  
 
                                               
64
 Average data on the Australian income tax legislation (eg, ITAA 1936 and ITAA 1997) was obtained 
from the earlier 1999 Smith & Richardson study: D Smith and G Richardson “The Readability of 
Australia’s Taxation Laws and Supplementary Materials: An Empirical Investigation” (1999) 20 
Fiscal Studies 321. 
65
 This result would tend to support a much higher FRE score than identified in the study. The rewritten 
ITAA 1997 returned a FRE score of 46.42 on the basis of an average sentence length of 22.27 words-
per-sentence (2 words more than the GST Act). 
66
 C Pau, A Sawyer, and A Maples “Complexity of the New Zealand Tax Laws: An Empirical Study” 
(2007) 22 Australian Tax Forum 59.  
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Table 4.4: New Zealand Income Tax Legislation (2004) – Average Readability 
ITA 2004 Average FRE Average F-KEL Average WPS 
Part A 49.1 10.9 28.5 
Part B 39.1 11.8 35.9 
Part C 44.4 10.5 31.4 
Part D 40.5 11.2 29.1 
Part E 35.3 11.4 45.2 
Average 41.7 11.2 34.0 
 
The Saw & Sawyer study,67 revisited the work of the earlier Pau et al study, and 
provided a final assessment of the then completed (and fully rewritten) ITA 2007 
(see Table 4.5 below). The Saw & Sawyer study observed that the rewrite had 
“significantly improved readability” with average FRE scores improving from 33.5 
(in the ITA 2004) to 42.8 (in the ITA 2007) and average sentence length reducing 
from 37 to 25 words.  
Table 4.5: New Zealand Income Tax Legislation (2007) – Average Readability 
 Average FRE Average F-KEL Average WPS 
 ITA 2007 ITA 2004 ITA 2007 ITA 2004 ITA 2007 ITA 2004 
Part C 45.18 24.04 13.16 22.59 25.89 49.59 
Part D 34.61 33.71 13.62 15.74 21.09 29.11 
Part E 54.83 48.93 10.50 12.76 19.86 25.64 
Part F 35.88 27.17 14.78 17.26 26.49 34.49 
Part G 42.42 30.91 12.45 18.16 20.80 45.49 
Part H 36.74 39.15 14.43 14.43 28.17 27.85 
Part I 45.96 29.43 14.43 21.13 30.69 44.64 
Part L 45.06 27.20 13.64 24.95 28.16 54.17 
Part M 37.27 35.84 15.24 15.73 29.09 32.01 
Part O 46.05 32.42 12.22 21.21 21.89 40.06 
Part R  41.20 31.94 15.28 20.07 30.97 42.13 
Part Y 44.79 35.16 12.79 17.20 23.46 35.72 
Part Z 45.62 44.40 11.78 12.27 19.92 21.00 
Average 42.77 33.52 13.38 17.74 25.03 36.63 
                                               
67
 K Saw and A Sawyer “Complexity of New Zealand Income Tax Legislation: The Final Instalment” 
(2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 213. 
 190 
The most recent Sawyer study (yet to be published),68 has raised some questions 
about the readability of the ITA 2007 using a Cloze Procedure analysis. However, 
the general trend of improved readability from plain language rewriting remains. 
Sawyer confirms earlier observations that the “rewrite project had been successful in 
improving readability”69 and providing “potentially understandable”70 legislation.  
The Richardson & Sawyer, Pau et al, Saw & Sawyer, and more recent Sawyer 
studies, all confirm that the readability of ITA 2007 is now comparable to the 
Australian Income Tax Act (based on the Smith & Richardson study) and Australian 
GST Act (based on the Richardson & Smith study). The studies also demonstrate 
that plain language drafting styles do improve the readability of tax legislation. In 
contrast, evidence suggests that the New Zealand and Canadian GST Acts continue 
to score poorly (both in terms of average FRE scores and words-per-sentence) and 
remain in reading equivalence to the former New Zealand Income Tax Act 1976 — 
an Act considered overly complex by the 1989 Waugh Committee.71  
D. Research Methodology 
According to Tran-Nam,72 tax complexity is strictly speaking a comparative concept. 
However, in many empirical studies it is a measurable concept that associates a piece 
of legislation with a unique score. The magnitude of these scores tell us how much a 
tax law is simpler (or more complex) than another. While a universally accepted 
numerical measure of legal complexity has yet to be agreed upon, in most of the 
                                               
68
 A Sawyer “Enhancing Compliance Through Improved Readability: Evidence from New Zealand’s 
Rewrite ‘Experiment’” (2011) IRS Research Bulletin 225. It is suggested that the less than 
encouraging results may also be due to reliance on less than accurate data provided from Word 
generated FRE scores. Although the author acknowledges that the Cloze analysis might have also 
been compromised by the methodology. 
69
 K Saw and A Sawyer “Complexity of New Zealand Income Tax Legislation: The Final Instalment” 
(2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 213 at 237. 
70
 A Sawyer “Enhancing Compliance Through Improved Readability: Evidence from New Zealand’s 
Rewrite ‘Experiment’” (2011) IRS Research Bulletin 225 at 246. 
71
 D Caygill Consultative Document on Tax Simplification (IRD, Wellington, December 1989) [the 
Waugh Committee]. See also J Waugh Tax Simplification: Final Report of the Consultative 
Committee (IRD, Wellington, 1990). 
72
 B Tran-Nam “Tax Compliance Research: An Economic Perspective” (2003) 9 New Zealand Journal 
of Taxation Law and Policy 455 at 462. 
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recent empirical studies that have been conducted, the preferred measurement has 
been the Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) index.73  
Consistent with earlier empirical studies of tax legislation provisions (notably Tan & 
Tower,74 Richardson & Sawyer,75 Smith & Richardson,76 Richardson & Smith,77 Pau 
et al78 and Saw & Sawyer79), this study has adopted the Flesch Readability Ease 
(FRE) index to determine the readability of selected GST change-in-use provisions 
from New Zealand, Canada, and Australia.  
As all four tax research studies have observed, the FRE index is the most commonly 
used method for assessing the readability of tax legislation. The FRE score is a 
measure of readability and generates a reading ease index from “0” (most difficult) 
to “100” (least difficult). Scores below zero are treated as zero on the index (and 
vice-versa). The lower the FRE score the harder a document is considered to read, 
and the higher the score tends to “100”, the easier a document is considered to read. 
For the purposes of this study, scores below zero have been left in the data (rather 
than deemed a zero) to provide more extensive comparisons (and provide a clear 
picture of the gravity of the situation for many legislative provisions).  
                                               
73
 R Flesch How to Write Plain English (Harper and Row, New York, 1979) cited in C Pau, A Sawyer, 
and A Maples “Complexity of the New Zealand Tax Laws: An Empirical Study” (2007) 22 Australian 
Tax Forum 59 at 69 (fn 51). 
74
 LM Tan and G Tower “The Readability of Tax Laws: An Empirical Study in New Zealand” (1992) 9 
Australian Tax Forum 355. Hereafter referred to as the “Tan & Tower” study. 
75
 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1988) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325. Hereafter referred to as the “Richardson & 
Sawyer” study. 
76
 D Smith and G Richardson “The readability of Australia’s Taxation Laws and Supplementary 
Materials: An Empirical Investigation” (1999) 20 Fiscal Studies 321. Hereafter referred to as the 
“Smith & Richardson” study. 
77
 G Richardson and D Smith “The Readability of Australia’s Goods and Services Tax Legislation: An 
Empirical Investigation” (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 475. Hereafter referred to as the “Richardson 
& Smith” study. 
78
 C Pau, A Sawyer, and A Maples “Complexity of the New Zealand Tax Laws: An Empirical Study” 
(2007) 22 Australian Tax Forum 59.  
79
 K Saw and A Sawyer “Complexity of New Zealand Income Tax Legislation: The Final Instalment” 
(2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 213. 
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However, as Tan & Tower observe,80 there are limitations in the use of readability 
indexes. This is because most readability formulae are based on simple measurable 
factors (eg, sentence length and word length) and fail to take into consideration other 
more complex factors that will often be part of legislation (eg, conceptual difficulty 
or semantics). Due to these limitations, readability indexes do not provide an 
absolute measure of clarity. However, they do provide a good indication of 
readability in the absence of any better measure.  
Initially the research methodology for this study intended to adopt the Richardson & 
Smith study approach of using only Word97’s internal readability system that returns 
two FRE scores (the Flesch readability score and the Flesch-Kincaid grade level 
score).81 This approach has a degree of merit in that it would provide comparability 
with the Richardson & Smith study while providing internal consistency with the 
other jurisdictions examined in this study.82 Furthermore, as the Richardson & Smith 
study points out, automated computer calculations were demonstrated to be 
considerably more accurate than human calculations.83 However, when 
benchmarking data from the Tan & Tower study sufficient irregularities were 
observed in Word97 to cause some concern with the Word97 FRE scores.84 Similar 
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 LM Tan and G Tower “The Readability of Tax Laws: An Empirical Study in New Zealand” (1992) 9 
Australian Tax Forum 355 at 361. 
81
 The Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) and Flesch–Kincaid Grade Level (F-KGL) indexes were first 
developed in the 1940’s and are designed to indicate comprehension complexity. Both tests use the 
same core measures (eg, word length and sentence length), but have different weighting factors. The 
lower the FRE score the more difficulty and less comprehendible the language. The F-KGL formula 
effectively inverts the FRE score in order to provide an indication of the equivalent school grade level 
required to comprehend language. The FRE formula is: 206.838 × 1.015 (total words \ total 
sentences) – 84.6 (total syllables \ total words). The F-KGL formula is: 0.39 × 015 (total words \ total 
sentences) + 11.8 (total syllables \ total words) – 15.59. 
82
 It is noted that the Pau et al study used Word2003and Saw & Sawyer study Word2007. However, to 
ensure absolute consistency with the Richardson & Smith GST Act data (and remove any doubt that 
Word2003 might compute FRE scores differently) Word97 has been used. 
83
 G Richardson and D Smith “The Readability of Australia’s Goods and Services Tax Legislation: An 
Empirical Investigation” (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 475 at 480. However, it is noted that while 
both calculations are computer generated (and therefore more technically accurate), they did provide 
different results.  
84
 The first irregularity concerned the total word counts. Word97 appeared to provide two different total 
word counts depending on which Word97 tool was being used (ie, the default word count, or the word 
count after “readability” was selected). In a number of instances the word count appeared to drop by 
one or two units after the readability option in Word97 was selected. The second concern related to 
the words-per-sentence (WPS) scores. After the readability option was selected, Word97 would 
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concerns were raised in the Sawyer study (although subsequently discounted in the 
Richardson & Smith study for the above reasons) and Pau et al and Saw & Sawyer 
studies.85 Additionally, Word97 was unable to provide syllable length data that was 
comparable with the data provided in the Tan & Tower study.86  
For the above reasons an alternative automated computer-generated calculation from 
an online readability-score tool87 was applied to the legislation in order to provide 
equivalent data to that provided in the Tan & Tower study (eg, syllable scores).88 
The online tool also provided additional scores using the Gunning-Fog,89 Coleman-
Liau,90 SMOG,91 and Automated Readability92 scoring systems.93 This additional 
                                                                                                                                     
provide WPS scores. However, these score did not often reflect the total word score divided by the 
total sentence score. In some instances they were much lower, particularly when the legislative 
provision also contained a number of paragraphs. This irregularity in WPS did not appear in the 
Online tool. Benchmarking the s 16 GST Act data from Tan & Tower against Word97 and the Online 
tool also highlighted an apparent error in the Tan & Tower data. Section 16 (as originally enacted and 
subsequently amended) only comprised 2 sentences, yet Tan & Tower returned an average sentence 
length of 71 words which would require 3 sentences (not 2), for a provision comprising 
approximately 213 words at that time. 
85
 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1988) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325 at 336-337. The Richardson & Sawyer 
study observed that Word97 failed to accurately compute FRI scores and considered that Word97 had 
particular difficulty in calculating long sentences. However, the inaccuracies may also have 
something to do with irregularities in syllable and sentence counting. The Pau et al study also 
identified irregularities with the use of colons and semi colons in the calculation of sentence length in 
Word2003. The Saw & Sawyer study also observed a similar problem in Word2007. According to the 
Pau et al study, Word2003 treated semi-colons as full-stops and thus inflated the FRE scores by 
increasing the number of words-per-sentence scores. The online tool used in this study did not 
experience these problems. 
86
 Furthermore, in order to stabilise word counts, spaces were removed from section references (eg, 
“CB 23” changed to “CB23”). In some instances spaces were inserted between words, where digital 
versions of legislative provisions had accidentally removed them. 
87
 See <http://www.addedbytes.com/code/readability-score/> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
88
 Benchmarking the s 16 GST Act data from the Tan & Tower study against the data from the Online 
tool provided a high degree of consistency (eg, similar syllable counts), which Word97 was not able 
to provide. 
89
 The Gunning-Fog (G-Fog) index was developed in 1952 and also estimates the years of formal 
education required to understand written language. Unlike the Flesch index it measures complex 
words (eg, words with 3 or more syllables), rather than just syllables. The G-Fog formula is: 0.4 
((words \ sentence) + 100 (complex words \ words)). 
90
 The Coleman-Liau (C-Liau) index was developed in 1975 and is a readability test that determines the 
understanding of written language and returns a score similar to the F-KGL index. Unlike syllable-
based readability indices, it does not require that the character content of words be analysed, only 
their length in characters. The C-Liau formula is: 0.0588 (number of charcters \ 100 words) – 0.296 
(sentences \ 100 words) – 15.8. 
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data also provides an alternative means of comparison between the three 
jurisdictions tested. 
Accordingly, in order to enable comparability with all four studies, two Flesch scores 
were recorded from two different sources — the first from Word97 (as used by the 
Smith study), and the second from the online readability-score tool.94 In order to 
ensure comparability between all three jurisdictions, the change-in-use provisions 
from New Zealand, Canada, and Australia have been examined using the 
aforementioned two-pronged approach. The resulting data from this research should 
enable comparability with all four studies and perhaps provide a greater element of 
objectivity to the overall results, due to the addition of other scoring systems. In 
addition, data on the Australian GST change-in-use provisions presented in the 
Richardson & Smith study is compared to data acquired in this study. Theoretically, 
the data from this study should be similar (subject to any subsequent changes to the 
legislation since 2002) to the data in the Richardson & Smith study. If this proved to 
be the case (which it was), computations for the other jurisdictions could be 
accurately compared with one another (albeit that the Word97 computations are not 
accurate). 
According to Richardson & Smith, a legislative provisions needs to achieve a FRE 
score of 60 or more to be considered readable.95 According to Tan & Tower,96 and 
                                                                                                                                     
91
 The Simple Measure of Gobbledygook (SMOG) index was developed in 1969 as a more accurate 
substitute for the G-Fog index. The formula for SMOG is: 1.043 × SquareRoot [30 × (number of 
polysyllables \ number of sentences)] + 3.1291. 
92
 The Automated Readability (ARI) index is similar to the C-Liau index and relies on a factor of 
characters per word, instead of the usual syllables per word. The ARI formula is: 4.71 (characters \ 
words) + 0.5 (words \ sentence) – 21.43. 
93
 Greater confidence was also experienced with the total word, sentence, and words-per-sentence 
scores. Both Word97 and the online tool returned the same sentence cores. However, (as explained 
above), Word97 appeared to experience a number of anomalies with its word-per-sentence scores. 
Often the word-per-sentence scores did not equal the total word count divided by sentence numbers. 
For this reason, the word-per-sentence scores (and thus the FRE scores) derived from the Online tool 
were preferred over the equivalent Word97 scores for accuracy. However, by computing Word97 
generated FRE scores, comparability of legislative performance between studies (and legislation) 
could be made. 
94
 See <http://www.addedbytes.com/code/readability-score/> (viewed 20 March 2011).  
95
 G Richardson and D Smith “The Readability of Australia’s Goods and Services Tax Legislation: An 
Empirical Investigation” (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 475 at 480-481. 
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applied in the Richardson & Sawyer study,97 this equates roughly to the school 
leaving age. A score of less than 60 equates to a tertiary level or undergraduate 
qualification and a score of less than 30 equates to a university graduate 
qualification.98 The Pau et al and Saw & Sawyer studies also applied this standard in 
reaching its conclusions.  
In the course of this research, it became apparent that it would be necessary to 
benchmark the various iterations of the New Zealand change-in-use provisions 
against the average GST Act provision from the same period.99 For this reason, the 
complete New Zealand GST Act was measured and the data presented in an 
Appendix at the end of this chapter.  
E. Interpretation of Readability Scores  
Australia 
In comparison to both New Zealand and Canada, the Australian change-in-use rules 
(contained in Division 129) record substantially better FRE scores, both in Word97 
and from the Online tool (see Table 4.6 below). The 2010 data provides an 
interesting picture of Australian GST Act, and in particular the Division 129 rules. 
The average provision in Division 129 contains approximately 135 words, 6 
paragraphs-per-section, 2.9 sentences-per-section (SPS), 222.79 syllables-per-
section, 55 words-per-sentence (WPS), and an FRE score of 18.81.100  
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 LM Tan and G Tower “The Readability of Tax Laws: An Empirical Study in New Zealand” (1992) 9 
Australian Tax Forum 355 at 370-371 (Table 5 and Table 6). 
97
 M Richardson and A Sawyer “Complexity in the Expression of New Zealand’s Tax Laws: An 
Empirical Analysis” (1988) 14 Australian Tax Forum 325 at 348 (Table 8 and Table 9). 
98
 As will become apparent from the data, the GST Act currently requires the equivalent of a university 
graduate (or higher) to read it.  
99
 While the 1992 Tan & Tower study provided a benchmark in which to compare the results from the 
change-in-use provisions, the averages from the Tan & Tower study were generated from a very small 
sample and were over 8 years old. A complete and more recent sample would not only provide a more 
accurate benchmark, it would also provide an opportunity to see if the readability of the GST Act had 
improved since it was last measured. 
100
 Word97 provides an average sentence length of 27 words-per-sentence and an FRE score of 28.89. 
While this is more consistent with Richardson & Smith, it does not appear to be an accurate picture. 
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In 2002, the Richardson & Smith study provided an average Word97 FRE score of 
40.3 and a words-per-sentence score of 20.9. Averaging the original Richards & 
Smith study data for Division 129 provides an average Word97 FRE score of 32.75 
and an average words-per-sentence length of 19.2 (see Table 4.7 below). This 
additional analysis of the Richardson & Smith data would appear to suggest that the 
Australian change-in-use rules are generally less readable than the average provision 
in the Australian GST Act. Nevertheless they are still substantially more readable 
than either the New Zealand or Canadian change-in-use rules.  
Table 4.6: 2010 Australian Change-in-Use Provisions –Readability 
 Online Tool Word97 
Sections Words Paras SPS WPS Syllable SPW FRE * MS-
FRE 
MS-
Words 
MS-
WPS 
11~1 37 1 2 18.5 66 1.78 37.1 37.1 37 18.5 
11~5 53 5 1 53 86 1.62 15.8 75.5 53 9 
11~10 148 14 3 49.33 249 1.68 14.4 45.9 148 18 
11~15 215 11 5 43 333 1.55 32.2 58.5 215 19.8 
11~20 15 1 1 15 26 1.73 45 44.9 15 15 
11~25 43 1 2 21.5 70 1.63 47.3 43.3 43 21.5 
11~30 261 10 6 43.5 440 1.69 20.7 31.5 259 32 
Average 110.29 6.14 2.86 34.83 181.43 1.67 30.36 48.10 110.00 19.11 
129~1 51 1 2 25.5 81 1.59 46.6 42.7 50 25 
129~5 89 8 2 44.5 162 1.82 7.7 30.2 89 18.5 
129~10 117 5 3 39 205 1.75 19 11.2 113 28 
129~15 36 1 1 36 62 1.72 24.6 9.3 35 35 
129~20 366 15 5 73.2 613 1.67 -9.2 17 361 31.4 
129~25 223 15 3 74.33 358 1.61 -4.4 30 221 20 
129~40 338 15 14 24.14 564 1.67 41.2 42.8 335 16.6 
129~45 182 7 3 60.67 305 1.68 3.5 23.5 177 33.6 
129~50 110 5 3 36.67 172 1.56 37.3 47 110 27.3 
129~55 36 4 1 36 55 1.53 41 60.7 36 12 
129~70 125 5 1 125 192 1.54 -50 36.1 120 31 
129~75 124 5 1 124 191 1.54 49.3 36.1 120 31 
129~80 57 1 1 57 86 1.51 21.3 0 55 55 
129~90 41 2 1 20.5 73 1.78 35.4 17.9 40 13 
Average 135.36 6.36 2.93 55.47 222.79 1.64 18.81 28.89 133.00 26.96 
 
Furthermore, a comparison of the 2010 Word97 data for Division 129 against the 
2002 Richardson & Smith study data for Division 129 would appear to suggest that 
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there has been no significant change. Since 2002, the Word97 words-per-sentence 
scores have only dropped marginally from 19.2 to 20.8, and the Word97 FRE scores 
have dropped only slightly from 32.75 to 34.48 (or if comparing the Online FRE 
score of 32.58 – no change at all). However, a more accurate picture of Division 129 
(eg, including Division 129 provisions excluded in the Richardson & Smith study) 
provides an average Word97 FRE score of 28.89 with an average words-per-
sentence length of 26.9 (see Table 4.7 below).101 
Table 4.7: Comparison of Richardson & Smith Data Against 2010 Study 
Section Richardson & Smith (2002) 2010 Study  
 FRE F-KGL PS WPS MS-WPS MS-FRE FRE * Average  
FRE scores 
11~1 37.1 12 0 18.5 18.5 37.1 37.1 37.1 
11~5 30.5 10.7 0 7 9 75.5 15.8 45.65 
11~10 40.2 11.8 33 17 18 45.9 14.4 30.15 
11~15 50.8 11 40 19.8 19.8 58.5 32.2 45.35 
11~20 27.6 12 0 13 15 44.9 45 44.95 
11~25 39.7 12 33 18 21.5 43.3 47.3 45.3 
11~30 30.5 12 16 31.3 32 31.5 20.7 26.1 
Average 36.62   17.8 19.11 48.1 30.35 39.22 
129~1 42.7 12 50 25 25 42.7 46.6 44.65 
129~10 12.3 12 0 27 28 11.2 19 15.1 
129~25 27.4 12 0 17.2 20 30 -4.4 12.8 
129~40 43.1 11.2 0 16.3 16.6 42.8 41.2 42.0 
129~55 49.5 9 0 11 12 60.7 41 50.85 
129~75 31.5 12 0 19 31 36.1 49.3 42.7 
129~90 22.8 12 0 19 13 17.9 35.4 26.65 
Average 32.75   19.2 20.8 34.48 32.58 33.53 
* FRE scores from online tool. 
The insignificant difference in respective Word97 scores for the same sample group 
used in the Richardson & Smith study should be expected given there has been very 
few amendments to these provisions since 2002. Importantly, the 2010 Word97 data 
appears to benchmark very well against the Richardson & Smith data, and would 
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 The average Online FRE score for Division 129 is 18.81 with an average words-per-sentence length 
of 55.47, and is probably a more accurate picture of the readability and sentence length of the 
Australian change-in-use rules contained in Division 129. 
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therefore appear to validate the comparative value of the resulting 2010 Word97 
scores for the New Zealand and Canadian legislation.102  
New Zealand  
The Tan & Tower study provided that the average GST Act provision (based on a 
small portion of selected provisions) had an average Word97 FRE score of zero, an 
average syllable score of 1.56, and an average sentence length of 125 words-per-
sentence (as enacted), that had increased to 128 words-per-sentence (WPS) after the 
first round of amendments.103  
This study has revisited the average scores for the revised GST Act and change-in-
use provisions and confirms that both the average GST provision and the original 
change-in-use provision (pre-10 October 2000) have changed little since the 1992 
Tan & Tower study and remain difficult to read.104 Although (as discussed below) it 
would appear that the change-in-use provisions are more readable than the average 
GST Act provision. 
According to this study the average GST Act provision in 2010 had an average 
sentence length of 99.53 WPS and an average Word97 FRE score of 34.91.105 
However, an FRE score of zero is probably more accurate.106 While this is a small 
(and possibly insignificant) improvement on the averages obtained in 1992 by Tan & 
Tower (eg, 128 WPS), it is still below the benchmark of 43 WPS set by the rewritten 
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 Although as discussed above, the accuracy of Word based FRE scores could be questionable in terms 
of accuracy, and it is suggested that the Online FRE scores generated from this study are more likely 
to provide a more accurate FRE score and words-per-sentence (WPS) score. 
103
 The apparent error with s 16 may have made the words-per-sentence mean average higher, as the 
score should have been 106.5 (ie, 213/2), rather than 71 (ie, 213/3).  
104
 The original change-in-use provision would certainly appear to support Tan & Towers conclusions. 
In fact if s 21 had been included in the Tan & Tower study it may well have further degraded the 
results from the Tan & Tower study. 
105
 The Word97 score of 37.58 WPS is difficult to reconcile given that the average provision comprises 
5.13 sentences and an average total of 510 words.  
106
 If we accept that the Word97 WPS score of 37.58 is not accurate, then it follows that the resulting 
Word97 FRE score is also inaccurate. Thus the online FRE score of -25.8 (or zero) is preferred as a 
more accurate picture of the state of the average provision in the GST Act (see Table 4.9 below). 
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Income Tax Act and 30 WPS set by the Working Party on the Reorganisation of the 
Income Tax Act 1976.  
According to this study, the original change-in-use provision (just prior to 
amendment on 10 October 2000 and 8 years after the Tan & Tower study) had a 
Word97 FRE score of zero, an average sentence length of 201 WPS, and an average 
syllable length of 1.46.107  
The revised change-in-use provision has made a substantial improvement on 
readability and average sentence length. The total word count for the provisions has 
dropped markedly from 1,611 words to 561 words, which translates to a reduction in 
sentence length from 201 to 112 WPS.108 Readability has also improved from a 
Word97 FRE score of zero to 31.5.109 However, in terms of educational equivalence 
this still equates to a university graduate qualification (or higher).  
Averaging all the revised change-in-use provisions (ss 21 to 21I) would appear to 
indicate an even more dramatic improvement. The average total word length for all 
the change-in-use provisions is 224 words and demonstrates a substantial decrease 
from 1,611 words in the original provision. Not surprisingly, the average sentence 
length is 61.32 WPS and an equally dramatic reduction from 201 WPS in the 
original provision.110 However, it is likely that this improvement is due the codified 
inclusion of the rules relating to methodology that were originally written in a non-
legislative style.111  
                                               
107
 The 1992 Tan & Tower GST Act average was 128 words-per-sentence, 1.57 syllables, and an FRE 
score of zero. The Online tool actually provided a FRE score of -120.7 which is treated as zero. The 
Word97 average sentence length of 81.5 WPS is difficult to reconcile given that the provision 
comprises 8 sentences and a total of 1611 words.  
108
 The Word97 score of 41.2 WPS is difficult to reconcile given that the provision comprises 5 
sentences and a total of 561 words. 
109
 However, given Word97 is producing extremely low WPS scores, it is more likely that the real FRE 
score is -29.4. While this is an improvement on -120.7 it is still technically considered to be a zero 
FRE score, and as such would not be considered to be an improvement. 
110
 The Word97 average WPS of 28.6 is difficult to reconcile given that the average provision comprises 
3.4 sentences and an average total of 224 words. 
111
 See Tax Information Bulletin Vol 5:8 (January 1994) 1. Document available at: 
<www.ird.govt.nz/resources/1/9/194616004bbe4243b4bdf4bc87554a30/tib5-08.pdf> (viewed 20 
March 2011). 
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A wider comparison of the change-in-use provisions against the average GST Act 
provision (see Table 4.8 below and discussed above) confirms that the revised 
change-in-use provisions are one of the most readable provisions of the GST Act.  
Table 4.8: 2010 New Zealand Change-in-Use Provisions –Readability 
 Online Tool Word97 
Sections Words Paras SPS WPS Syllables SPW FRE * MS-FRE MS-
Words 
MS-
WPS 
Old           
21 1611 27 8 201.38 2345 1.46 -120.7 0 1608 81.5 
Revised           
21 561 15 5 112.2 814 1.45 -29.8 31.5 560 41.2 
21A  113 6 3 37.67 191 1.69 25.6 38.6 113 17 
21B  167 5 3 55.67 256 1.53 20.6 3.8 167 35.6 
21C  167 7 4 41.75 252 1.51 36.8 50.3 167 25 
21CB  89 3 1 89 128 1.44 -5.2 66.1 89 9 
21D  90 3 1 90 136 1.51 -12.4 31 90 41 
21E  313 16 4 78.25 441 1.41 8.2 52.1 312 29.5 
21F  116 4 2 58 161 1.39 30.5 68.7 116 14 
21G  212 7 5 42.4 315 1.49 38.1 42.1 211 34.6 
21H  248 13 4 62 389 1.57 11.2 38 247 30.7 
21I  388 13 5 7.6 575 1.48 2.7 38 388 37.2 
Average 224 8.36 3.36 61.32 32.54 1.49 11.48 41.83 223.6 28.6 
New           
21 261 10 5 52.2 406 1.56 22.3 30.8 257 33 
21A 73 4 1 73 121 1.66 -7.5 35.9 72 25 
21B 209 12 4 52.25 307 1.47 29.5 57.3 206 24 
21C 99 5 1 99 150 1.52 -21.8 50.6 98 15 
21D 174 8 3 58 289 1.66 7.5 48.1 171 21.6 
21E 444 18 9 49.33 684 1.54 26.4 46.3 436 25.2 
21F 176 10 3 58.67 289 1.64 8.4 44.5 171 21 
21G 671 27 9 74.56 1041 1.55 -0.1 29.9 661 32.8 
21H 220 6 4 55 316 1.44 29.5 38.9 217 31 
Average 258.55 11.11 4.33 63.55 400.33 1.56 10.46 42.47 254.33 25.4 
 
The new change-in-use provisions (that apply from 1 April 2011) have made little (if 
no) improvement, recording an average Word97 FRE score of 42.47.  
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An FRE score of 10.46 is probably a more accurate reading.112 Again, a wider 
comparison against the average GST Act provisions confirms these provisions are 
still some of the most readable provisions of the GST Act. However, an FRE score 
of 10.46 is still very low and shows little improvement since the 1992 Tan & Tower 
study. 
Table 4.9: 2010 Word97 vs Online Tool – Average Readability of GST Act 
 Flesch Reading 
Ease (FRE) 
Words per 
Sentence (WPS) 
Syllables per 
Word (SPW) 
GST Act 
Words 
per 
Section 
Sentences 
per 
Section 
Paras 
per 
Section FRE STD WPS STD* SPW STD* 
Online tool 511.73 5.13 17.37 -25.08 62.88 99.53 61.09 1.54 0.12 
Word97 510.93 5.13 17.37 34.91 18.66 37.58 15.78 NA NA 
* STD is the standard deviation. 
Canada 
The Canadian picture is not dissimilar to New Zealand prior to reform (see Table 
4.10 below). The total average FRE score is -69.56 (deemed to be zero).113 Similar to 
the old New Zealand change-in-use rule, the provisions have very high words-per-
sentence cores (ranging from 75 to 265). Generally, readability is extremely poor 
across all the Canadian provisions (especially ss 196.1 and 207). Yet, despite the 
poor average readability, the volume of litigation is relatively low. 
A comparison between the legislative provisions associated with the two approaches 
of apportionment of non-capital and real property (ss 141, 169, 172, 196.1, 206, 207, 
208) and adjustment of capital property (ss 141.01, 196, 199, and 200), while 
removing any provisions that are used by both approaches (s 197), provides a more 
interesting picture. The apportionment provisions have much higher average words-
per-sentence (WPS) scores than the adjustment provisions (158.11 vs 83.12) and 
poorer average FRE scores (-94.74 vs -19.13). This would suggest a higher degree of 
                                               
112
 Word97 provides an FRE score of 42.47. The difficulty with the Word97 FRE score is that the WPS 
score (as discussed above) does not match the raw data. If Word97 is using the WPS score of 37.58, it 
may well be undermining the FRE score it delivers. For this reason the online FRE score of 10.46 is 
preferred, unless making comparisons to the Richardson & Smith study. 
113
 The Word97 FRE score is 20.62.  
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complexity in applying the apportionment rules, and one would correspondingly 
expect greater litigation activity for these rules. However, the fact there is no major 
difference in litigation activity between the two approaches might suggest that 
apportionment approach is better than the adjustment approach. 
Table 4.10: 2010 Canadian Change-in-Use Provisions – Average Readability 
 Online Tool Word97 
Sections Words Paras SPS WPS Syllables SPW FRE MS-
FRE 
MS-
Words 
MW-
WPS 
197 165 6 1 165 256 1.55 -91.9 0 165 92 
Apportionment provisions 
141 447 7 5 89.4 696 1.56 -15.6 0 447 79.2 
169 1128 29 10 112.8 1759 1.56 -39.6 27.7 1119 45.3 
172 338 9 3 129.3 651 1.68 -66.4 45.7 387 23.6 
196.1 265 7 1 265 438 1.65 -202 53.1 265 16 
206 690 24 5 138 135 1.64 -72.4 41.4 688 34 
207 473 15 2 236.5 821 1.74 -180.1 42.3 472 36.5 
208 543 15 4 135.75 1002 1.85 -87.1 0 542 60 
Average 554.86 15.14 4.28 158.11 786 1.67 -94.74 30 560 42.08 
Adjustment provisions 
141.01 1145 39 14 81.79 1791 1.56 -8.5 32.8 1141 35.3 
196 150 2 2 75 261 1.74 -16.5 0 150 75 
199 466 11 5 93.2 813 1.74 -35.4 8.9 466 51.8 
200 660 17 8 82.5 1086 1.65 -16.1 20.6 655 51.7 
Average 605.25 17.25 7.25 83.12 987.75 1.67 -19.13 15.58 603 53.45 
All Provisions 
Average 539.17 15.08 5 133.69 809.08 1.66 -69.30 22.71 541.42 50.03 
 
Comparing the main apportionment provision for non-capital and real property (s 
169) against the main adjustment provisions for capital property (ss 199 and 200), it 
appears there is no substantial difference in the WPS scores (1128 words vs 466 + 
660 words) or FRE scores (-39.6 vs -35.4). Taking into consideration the poor 
readability and the relatively low litigation history, it would appear that the success 
of Canada’s change-in-use provisions must be due to other factors. The invariable 
conclusion (in the absence of low audit activity) is that the Canadian GST legislation 
has been able to draw upon earlier experiences in other areas of law (eg, income tax 
law). While this appears to account for the low litigation rate, it still does not 
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mitigate what must be high compliance costs for taxpayers in terms of reading and 
understanding the law.  
F. Analysis 
Sentence Length 
The Working Party on the Reorganisation of the Income Tax Act 1976 identified an 
average of 30 words per sentence as a benchmark to guide the rewrite process.114 
Kongold also suggests that the length and complexity of many legislative sentences 
provides an unnecessary challenge for readers.115 Legislative sentences that are long 
tend to contain too many elements (ie, ideas, actions, or exemptions) for a reader to 
absorb.116 After two or three ideas the reader needs to pause and digest what has 
been said. According to Kongold,117 “every modern authority on legislative drafting 
condemns long sentences, even if they are accurate and grammatical”.  
Subsequent studies have returned varying average scores (see Table 4.11 below). 
Only the Australian GST Act (according to the Richardson & Sawyer study) and to a 
lesser extent the New Zealand Income Tax Act (according to the Pau et al and Saw 
& Sawyer study) meet the Working Party guidelines. The New Zealand GST Act 
appears to lag behind the New Zealand Income Tax Act 2007 and Australian GST 
Act.  
However, the New Zealand change-in-use provisions (see Table 4.12 below) indicate 
that since their revision (and codification) average sentence length has been within 
the Working Party guidelines. While the study confirms Australia is also within the 
                                               
114
 Working Party on the Reorganisation of the Income Tax Act 1976 Second Report of the Working 
Party (Wellington, September 1993), Chapter 7. 
115
 S Krongold “Writing Laws: Making The Easier to Understand” (1992) 24 Ottawa Law Review 495 at 
514. See also G Thornton Legislative Drafting (3rd ed, Butterworths, Toronto, 1987). Both authors 
discuss elements of good legislative drafting (eg, language, structure, and typography). Their 
suggestions are ones that drafters would be wise to accommodate. It would appear the Australian GST 
legislation has taken them on board. 
116
 VR Charrow and MK Erhardt Clear and Effective Legal Writing (Little, Brown and Co, Boston, 
1986) 96-97. 
117
 S Krongold “Writing Laws: Making The Easier to Understand” (1992) 24 Ottawa Law Review 495 
at 515. See also EA Dreidger A Manual of Instructions for Legislative and Legal Writing (Ottawa, 
1982) 556-557.  
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Working Party guidelines, this 2010 study has produced markedly higher average 
sentence lengths than recorded in the 2002 Richardson & Smith study.  
Table 4.11: Comparison of Empirical Studies – Average Word FRE and WPS Scores 
 2010  
Thesis 
(GSTA 1985) 
2010  
S&S  
(ITA 2007) 
2007  
PM&S  
(ITA 2004) 
2002  
R&S  
(ITA 2004) 
2002  
R&S  
(GST 2002) 
1992  
T&T  
(GSTA 1985) 
FRE  34.91 42.77 ** 41.7 * 16.11 40.3 0 
WPS 37.58 25.03 ** 34 * 43 20.9 128.11 
* Scores based on Word 2003. ** Scores based on Word2007. All others based on Word97. 
As illustrated above, the discrepancy in data is probably due to the Richardson & 
Smith study not including all the Division 129 provisions. When a true comparison 
is made by only comparing those provisions measured by Richardson & Smith, this 
study returned a WPS score of 20.8 (and FRE score 34.48), which is very similar to 
the scores returned by the Richardson & Smith study. The Canadian and old New 
Zealand GST change-in-use rules provisions on the other hand provide sentence 
lengths that are substantially higher than the Working Party guidelines. 
Not only does the Australian GST legislation have the lowest number of words-per-
sentence (WPS), but it also has the lowest average number of sentences-per-section 
(SPS).118 This observation, in conjunction with the average number of paragraphs 
and words per section, provides an interesting picture of the structure of the 
Australian GST Act.  
In contrast, both the Canadian and New Zealand GST Acts have markedly longer 
sections in terms of total words and number of paragraphs. The New Zealand and 
Canadian GST Acts would also appear to use substantially more paragraphs than the 
Australian GST Act, probably to break up elements of a provision. The Australian 
approach would appear to separate elements into separate provisions. As Kongold 
points out, a section with too many subsections is difficult to read and understand.119 
                                               
118
 This probably accounts for its high volume of provisions. 
119
 S Krongold “Writing Laws: Making The Easier to Understand” (1992) 24 Ottawa Law Review 495 
at 510. 
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The presence of a high number of paragraphs in the New Zealand and Canadian GST 
Acts would also appear to suggest that they are overly complex.  
Table 4.12: Comparison of Change-in-Use Provisions – Average FRE and WPS 
Scores 
 Online Tool Word97 
Sections Words Paras SPS WPS Syllables SPW FRE * MS-
FRE 
MS-
Words 
MS-
WPS 
NZ (Old) 1611 27 8 201.38 2345 1.46 -120.7 0 1608 81.5 
NZ (Revised) 224 8.36 3.36 61.32 32.54 1.49 11.48 41.83 223.6 28.6 
NZ (New) 258.55 11.11 4.33 63.55 400.33 1.56 10.46 42.47 254.33 25.4 
Canada 557.45 15.64 5.18 134.09 823.45 1.66 -69.56 20.62 555.45 54.15 
Australia 135.36 6.36 2.93 55.47 222.79 1.64 18.81 28.89 133.00 26.96 
Benchmarks           
2002 R&S study        32.75  19.2 
2010 GST study        34.91  37.58 
 
Syllable scores 
Tan & Tower found that the New Zealand GST Act (based on a small sample of 
GST provisions) returned a syllable-per-word (SPW) score of 1.56 to 1.57 (with a 
standard deviation of 0.08 to 0.09). This study (based on data returned from the 
Online tool) confirmed those original syllable scores from the provisions tested by 
Tan & Tower. This study found that the New Zealand GST Act had an average SPW 
score of 1.54 (with a standard deviation of 0.12).120 It also identified that the average 
SPW scores (see Table 4.12 above) for the respective change-in-use provisions have 
been increasing since the New Zealand GST Act was first enacted (from 1.46 to 
1.56). It would appear words are getting bigger. Technically (all other elements 
remaining constant) this should result in a poor FRE score. However, the reverse is 
evident and is due principally to the marked reduction in the total words-per-section. 
In comparison, both the Australian and Canadian change-in-use provisions have 
higher syllable scores.  
                                               
120
 The difference (albeit surprisingly marginal) can be attributable to a larger data sample, thus 
providing a more accurate score. Moreover, the Tan & Tower scores fall within the standard 
deviations of this study.  
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Flesch scores 
The New Zealand GST Act returned an average (Word97) FRE score that was only 
slightly higher than the average score returned in the Richardson & Smith study (see 
Table 4.12 above). This result appears to suggest the New Zealand GST Act is 
slightly better drafted than the Australian GST Act. Moreover, the revised (and new) 
New Zealand change-in-use provisions appeared to return an average FRE score 
higher than the average for both the New Zealand and Australian GST Acts. 
However, not surprisingly, both the old New Zealand and current Canadian change-
in-use provisions returned poorer FRE scores. The similarity in (Word97) FRE 
scores is somewhat surprising, especially given the significant disparity in the total 
amount of words that appear in the respective provisions.  
This unexpected result would appear to be due to the manner in which Word97 
returns equally surprising low word-per-sentence scores (in complete incongruence 
to actual word and sentence scores). Accordingly, it is submitted a more accurate 
picture of comparative FRE scores is obtained from the data generated from the 
Online tool.  
As Table 4.12 illustrates, the Australian change-in-use provisions provide a FRE 
score nearly twice as good as the revised (and new) New Zealand change-in-use 
provisions, and no doubt a larger gap would appear between the Act averages, if the 
Australian data had used the online tool, rather than Word97. Similarly, a much 
larger gap appears between the old New Zealand change-in-use provisions and 
Canadian change-in-use provisions, compared to the Australia provisions.  
Alternative measures of complexity 
Redish & Selzer121 suggest that readability formulae are inadequate measures of how 
difficult technical material is to read on the grounds that readability formulae do not 
take into account the content, organisation and layout of reading material. The Flesch 
Reading Ease (FRE) index is itself based only on two elements: words-per-sentence 
                                               
121
 J Redish and J Selzer “The Place of Readability Formulas in Technical Communication” (1985) 32 
Technical Communication 46, cited in A Sawyer “New Zealand’s Tax Rewrite Program – In Pursuit 
of the (Elusive) Goal of Simplicity” (2007) British Tax Review 405 at 419. Document available at: 
<www.rbainformationdesign.com.au/Readability¨Formulas.pdf> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
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(eg, sentence length) and syllables-per-word (eg, word length). FRE fails to take into 
account structure (eg, the use of paragraphs to break up content), the use of diagrams 
and flowcharts, or the total number of words in a provision (eg, some provisions 
contain over 1,000 words in some instances, which would tend to suggest the 
existence of too many ideas or exceptions being communicated). Equally, syllable 
scores do not necessarily reflect word complexity or topic complexity. Some words 
may have complex definitions that are not factored in to the overall score. Nor does 
it indicate the unique drafting features of legislation (eg, the use of double negatives 
or the use of exemptions from exemptions). However, Pau et al, has suggested that 
the FRE scores do provide an important and comparable measure of the readability 
of tax materials and should not be ignored. Moreover, Richardson & Sawyer have 
suggested that FRE scores should be considered in conjunction with other measures 
of readability, by way of triangulation of results, to corroborating research findings 
and recommendations.  
It is submitted that the use of alternative readability formulae and other structural 
measures (eg, instances of defined terms, exceptions, and external references) do 
provide a degree of triangulation recommended by Richardson & Sawyer. The 
variations in FRE scores are to a degree reflective of syllable scores. Substituting 
syllables for another measure of word complexity might provide more stable 
comparisons and better reflect complexity.  
In this regard, C-Fog and SMOG (which compute only words with 3 or more 
syllables as complex, rather than compute all syllables) and C-Liau, and ARI (which 
measure word length in terms of characters, rather than syllables) are good 
candidates. The aforementioned indexes provide a measure of readability similar to 
the F-KGL score (eg, years of educational level), so the lower the score the more 
readable the provision.122 As illustrated in Table 4.13 below, the alternative 
readability indexes to F-KGL, do provide less variability and more compressed 
scores (although ARI appears to return higher scores than F-KGL). 
                                               
122
 It is acknowledged that these measures suffer the same inability to accommodate the unique drafting 
features of legislation. 
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Applying F-KGL G-Fog, and SMOG, the Australian change-in-use provisions return 
the lower scores (ie, are more readable) than any other jurisdiction. It is equally 
noticeable that Canada scores comparatively quite high in G-Fog, which would 
appear to suggest the legislation uses more words comprising three syllables, than 
any other jurisdiction. However, the difference between the jurisdictions is less 
pronounced using measures that compute word complexity in terms of character 
length (ie, C-Liau). In fact it would appear that New Zealand’s revised (and new), 
change-in-use rules use shorter words (measured in character length) than any other 
jurisdiction. However, while New Zealand’s change-in-use rules appear to be 
heading in the right direction (no doubt due to more recent versions being written), 
the remainder of the GST Act has not performed so well (see Appendix 1). 
Table 4.13: Alternative Readability Scores for Change-in-Use Provisions 
Sections FRE F-KGL G-Fog SMOG C-Liau ARI MS FRE 
Canada        
141 -15.6 37.6 42.7 22.6 11.3 44.9 0 
141.01 -8.5 34.8 38.7 20.5 11 40.9 32.8 
169 -39.6 46.8 51.1 24.2 10.4 55.9 27.7 
196 -16.5 34.2 37.7 21.8 12.3 38.5 0 
196.1 -202 107.3 114.8 43.5 11.8 133.1 53.1 
197 -91.9 67.1 74.2 33.4 7.9 80 0 
199 -35.4 41.3 47.5 28.4 12.7 48 8.9 
200 -16.1 36 41.5 24.9 11.1 41.4 20.6 
206 -72.4 57.6 63.4 30.9 11.7 69.9 41.4 
207 -180.1 97.1 103.2 41.2 11.2 118.4 42.3 
208 -87.1 59.1 64.5 34.1 12.5 69 0 
Australia        
129~1 46.6 13.1 14.9 10.1 11.1 12.8 42.7 
129~5 7.7 23.2 26.3 19 13.1 23.9 30.2 
129~10 19 20.3 22.8 16.3 11.6 20 11.2 
129~15 24.6 18.8 21.1 16.3 12.5 19.2 9.3 
129~20 -9.2 32.7 37.8 24.2 9.4 35.3 17 
129~25 -4.4 32.3 37.4 22.7 9.6 36 30 
129~40 41.2 13.5 17.3 13.2 12.2 13 42.8 
129~45 3.5 27.8 31.1 19.3 9.2 28.9 23.5 
129~50 37.3 17.2 19 12.9 10.1 17.6 47 
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129~55 41 16.5 18.8 11.6 10 17.2 60.7 
129~70 -50 51.3 55.4 24.3 9.4 61.2 36.1 
129~75 49.3 50.9 55.1 24.3 9.6 60.9 36.1 
129~80 21.3 24.4 24.9 14.1 7.3 25.6 0 
129~90 35.4 13.4 18 13.5 12.6 11.6 17.9 
New Zealand        
Old        
21 -120.7 80.1 85.5 26.7 9.6 9.6 0 
Revised        
21 -29.8 45.3 47.9 19.2 8.5 54.1 31.5 
21A  25.6 19 21.4 14.9 13 20.5 38.6 
21B  20.6 24.2 28 16.3 11.2 28 3.8 
21C  36.8 18.5 22 13.8 10 20.1 50.3 
21CB  -5.2 36.1 38.3 16.3 10.3 44 66.1 
21D  -12.4 37.3 40.9 19.9 10.5 44.6 31 
21E  8.2 31.6 34.5 14.7 8.4 37.1 52.1 
21F  30.5 23.4 26 12.9 9.2 27.6 68.7 
21G  38.1 18.5 22.1 13.9 9.2 19.8 42.1 
21H  11.2 27.1 28.8 17 9.8 30.1 38 
21I  2.7 32.2 35.4 17.2 8.7 37 38 
New        
21 22.3 23.1 28.2 18 10.9 26 30.8 
21A -7.5 32.4 37.4 22.9 11.9 37.2 35.9 
21B 29.5 22.1 22.5 14.1 9 24.5 57.3 
21C -21.8 40.9 46.9 24.3 11.4 49.8 50.6 
21D 7.5 26.6 31.7 20.1 10.8 28.9 48.1 
21E 26.4 21.8 24.5 14.2 9.2 23.2 46.3 
21F 8.4 26.7 30.1 18.7 11.1 29.4 44.5 
21G -0.1 31.8 36.6 20.9 10 36.5 29.9 
21H 29.5 22.8 25.3 13.2 7.9 25 38.9 
 
In response to the apparent weakness of the FRE index a series of other measures 
were captured (see Table 4.14 below), that included: the total number of instances 
that a defined term, exception, proviso (or exception), paragraph, and external 
legislative reference, appeared in a provision, together with the total word count of 
each provision. These measures, together with readability, provide a much clearer 
picture of the structural complexity of the change-in-use provisions.  
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Table 4.14: Structural Complexity for Change-in-Use Provisions 
Sections Words Paras Sentence WPS Defins Proviso External Refs 
Canada        
141 447 7 5 89.4 50 0 0 
141.01 1145 39 14 81.79 114 0 2 
169 1128 29 10 112.8 123 0 14 
196 150 2 2 75 19 0 0 
196.1 265 7 1 265 43 0 0 
197 165 6 1 165 19 0 10 
199 466 11 5 93.2 63 1 4 
200 660 17 8 82.5 97 3 6 
206 690 24 5 138 92 2 1 
207 473 15 2 236.5 59 2 2 
208 543 15 4 135.75 78 0 0 
New Zealand        
Old    201.38    
21 1611 27 8  149 4 31 
Revised        
21 561 15 5 112.2 53 3 9 
21A  113 6 3 37.67 10 0 0 
21B  167 5 3 55.67 19 0 2 
21C  167 7 4 41.75 25 0 1 
21CB  89 3 1 89 0 0 3 
21D  90 3 1 90 16 0 3 
21E  313 16 4 78.25 46 0 9 
21F  116 4 2 58 22 1 2 
21G  212 7 5 42.4 23 2 5 
21H  248 13 4 62 23 1 7 
21I  388 13 5 7.6 25 1 17 
New        
21 261 10 5 52.2 24 1 17 
21A 73 4 1 73 11 0 1 
21B 209 12 4 52.25 23 1 5 
21C 99 5 1 99 16 0 1 
21D 174 8 3 58 16 0 3 
21E 444 18 9 49.33 32 1 2 
21F 176 10 3 58.67 14 0 1 
21G 671 27 9 74.56 66 2 24 
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21H 220 6 4 55 15 1 7 
Australia        
129~1 51 1 2 25.5 0 0 1 
129~5 89 8 2 44.5 8 1 0 
129~10 117 5 3 39 5 0 2 
129~15 36 1 1 36 1 0 1 
129~20 366 15 5 73.2 2  4 
129~25 223 15 3 74.33 4 2 4 
129~40 338 15 14 24.14 23 0 2 
129~45 182 7 3 60.67 7 2 2 
129~50 110 5 3 36.67 10 1 0 
129~55 36 4 1 36 0 0 0 
129~70 125 5 1 125 5 0 3 
129~75 124 5 1 124 5 0 4 
129~80 57 1 1 57 1 0 6 
129~90 41 2 1 20.5 2 0 1 
 
Immediately evident is the striking similarity in structure between the Canadian 
provisions (s 169) and original New Zealand provision (s 21) — both the worst 
provisions in terms of highest total words, words-per-sentence, number of 
paragraphs, instances of defined terms, and external references, to other provisions. 
Yet surprisingly, the Canadian provision advocates an apportionment approach and 
the New Zealand provision a threshold adjustment approach. However, it is 
noticeable how much the New Zealand provision has improved after revision in 
2000. It is also striking to see the similarity between the Canadian and New Zealand 
drafting style in terms of the usage of definitions, which add another layer of 
complexity to understanding the meaning of a provision. In contrast, the Australian 
provisions (which adopt an apportionment approach) have low definition and 
external reference scores.  
It is also noticeable that New Zealand's revised adjustment rules are much longer 
than Australia’s apportionment rules. From the discussion above, shorter simpler 
rules are preferred from a complexity and compliance perspective. However, in 
comparison to Australia, New Zealand’s former rules (and especially the 
measurement rules) are more detailed, run over several sections, and comprise many 
more words. It would appear that comparatively, New Zealand’s revised adjustment 
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rules are from a legislative perspective, much more complex than Australia’s 
apportionment rules.  
G. Conclusion 
It would appear from the empirical evidence that any technical or structural 
complexity in the change-in-use provisions does not explain the different outcomes 
in the respective jurisdictions. Canada received very poor readability scores and 
appears to have poorly structured provisions, yet its litigation activity is similar to 
Australia, whose readability scores are markedly better. Only New Zealand’s 
original change-in-use provisions received readability scores that would appear to 
indicate a significant correlation between poor readability and high compliance costs 
(eg, high litigation activity) — although the New Zealand experience could equally 
be attributable to the underlying policy (ie, the use of a threshold adjustment 
approach, rather than apportionment). This later observation is even more perplexing 
when one considers that the worst performing Canadian provision advocates an 
apportionment approach, and the New Zealand provision, a threshold adjustment 
approach. Yet, it is the New Zealand provision that has significantly more litigation 
activity in relation to change-in-use.  
One is left to conclude that tax complexity may not have a significant correlation to 
legislative complexity for the change-in-use provisions, which would appear to 
suggest that tax complexity and consequential compliance costs might be more 
related to the underlying policy (ie, apportionment versus threshold adjustment 
approach). If this is the case, then the empirical data would appear to suggest that 
those jurisdictions that have used an apportionment approach tend to have lower 
litigation activity and therefore lower compliance costs, than those jurisdictions that 
have not.  
The evidence also suggests that the expression of New Zealand’s revised adjustment 
rules are longer and more complex than Australia’s (and New Zealand’s new) 
apportionment rules, which are shorter and easier to understand. The fact that the 
threshold adjustment policy approach requires lengthy expression in both in New 
Zealand and Canadian legislation suggests that from a certainty and compliance cost 
perspective, the apportionment rules should be preferred.  
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While the introduction of the new apportionment rules may improve compliance 
costs for small and medium businesses, there remains a concern that the new 
provisions need to be further simplified to avoid any erosion of compliance cost 
gains. Submissions on the Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill 2010 
(proposing the introduction of the apportionment rules) observed that “a number of 
new provisions are overly complex with ambiguity surrounding key terms and 
formulae. The legislative drafting, in our view, needs to be further simplified.”123  
The empirical research of this study confirms the view that little has changed in 
terms of legislative complexity (and readability) between the New Zealand revised 
adjustment rules and the new apportionment rules. While, there has been a 
substantial improvement since the enactment of the original change-in-use provision, 
there is still room for substantial improvement, in both the change-in-use rules and in 
the wider GST Act. 
Finally, this study provides empirical evidence that generally, New Zealand’s GST 
provisions are overly complex in comparison to New Zealand’s own income tax 
legislation and in comparison to Australia’s GST Act. As the evidence illustrates, 
New Zealand’s GST legislation (like the former New Zealand Income Tax Act 
1976), is far from simple. The length of some provisions suggests a higher level of 
complexity than the readability scores might suggest. Many GST provisions are 
long, complex, and difficult to read. This conclusion is not dissimilar to that reached 
by the Valabh Committee (1992) when recommending that New Zealand’s income 
tax legislation should be rewritten.  
On the basis of the empirical evidence of this study the New Zealand GST Act 
would appear to fulfil the Valabh Committee’s criteria for rewriting. Furthermore, 
the recent observations about the quality of drafting in the GST Act by Blanchard J 
                                               
123
 KPMG Submissions on the Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill (9 September 2010) 2. 
Document available at <www.parliament.nz/en-
NZ/PB/SC/Documents/Evidence/?Custom=00DBHOH_BILL10121_1> (viewed 20 March 2011). 
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in his extra-judicial writing124 and in the Contract Pacific case in the New Zealand 
Supreme Court must also add weight to a general call to rewrite the GST Act.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
124
 P Blanchard “Some Basic Concepts of New Zealand GST” in R Krever and D White (eds) GST in 
Retrospect and Prospect (Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2007) 91 at 92. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
“Our tax system, like that of many other countries, depends essentially on the central strategy 
of voluntary compliance. Accordingly it is necessary to consider and balance the objectives 
of certainty, economic efficiency, and acceptability.” ~ Sir Ivor Richardson 1 
A. Evaluating the Performance of the New Zealand Adjustment Approach 
It is clear from the empirical evidence that the former New Zealand adjustment rules 
have failed the tests of good tax design. Generally, the adjustment rules have 
provided a high degree of uncertainty (before and after Lundy), which has 
manifested itself in a high degree of litigation. The former New Zealand adjustment 
rules were inefficient and did not measure accurately non-taxable use or reduce 
compliance costs by actively reducing further adjustments. 
Administrative Simplicity  
A tax rule should be simple and inexpensive for taxpayers to comply with and for the 
revenue authority to administer and enforce. This has not been the case with the 
former New Zealand adjustment rules, which have resulted in high litigation activity 
over a prolonged period of time. The adjustment rules have inherently high 
compliance costs by requiring subsequent adjustments to occur to correct the over-
payment of full initial input tax credits where purposes were initially mixed. In 
contrast, the apportionment rules provide mechanisms to reduce compliance cost in 
not only reducing the need for subsequent adjustments, but also in reducing the 
number of adjustments that have to be tracked. Furthermore, New Zealand’s 
adoption of an alternative EUL method in the application of apportionment rules 
appears to have responded to concerns raised by larger organisations that greater 
alignment with income tax reporting methods would aid in further reducing existing 
compliance costs.  
 
 
                                               
1
  ILM Richardson “Launch of Journals by Sir Ivor Richardson” (1995) 1 New Zealand Journal of 
Taxation Law and Policy 196 at 197. 
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Coherence 
Prior to the Court of Appeal decision in Lundy, New Zealand’s former adjustment 
rules were disconnected from the underlying policy intent of the legislation and 
allowed adjustments to exceed the initial input tax credits when using periodic 
taxable periods to account for adjustments. The disconnection between the initial 
supply and subsequent adjustments also illustrated that the supply rules were unable 
to provide the policy outcomes that they were being put under strain to achieve. 
These factors demonstrate that the adjustment rules provide poor coherence. 
On a broader level, the apportionment approach offers greater symmetry and 
consistency with income tax law than the former adjustment approach. The new 
apportionment approach has removed a complicated layer of rules (eg “principal 
purpose” and a deemed supply mechanism) that does not exist in income tax law, 
and aligns business and accounting practices (eg, the availability of EUL) with 
income tax rules. 
Efficiency 
An adjustment approach does not reflect actual non-taxable use until after a deemed 
adjustment has been made. In contrast, an apportionment approach provides the 
opportunity for more accurate accounting of non-taxable use, thus minimising the 
economic distortions of the change-in-use rules. The former New Zealand 
adjustment rules have also required extensive investment in litigation activity. In 
contrast, the apportionment approach has widely experienced minimal litigation 
activity, with most cases dealing with questions of fact, rather than law.  
New Zealand’s former adjustment rules were unique and their model of operation 
has not been adopted in any other jurisdiction. This seriously limits the ability to 
learn from and possibly follow legal precedents from other jurisdictions. In contrast, 
the apportionment approach is simpler and more widely understood and will allow 
for greater harmonisation of rules with New Zealand’s major trading partners.  
 
 
 217 
Equity and Fairness 
New Zealand’s former adjustment rules were not transparent, were poorly 
understood, and consequently resulted in a high level of litigation over a prolonged 
period of time. Judicial confusion in the interpretation of the rules also resulted in 
subsequent cases returning different outcomes for participants over an extended 
period of time (as the interpretation of the rules has evolved) and on appeal. The 
disconnection between the initial acquisition and subsequent adjustments, as well as 
the indefinite nature of adjustments, also resulted in taxpayers potentially remitting 
more tax than initially claimed. In contrast, the apportionment rules tend to 
experience lower levels of litigation activity and more accurately measure (in a more 
timely fashion) non-taxable supplies. 
Predictability  
The former New Zealand adjustment rules have not been certain or predictable. The 
judiciary has struggled to agree on how the rules operate or how adjustments should 
be calculated. Key elements of the rules have gradually changed over time (eg the 
principal purpose test shifting from a “more than half” to a “less than half” test). 
Equally, the courts (and taxpayers) have had to resort to “rough and ready” 
methodologies to provide statutorily required outcomes. In contrast, the Australian 
and Canadian apportionment rules provide easily measurable outcomes that can be 
more readily predicted. For this reason, these apportionment rules have not required 
the amount of litigation activity that has haunted the former New Zealand adjustment 
rules. 
Revenue Integrity 
While officials have regularly stated that the reform proposals are revenue neutral, 
the New Zealand adjustment rules provided a full input tax credit up-front that only 
took account of non-taxable activity in the subsequent period. This timing difference 
provided taxpayers an initial financial windfall and corresponding revenue gap. In 
contrast, the apportionment rules more accurately account for non-taxable activity 
and more effectively protect the tax base from over-payment of input tax credits.  
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Visibility  
The New Zealand former adjustment rules have not been understood by taxpayers, 
tax advisors, or the courts, and have been considered complex and confusing. 
Revenue authority guidance has been minimal or lacking in sufficient detail. There 
has been judicial disagreement arising early in the consideration of the New Zealand 
rules. Furthermore, the guidance that has been provided has gradually degraded from 
binding rulings to just interpretation statements and has diminished taxpayer 
certainty in interpreting and applying the adjustment rules. The readability of the 
original adjustment rules was also poor and while readability has improved in 
subsequent revisions, it is still well below the readability of the New Zealand Income 
Tax Act 2007 or the equivalent provisions in the Australian GST Act. 
B. The Adjustment Approach Experience 
Lessons from New Zealand 
If there is one central lesson from the New Zealand experience it is that the 
mechanics of the former adjustment rules were not clearly articulated by tax 
policymakers, leaving it to taxpayers, tax advisers, and the judiciary to struggle to 
formulate a workable model from the statutory language. Clearly, the underlying 
policy intent was to ensure that the GST Act provided a mechanism of adjustments 
that ensured the taxpayer paid no more or no less than they were obliged to (allowing 
for the obvious timing issues that the GST Act is premised upon). The New Zealand 
approach did utilise existing supply rules by creating a deemed supply, but, this 
created inherent problems. The existing supply rules had never contemplated the 
repetitive nature of a deemed supply which was required for change-in-use purposes, 
and the inevitable and indefinite recalculation of the same fictional supply. 
Protracted litigation was inevitable. 
Assuming that a decision to use an adjustment approach is optimal, the change-in-
use rules should have maintained a more than half approach that allowed for only 
one purpose (that being the principal purpose). Such an approach would have 
removed the opportunity for repetitive supplies and instead have provided a one-off 
adjustment process that merely asked the question whether the principal purpose had 
been abandoned or not. Effectively, the one-purpose model approach applied in 
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Canada — a model that appears to produce far less litigation activity than in New 
Zealand.  
Unfortunately, the New Zealand courts (in the absence of adequate guidance from 
tax policymakers and the tax administration) over a course of time embarked on a 
journey that would create an adjustment mechanism that was not only unique in the 
world, but disconnected adjustments from the initial (real) supply. The judges thus 
created an adjustment mechanism that could not have been contemplated by 
Parliament. It took 19 years before the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Lundy had 
an opportunity to attempt to fix the downstream effects of the judiciary’s 
interpretation of the adjustment rules and to contain the potential for indefinite 
adjustments that would out-strip the original input tax credit.  
However, while the Court of Appeal was able to resolve this problem and cap the 
number of adjustments,2 the New Zealand GST was still exposed to apportionment 
problems arising from the concurrent purpose model the courts had developed, and 
which it could only resolve from applying a “rough and ready” approach to 
apportionment. The fact that remedial legislation was enacted to plaster over the 
inherent problems of a concurrent purpose model, by statutorily allowing one-off 
adjustments, acknowledged the strain that the existing rules were under.  
It has been suggested, that New Zealand did not have to abandon the adjustment 
approach (or principal purpose test), and that what was required to address the 
disconnection between the initial input tax credit and adjustments was the 
introduction of the adjustment capping mechanism applied in the Australian 
apportionment rules.3 There are several problems with this suggestion. First, the 
Australian adjustment mechanism would not necessarily have prevented the 
possibility of adjustments still exceeding initial input tax credits (especially in 
circumstances where assets substantial increase in value over short durations).  
                                               
2
  One-off adjustments were statutorily provided for in the 2000 reforms. Effectively, this merely 
codified what the Courts had already allowed.  
3
  PricewaterhouseCoopers Submissions on the Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Bill 2010 
(undated, considered on 15 September 2010). Document available at 
<www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/65E97BA6-4B22-409D-ADF7-
0F26C2ABE70C/159164/49SCFE_EVI_00DBHOH_BILL10121_1_A67947_Pricewaterho.pdf> 
(viewed 20 March 2011). 
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Second, the suggestion also overlooks the fact that the GST supply mechanism (via 
deeming) was being asked to do something that it was not designed to do (and as the 
evidence suggests, failed to do very well). The fact the Court of Appeal were called 
upon to correct, not only the disconnection between the initial acquisition and 
adjustment, but also the disconnection between the underlying policy and the 
statutory rules themselves, suggests that further manipulation at the fringes would 
only invite further litigation. It would not have addressed the inherent problems that 
the New Zealand adjustment approach had. It is also evident that not everyone was 
convinced by the Court of Appeals reasoning n Lundy.4 Taking a long term 
perspective, it seems eminently more sensible to look towards a more stable set of 
rules (that also provides opportunities for harmonisation with the rules in Australia 
and elsewhere), than continuing on with an approach that was still open to dispute 
and on-going maintenance.  
The empirical evidence shows that the New Zealand adjustment rules were complex 
and confusing. This view has been expressed by commentators, who made repeated 
submissions on the GST Act in its infancy and during subsequent reviews and 
reform initiatives. There has been substantial judicial consideration of the rules over 
a very long time. In some instances, the New Zealand judges have developed 
divergent interpretations, or have attempted to distinguish their interpretations from 
earlier interpretations,5 leading to difficult problems for appeal courts. The volume 
of New Zealand litigation was also quite high as a proportion of GST cases that 
appeared before the New Zealand courts, and compared to Australia and Canada.  
The empirical data has also suggested that those jurisdictions that have used an 
apportionment approach tend to have lower litigation activity and therefore lower 
compliance costs than New Zealand had with its former adjustment rules. 
 
                                               
4
  Based on anecdotal conversations with officials and commentators. 
5
  Judge Willy’s attempt in Case U49 (2000) 19 NZTC 9,429 (TRA), and successfully appealed in 
CIR v Carswell Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,149 (HC), could well be described as judicial 
dissention and a flawed attempt to distinguish itself from binding precedent. 
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Lessons from Canada 
As noted above, Canada appears to have adopted a different approach to adjustments 
than the rules applied in New Zealand. While the Canadian rules are more 
prescriptive than New Zealand’s former adjustment rules, they are also far more 
liberal. For example, Canada’s de minimis tests are not financially capped. However, 
this might also be due to the lower rate of GST (ie, less revenue at risk).  
An inherent problem of the Canadian adjustment approach (ie, a one-purpose model) 
is the amount of revenue applied for non-taxable purposes that is not immediately 
accounted for. Essentially, this is a timing issue. In Canada, the GST rate is much 
lower, so the revenue gap is relatively smaller. However, New Zealand’s rate of GST 
is much higher and exposure to this potential revenue risk appears to have been 
reduced by adopting a “less than half” approach to principal purpose so that 
subsequent adjustments would be larger and clawed back earlier (ie, before the 50 
per cent threshold is met). Furthermore, while the GST Act ensures that the revenue 
will eventually be recaptured at some later time, there is always the possibility that in 
the absence of appropriate avoidance measures, that the revenue for non-taxable 
supplies will never be returned (eg, through phoenix entities). However, recent 
reforms in New Zealand have addressed some of these concerns.6 
While New Zealand policy makers and revenue authority officials might emphasise 
that their major concerns have been compliance, it is equally apparent that the rules 
have also developed in response to revenue concerns. This is evident not only in the 
Crown’s arguments made to the New Zealand courts (that appear to focus on 
clawing back non-taxable use as soon as possible), but also in the design choices 
made in the new apportionment rules (that sometimes adopt Crown positions argued 
in court) and in a general refusal to provide more liberal de minimis rules during 
recent reform discussions. 
The empirical evidence shows that the Canadian adjustment rules are easier to 
understand and comply with. The amount of litigation is very low in comparison to 
                                               
6
  Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Act 2010 has introduced new rules intended to address 
phoenix entity in relation to land transacitons. For a recent outline of key features see Tax 
Information Bulletin Vol 23:1 (February 2011) 33-42.  
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both the apportionment approach used in Canada and Australia, and also compared 
to the total amount of GST litigation in Canada. This is more surprising when the 
poor readability of the Canadian adjustment provisions is taken into account. One 
possible explanation for such low levels of Canadian litigation is lower levels of 
GST audit activity, but the evidence appears to suggest that audit activity is just as 
vigorous in Canada as in New Zealand.  
Assessment 
Overall the Canadian adjustment rules appear to have better administrative 
simplicity, visibility, predictability, coherence, and efficiency than New Zealand’s 
adjustment rules, but have poorer revenue adequacy and revenue integrity. If revenue 
considerations were not as important as compliance (which is what the New Zealand 
reform proposals have constantly emphasised), then New Zealand might have been 
expected to look towards Canada’s apportionment rules. The fact New Zealand has 
instead looked towards the Australian rules, would suggest revenue has been a much 
larger consideration in determining the New Zealand reform strategy, unless 
harmonisation of rules with Australia has been a major factor in the thinking of 
officials. 
C. The Apportionment Approach Experience 
Lessons from Australia 
The Australian apportionment model comprises two important elements: a use test 
(providing immediate up-front apportionment), and a statutory mechanism for 
capping the number of adjustments. In contrast, the former New Zealand adjustment 
rules comprised a principal purpose test (the gateway into the system) and a deemed 
supply mechanism. In both systems an apportionment is undertaken between the 
taxable and non-taxable part of the supply.  
How the apportionment is determined and how it is valued will determine the 
complexity of the system. There are two models. The first is a value parity (or “used-
up”) model that will only allow adjustments to be made until the total value of the 
adjustments equals the total value of the initial input tax claim. The second model is 
a disparate value model that disconnects the total value of the adjustment from the 
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total value of the initial input tax claim. This disconnect in total values allows the 
total value of adjustments to exceed the total value of the initial acquisition.  
Disparate models have no inherent mechanism to end the number of adjustments. 
The effect of the disparate model is accentuated when valuation methods are also 
disparate (eg initial acquisition is valued according to cost, but the adjustment values 
are derived from market value). The differences between the two models can also be 
described on the basis of the broader holistic approach of a “used-up” model that 
focuses on the initial acquisition, compared to a “disparate model” that is focused 
only on the adjustments.  
The Australian apportionment rules adopt a parity model7 that also caps the number 
of adjustments based on the value of the transaction, rather than the assets EUL (as 
done in the UK).8 In the UK, the revenue authority has declared that adjustments will 
not exceed the value of the initial tax credits, regardless how adjustments are valued. 
However, it also appears to have provided an additional cap on the number of 
adjustment that can be made, based on EUL.9  
Significantly, New Zealand has provided taxpayers the choice of either approach (ie, 
transaction value or EUL), but has excluded land from any additional capping 
mechanism. New Zealand has also not provided any additional differences in 
treatment in terms of the type of adjustment (eg, private or exempt) or type of entity 
(eg, financial or non-financial). 
In terms of safe harbour thresholds and de minimis rules, all three jurisdictions have 
adopted different approaches in their respective apportionment rules (see Table 5.1). 
While the Canadian approach appears to provide a very simple rule, it fails to 
accommodate low value changes and is therefore high in compliance costs for low 
                                               
7
  The model is embodied in the statutory calculation methodology that takes into consideration the 
initial input tax credit. An explanation of the calculation methodology is provided in GST Ruling 
2000/24. At present, there are no equivalent New Zealand rulings providing guidance. 
8
  In contrast, the former New Zealand adjustment rules (pre-Lundy) were a disparate model. 
However, post-Lundy, they were a parity model.  
9
  For example, if an asset has a 20 year EUL it means adjustments cannot go beyond this point in 
time, even if the value of the adjustments at the end of 20 years does not yet exceed the initial input 
tax claim. 
 224 
value assets. In contrast, the Australian and New Zealand approaches have more 
complex rules that have low compliance costs for low value assets, but higher 
compliance cost for higher value assets.  
Table 5.1: Comparison of De Minimis Rules in Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
 New Zealand Australia Canada 
Safe Harbour $5,000 $1,000 Nil 
De minimis    
Single supply 10% (NZ$1,000 cap)  10% 
Annual 5% (NZ$50,000 cap)* 5% (AU$90,000 cap) 10% 
* Proposal to increase to 10%. 
New Zealand appears to have closely followed the current Australian adjustment 
thresholds (see Table 5.2). However, it would appear that New Zealand’s 
apportionment rules have lower compliance costs than Australia for low value assets 
(eg, by adopting a higher safe harbour of $5,000 and a limited 10 per cent de 
minimis rule).  
Table 5.2: Comparison of Adjustment Thresholds in Australia and New Zealand 
Australia New Zealand 
Current Rules Proposed Rules From 1 April 2011  
Threshold Periods Threshold Periods Threshold Periods 
Non Business Finance  Private Use    
$0 - $1,000 0 $0 - $1,999 0 $0 - $5,000 0 
$1,001 - $5,000 * 2 $2,000 - $14,999 2 $5,001 - $10,000 2 
$5,001 - $499,999 5 $15,000 + 5 $10,001- $500,000 5 
$500,000 + 10   $500,001 + 10 
  $1,000,000 + ** 10   
Business Finance  Exempt Use    
$0 - $10,000 0 $0 - $19,999 0   
$10,001 - $50,000 * 2 $20,000 - $499,999 2   
$50,001 - $499,999 5 $500,000 + 5   
$500,000 + 10     
  $5,000,000 + ** 10   
* GST exclusive amounts. ** Applies to real property only.  
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Whether Australia adopts a dual EUL and transaction threshold approach is hard to 
judge given they have already gone down a two-streamed approach. Given 
submissions on the Australian reforms have already suggested adoption of EUL, and 
revised reform proposals have not accommodated them, it would appear unlikely. No 
doubt Australia will be watching New Zealand with interest if an EUL approach 
outperforms a two streamed reduced adjustment period approach in terms of 
compliance costs and efficiency.  
Lessons from Canada 
Canada has adopted a “used-up” model of adjustments that calculates adjustments 
based on cost, not market value. The Canadian model has not sought to further 
constrain the number of adjustments by using an adjustment period mechanism that 
restricts the number of adjustments based on either transaction value or EUL. Rather, 
it has mitigated costs through the adoption of an uncapped 10 per cent de minimis 
rule. In all other aspects, the rules are similar to “use” based apportionment rules in 
other jurisdictions.  
In relation to the apportionment methodology, all jurisdictions appear to recognise 
direct and indirect methods of apportionment. The New Zealand and Australian rules 
require a “fair and reasonable” estimate of use and also allow taxpayers to select a 
fair and reasonable method of adjustment (subject to the Commissioner’s prior 
approval and provided it has regard to the tenor of the calculation methodology 
provided in the apportionment rules). In Canada, the courts have chosen not to 
interfere in the adoption of a “fair and reasonable” method of apportionment, thus 
avoiding the need to pick the best method. This is a sound approach that reduces 
room for litigation or judicial inquiry, which is both efficient and reduces 
compliance costs. In Australia, the courts have to date focused on the scope of 
elements in an apportionment method, rather than the method itself, and this would 
appear to be consistent with the approach in Canada. 
Assessment 
Generally the Canadian rules are very simple to understand in mechanical terms 
(although the readability of legislative provisions has room for improvement). 
However, Australia’s apportionment rules appear to provide greater revenue 
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adequacy and revenue integrity than Canada. The Australian rules also enable more 
flexible valuation approaches which could be considered more efficient. However, at 
present, it would appear that New Zealand’s rules are the most efficient of all three 
jurisdictions and are more geared towards maximising existing accounting and 
income tax practices and therefore minimising compliance costs for businesses.  
D. Legislative Drafting 
Finally, consideration must be given to the drafting of the rules and Sir Kenneth 
Keith’s observations on the need to rewrite tax legislation:10 
“The four matters that I have mentioned, like the whole emphasis on plain drafting, are 
motivated by a number of considerations. One is simple efficiency. Time and money can be 
saved if legislation is written in a way which makes for ease of comprehension and, often as 
a consequence, a greater likelihood of compliance. Compliance costs are also reduced if the 
legislation does not have to be amended to take account of problems that were not 
appreciated because of the failure in any of the four respects.” 
The empirical evidence of this thesis and the observations from the Court of Appeal 
about the quality of drafting in the GST Act suggests that the New Zealand GST Act 
should be rewritten in plain language.  
E. Mapping Comparative Complexity 
A generalised picture (or matrix) of the three jurisdictions that compares policy and 
complexity (illustrated in Figure 5.1) can now be developed. The matrix uses 
litigation activity as a proxy for measuring policy complexity (horizontal axis) and 
FRE scores for measuring readability complexity (vertical axis).11 The left-hand side 
of the vertical axis are adjustment approaches, and the right-hand side of the axis are 
apportionment approaches. Those policy approaches closer to the centre are 
considered less complex than those further away.  
                                               
10
 K Keith “The Need to Rewrite Tax Legislation” (1997) 3 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law 
and Policy 96 at 98. 
11
 The New Zealand approaches (old and revised) are based on the same number of cases (46) as the 
revised rules merely codified earlier policy (see Chapter 1). The Canadian approaches are based on 
58 adjustment cases and 39 apportionment cases (see Chapter 3). The Australian apportionment 
approach is based on one Division 129 case (see Chapter 2).  
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Figure 5.1: Complexity Matrix 
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F. Conclusion 
Overall, an evaluation of the performance of the New Zealand’s change-in-use rules 
against tax policy criteria weighs heavily in favour of New Zealand adopting an 
apportionment approach in place of its former adjustment approach. During the 
course of the research undertaken on this thesis, the New Zealand Government 
finally decided to change to an apportionment approach. The comparative research 
undertaken in this thesis suggests that it has made the right policy choice. However, 
the empirical evidence in this thesis suggests that high priority should be given to 
rewriting the New Zealand change-in-use provisions, and indeed the GST Act as a 
whole, in plain language. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Goods and Services Tax Act Readability Table 
 Table: Readability of New Zealand GST Act 1985 (as at 19 December 2010)* 
 Sections Words Paras Sentence WPS Syllables SyPS FRE F-KGL G-Fog C-Liau SMOG Auto MS  
FRE 
MS  
F-KGL 
MS 
Words 
MS 
WPS 
 1 60 3 3 20 78 1.3 76.6 7.6 8.7 5.2 6 5.4 55.4 10.5 60 20 
Part 1 2                 
 2A  741 38 7 105.86 1162 1.57 -33.3 44.2 48 8.4 22.6 50.8 53.5 12.6 734 27.7 
 3 1245 47 8 155.63 2159 1.73 -97.8 65.6 69.7 11.9 32 78.6 33.2 17 1241 34 
 3A  652 34 6 108.67 968 1.48 -29.1 44.3 47.4 8.4 18.7 52.2 53.6 12.2 649 26.1 
 4 342 7 5 68.4 551 1.61 1.1 30.1 32.4 12.4 17.2 35.3 13.4 25.1 341 55.4 
 5 3233 92 42 76.98 4865 1.5 1.4 32.2 35 9.5 17.5 37.3 28 20.6 3223 45.3 
 5B  72 1 1 72 98 1.36 18.6 28.6 32.1 3.4 14.1 29.9 8.8 29.4 70 70 
 6 380 15 3 126.67 679 1.79 -72.9 54.9 57.7 11.7 31 63.9 26 15.4 376 23.3 
 7 6 1 1 6 6 1 116.1 -1.4 2.4 7.7 1.8 0.4 100 0 6 6 
Part 2 8 699 23 11 63.55 1059 1.52 14.2 27.1 30.5 10 16.6 31 27.5 19.5 698 40.7 
 8A  145 4 4 36.25 242 1.67 28.8 18.2 20.6 13 13.8 19.7 26.7 18.4 143 35.7 
 9 1212 33 8 151.5 1783 1.47 -71.4 60.9 65.3 9.9 24.8 74.9 44.3 16.8 1211 29.5 
 10 2245 72 31 72.42 3332 1.48 7.8 30.2 32.7 8.8 15.5 34.4 37.7 17.3 2235 37.6 
 11 1805 73 11 164.09 2686 1.49 -85.6 66 70.1 9 25.8 80.4 44.1 16.7 1801 38.8 
 11A  1540 58 6 256.67 2324 1.51 -181.4 102.3 107.8 10.4 33.7 127.8 45.9 14.4 1531 30.5 
 11AB  76 3 1 76 140 1.84 -26.1 35.8 37.8 14.5 21.5 40.8 3.4 20.4 75 31 
 11B  197 6 4 49.25 317 1.61 20.7 22.6 25.4 9.8 16 23.7 25.1 20.6 197 43.7 
 11C  338 12 7 48.29 537 1.59 23.4 22 25.3 10.7 15.5 23.9 36.5 16.8 337 34.8 
 12 1033 34 8 129.13 1538 1.49 -50.2 52.3 55.5 8.7 21.7 62.7 41.3 15 1032 30.5 
 14 565 27 4 141.25 869 1.54 -66.7 57.6 61.7 9.3 25 69.3 40.8 17 562 38.2 
Part 3 15 279 16 5 55.8 426 1.53 21 24.2 28.8 6.7 18 24.5 49 11.5 275 20.8 
 15B  328 13 6 54.67 499 1.52 22.6 23.7 26.5 9.1 15.2 25.8 41.6 14.9 327 30.1 
 15C  292 13 7 41.71 462 1.58 30.6 19.3 2.2 8.1 15.4 18.5 43.8 14.2 292 28.7 
 15D  151 6 4 37.75 230 1.52 39.7 17.1 20.1 8.8 13.2 17.1 42.4 14.5 150 29 
 15E  130 6 4 32.5 199 1.53 44.3 15.1 18.5 7.8 12.9 13.7 49.9 12.6 130 25.5 
 16 254 12 6 42.33 380 1.5 37.3 18.6 22.8 7.1 15.4 18.1 50.4 12.2 253 24.1 
 17 355 17 4 88.75 490 1.38 0 35.3 38.1 8.5 15.5 42.4 58 13.1 355 32 
 18 62 1 1 62 96 1.55 12.9 26.9 26.7 11 14.1 31 6 27.8 62 62 
 19 299 12 4 74.75 495 1.66 -9.1 33.1 35.9 11.3 21.1 37.7 46.4 11.1 299 17.5 
  19A  417 14 3 139 664 1.59 -69 57.4 60.9 10 25.8 68.7 39.3 15.3 413 30.3 
 19AB  57 3 1 57 93 1.63 10.9 25.9 27 8.8 16.3 26.7 38.3 13.3 56 22 
 19B  405 9 4 101.25 634 1.57 -28.4 42.4 46.2 11.6 22.9 51.1 16.9 23.3 405 50 
 19C  979 37 9 108.78 1433 1.46 -27.4 44.1 48.3 8.9 20.9 52.7 36.3 19.5 991 45.5 
 19D  181 5 3 60.33 252 1.39 27.8 24.4 27.2 7.9 13.7 27.7 42.7 16.5 178 37.3 
 20 1682 49 6 280.33 2559 1.52 -206.4 111.7 117.1 8.8 35.4 138.4 28 19 1678 39 
 20A  592 22 5 118.4 954 1.61 -49.7 49.6 53 11.5 25 59.6 37.3 15.3 590 35.4 
 20B  512 9 4 128 870 1.7 -66.8 54.4 60 12.1 31.1 64.9 7.4 27 512 59.5 
 20C  211 10 1 211 343 1.63 -144.9 85.9 91.2 10.4 34.3 105.1 40.4 12.8 216 21 
 20D  64 1 1 64 98 1.53 12.3 27.4 28.7 9.9 12.9 31.1 9.6 27.8 64 64 
 20E  88 3 1 88 117 1.33 5 34.4 36.1 6 10.1 40 69.7 6 88 10 
 20F  157 7 2 78.5 271 1.73 -18.9 35.4 40.6 12.1 25.6 40.1 39.2 15.1 157 29.5 
  21 561 15 5 112.2 814 1.45 -29.8 45.3 47.9 8.5 19.2 54.1 31.5 19 560 41.2 
 21A  113 6 3 37.67 191 1.69 25.6 19 21.4 13 14.9 20.5 38.6 12 113 17 
 21B  167 5 3 55.67 256 1.53 20.6 24.2 28 11.2 16.3 28 3.8 17.3 167 35.6 
 21C  167 7 4 41.75 252 1.51 36.8 18.5 22 10 13.8 20.1 50.3 12.4 167 25 
 21CB  89 3 1 89 128 1.44 -5.2 36.1 38.3 10.3 16.3 44 66.1 6.2 89 9 
 21D  90 3 1 90 136 1.51 -12.4 37.3 40.9 10.5 19.9 44.6 31 19.1 90 41 
 21E  313 16 4 78.25 441 1.41 8.2 31.6 34.5 8.4 14.7 37.1 52.1 13.3 312 29.5 
 21F  116 4 2 58 161 1.39 30.5 23.4 26 9.2 12.9 27.6 68.7 7.1 116 14 
 21G  212 7 5 42.4 315 1.49 38.1 18.5 22.1 9.2 13.9 19.8 42.1 15.9 211 34.6 
 21H  248 13 4 62 389 1.57 11.2 27.1 28.8 9.8 17 30.1 38 15.5 247 30.7 
 21I  388 13 5 7.6 575 1.48 2.7 32.2 35.4 8.7 17.2 37 38 17.1 388 37.2 
 22 285 8 1 285 420 1.47 -207.1 112.9 119.3 9.6 35.7 141.3 40.6 12.3 283 19 
 23 88 2 2 44 134 1.52 33.4 19.5 23.1 9.3 15.2 20.6 31.4 19.8 88 44 
 23A  112 2 2 56 161 1.44 28.4 23.2 26 6.9 14.1 24.7 15.5 25 112 56 
 24 1196 46 13 92 1827 1.53 -15.8 38.3 42.3 10.7 21.7 45.8 41.7 17.1 1192 38.9 
 24BA  274 18 4 68.5 412 1.5 10.1 28.9 33.1 11.3 17.9 34.5 51.6 12.1 275 24.5 
 24B  146 8 1 146 226 1.55 -72.3 59.6 63.6 10.2 25 72.3 43.8 14.5 145 30 
 25 1747 53 9 194.11 2626 1.5 -117.4 77.9 82.7 10 29.1 96.3 17.7 26.6 1747 63.7 
 25AA  351 13 3 117 542 1.54 -42.6 48.3 52.6 10 23.6 57.7 52 11.9 348 24 
 25A  130 5 2 65 209 1.61 4.8 28.7 30.9 10.9 18.2 32.4 24.2 20.3 130 42 
 26 494 14 4 123.5 724 1.47 -42.5 49.9 53.3 9.3 20.7 60.4 34.7 20.2 492 47.7 
 26A  79 6 2 39.5 115 1.46 43.6 17 20.4 7.9 12.3 17.3 82.2 5.7 79 16 
 Part 6 42 604 15 5 120.8 1020 1.69 -58.6 51.4 54.3 11.3 26.4 60.7 24.3 16.7 604 27.6 
 43 1574 43 11 143.09 2394 1.52 -67.1 58.2 62 9.8 24.9 70.6 23.9 22.2 1574 54.3 
Part 7 45 355 16 4 88.75 528 1.49 -9.1 36.6 39.4 8.1 19.5 42.1 58 11.4 355 25.2 
 46 530 27 7 75.71 888 1.68 -11.8 33.7 35.3 11.3 20.9 38.1 36.6 11.9 530 15.1 
 47 160 4 1 160 286 1.79 -106.8 67.9 72.3 12.3 35.3 81 0 32.6 160 69 
 48A  265 15 3 88.33 404 1.52 -11.8 36.8 40.3 9 19.6 42.5 43.8 15.6 265 34.3 
Part 8 51 847 20 7 121 1368 1.62 -52.6 50.7 54.2 11.2 26.3 60.7 9 26.1 839 56.8 
 51B  206 8 3 68.67 319 1.55 6.1 29.5 32.1 9.7 17.5 33.3 43.4 14.8 206 31 
 52 506 10 7 72.29 841 1.66 -7.1 32.2 35.7 11.9 22.3 36.8 8.8 25.7 505 55.2 
 53 278 11 2 139 36 1.57 -66.9 57.1 61.4 10.2 26.9 68.9 62.1 10.3 278 23 
 54 61 1 1 61 99 1.62 7.6 27.4 30.3 11.9 18.2 31.2 7.6 27.3 61 61 
Part 9 55 1190 44 10 119 1805 1.52 -42.3 48.7 53.1 9.4 24.2 58.2 38.7 17 1189 37.2 
 56 410 6 6 68.33 679 1.66 -2.6 30.6 35 12.6 21.6 35.5 0 30.6 410 68.3 
 56B  145 8 4 36.25 216 1.49 44 16.1 19.2 8.7 11.9 16.3 61.4 9.8 143 20.7 
 57 613 16 7 87.57 944 1.54 -12.3 36.7 40.1 9.5 19.8 42.6 35.8 17.5 613 37.5 
 58 488 12 7 69.71 878 1.8 -16.1 32.8 36.9 11.9 23.2 35.6 0 26.5 488 53.5 
 59 186 5 2 93 290 1.56 -19.5 39.1 42.6 9 21.5 44.9 13.3 26.2 186 60 
 60 769 20 7 109.86 1140 1.48 -30.1 44.7 48.8 9.6 21.6 53.8 39.8 17.2 767 38.4 
 61 32 1 1 32 45 1.41 55.4 13.5 15.3 8.7 8.3 14.1 42.1 15.3 32 32 
 61A  483 30 6 80.5 836 1.73 -21.3 36.2 39.9 11.6 22.9 40.8 29 16.8 483 30.6 
Part 11 75 495 13 5 99 814 1.64 -32.8 42.4 45.8 12.7 24.2 50.9 25.4 18.6 495 35.8 
 76 594 25 8 74.25 971 1.63 -6.8 32.7 35.7 10.1 20.1 36.4 28.6 18.9 594 39 
 77 56 1 1 56 78 1.39 32.2 22.7 24.5 9 10.1 26.4 30.6 22.8 56 56 
 78 811 16 6 135.17 1220 1.5 -57.6 54.9 58.7 10.2 23.6 66.9 27.2 20.3 810 43.8 
 78AA  1308 58 14 93.43 1896 1.45 -10.6 38 41.3 0.1 17.8 45.2 51 13.2 1306 28.7 
 78A  491 12 5 98.2 717 1.46 -16.4 39.9 43.8 9.4 20.5 47.9 47.1 16.9 491 41.2 
 78B  1678 60 10 167.8 2477 1.48 -88.4 67.3 71.2 9.1 24.4 82.4 43.3 15.2 1678 32.4 
 78BA  501 22 5 100.2 756 1.51 -22.5 41.3 44.7 9.8 19.7 49.1 39.7 15.3 501 30.6 
 78C  548 15 2 292 866 1.48 -215 115.8 120.7 8.7 31.6 144.2 0 3.1 584 79.5 
 78D  165 3 1 165 282 1.71 -105.2 68.9 75 11.9 34.8 83.2 0 30.7 165 67 
 78E  163 5 1 163 246 1.51 -86.3 65.8 70.1 9.5 25.6 80.3 24.9 19.9 162 41 
 79 140 7 2 70 240 1.71 -9.2 31.9 35.4 13.7 2.2 37.2 37.8 15.3 139 29.5 
Part 12 84 1164 29 6 194 1699 1.46 -113.6 77.3 81.7 8.8 27.8 95.2 29 21.3 1162 48.8 
 84B  335 10 4 83.75 471 1.41 2.9 33.7 34.8 7.2 15 38.8 28 21.4 330 48.7 
  85 382 10 3 127.33 489 1.54 -52.9 52.3 55.5 10.6 22.4 63.3 32 19.7 379 44 
 86 681 7 2 340.5 1016 1.49 -265 134.8 140.2 9 36.2 168.7 0 38.2 678 91.5 
Average   511.73 17.37 5.13 99.53 780.46 1.54 -25.08 41.66 44.87 9.71 20.24 49.16 34.91 17.39 510.93 37.58 
Median  338 12 4 87.57 495 1.52 -11.8 35.8 38.3 9.7 19.8 40.8 37.8 16.8 337 35.4 
Std Dev  541.72 17.96 5.42 61.09 817.85 0.12 62.88 23.71 24.71 2.02 7.03 30.34 18.66 6.37 540.54 15.78 
* Prior to assent of Taxation (GST and Remedial Matters) Act 2010. 
  
